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Abstract
One need only look at the list of the worlds most valuable rms, including Apple Inc. and
Microsoft, to understand that there is a link between innovation and success. However, little
has been done to explore why some rms are more innovative. In this thesis we explore one
possible reason that some rms are more innovative than others: innate ability.
The rst essay explores the importance of abilities on the innovative process, dened as
a rms ability to spot and implement new technologies. We observe that if the more able
rm possesses both an ability and timing advantage, it always becomes the dominant rm.
However, if an ex ante low ability rm has an investment timing advantage it can become
the ex post market leader if and only if the a priori ability gap is not too large.
The second essay analyses whether a rms incentive to agglomerate, when research
spillovers are location based, survives the existence of asymmetric abilities which may gen-
erate heterogeneous unit costs. First, we nd that agglomeration is never optimal, not even
when the rms are symmetric, due to the threat of rapidly escalating of price competition.
Second, where a rm is better able to both reduce its own costs and assimilate a rivals
economic knowledge, it becomes more aggressive in terms of both location and investment,
leading to increasingly asymmetric outcomes.
The third essay examines the impact abilities have on venture capital funding. Specif-
ically, we consider the impact of venture capital from the rms perspectives. We nd
evidence of both a direct and indirect impact of venture capital. Furthermore, we nd
that the commonly held assertion that venture capital spurs success is too vague. Instead,
venture capital only spurs innovation amongst the "lucky", chosen few, but unambiguously
suppresses innovation of non-VC-backed rms.
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Introduction
In recent decades, and with societys growing reliance on technology, the in-
novative abilities of rms have become an increasingly important factor in
driving and maintaining their success. In fact, one need only look at the list of
the worlds most valuable rms, which includes such notable - and innovative
- companies as Apple Inc., Exxon Mobil, Google and IBM, to notice that a
rms innovative e¤orts are positively correlated with their success (Forbes,
2013b). However, this idea is not just one held by economists but also by
those in charge of businesses themselves. In a survey of 216 worldwide exec-
utives, the Economist Intelligence Unit (2008, p.6) observed that "70% of ...
respondents [believed] product innovation [was] critical or very important to
maintaining corporate competitiveness", by reducing production costs, gen-
erating new customer opportunities, or both. However, despite the apparent
belief that innovation was crucial for success, a signicant (innovative) perfor-
mance gap persisted between rms. For example, 90% of the top performing
companies surveyed described themselves as successful or very successful at
driving innovation in new product development compared to only 33% for all
other respondents (Economist Intelligence Unit, p.6). A similar gap persisted
across the rms stated abilities to improve their manufacturing processes,
falling from 53% for the most innovative rms to only 20% for all others.
For an example of this disparity, one need only consider the market for
search engines in which, as of September 2013, Google controls approximately
89.7% of the global market (StatCounter, 2013). In contrast, its nearest ri-
vals, Bing, Yahoo! and Baidu, control a paltry 4.1%, 2.9% and 1.1% respec-
tively (StatCounter, 2013). Googles innovative success, and subsequent mar-
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ket dominance, has come from its active pursuit of an "innovative culture".1
This approach to innovation has played a crucial role in determining Googles
corporate culture, with two unique strategies standing out. First, their im-
plementation of "20% time", which enables employees to spend 20% of their
time working on individual side projects, allowing Google to reap the benets
of research pathways that would have otherwise been ignored (Forbes, 2013a).
Whilst this has now, to some extent, been reigned in, this has harboured a
creative and innovative atmosphere amongst its employees. In fact, the suc-
cess of this strategy has seen it implemented by other rms. Second, Google
has consistently promoted creative work spaces, once again hoping to attract
more innovative employees and boost innovative output (BBC, 2008). This
attention to detail and willingness to take risks has seen Google develop into
a creative powerhouse.
Whilst many rms try to mimic Googles strategies, very few are able to
turn these into sustainable success. The question is, then, why are rms that
are employing similar innovative strategies almost destined to diverge, with
some rms being consistently more successful. Obviously, neither a desire
to be innovative nor simply imitating a rivals innovation strategies is to be
enough to guarantee success. Therefore, in this thesis we explore one of the
reasons that may explain the innovation disparity between rms: innate ability.
In essence, this assertion is simple and assumes that some rms are more
likely to be innovative than others. Of course, the di¤erence in abilities could
also be driven by a wide range of factors, including but not limited to: the
research skills of employees; the quality of the equipment and raw materials;
or luck. This thesis examines three distinct ways in which abilities inuence
the strategic innovation decisions made by and the composition of the nal
product market.
Chapter 2 examines how abilities are important in inuencing the innova-
tive process (dened as the ability to spot and implement new innovative ideas)
and determining the composition of the nal product market. To the authors
knowledge, no attempt has been made to examine the innovative process in
this way. To do this, we propose a model of endogenous cost selection in which
1For example, see Googles "eight pillars of innovation" which o¤ers up advice including:
"strive for continual innovation, not instant perfection"; and "look for ideas everywhere"
(Google, 2013).
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rms are heterogeneous with respect to both their ex ante abilities to imple-
ment a cost reducing technology and their investment timings. In modelling
innovation in this way, it is possible to evaluate the importance of both invest-
ment timing and innovative ability in determining the composition of the nal
product market or, more interestingly, whether it is possible for an ex ante low
ability rm to become an ex post market leader. In doing this, we extend the
existing linear spatial literature in two ways. First, rms are a priori hetero-
geneous in respect of both their ability to implement cost reductions and the
timing of their investments. Second, the ex post cost di¤erential is endogenous
and determined by the strategic interactions of the rms.
The results suggest that abilities do, indeed, play a crucial role in determin-
ing which rm will be most innovative. To summarise: (i) if a rm possesses
both an investment timing and ability advantage it always becomes the ex post
e¢ cient rm; and (ii) if a rm possesses only an investment timing advantage,
it can become the ex post e¢ cient rm if and only if the a priori ability gap
is not too large. Our results appear to both agree with and extend upon the
existing literature. Whilst the results presented here agree that the ex post
low cost rm would emerge as the market leader, they also suggest that this
rm could be either the ex ante e¢ cient or the ine¢ cient rm. If, as here,
the rms are a priori heterogeneous with respect to their e¤ectiveness at re-
ducing costs and the timing of their investments then a rms unit cost is no
longer a measure of its e¢ ciency but, instead, a direct consequence of strategic
interactions given the rmsrelative e¢ ciencies (investment timing and cost
reduction e¤ectiveness).
Chapter 3 takes a slightly di¤erent approach and examines whether rms
of asymmetric abilities would ever nd it optimal to agglomerate. In essence,
we analyse whether a rms incentive to agglomerate, when research spillovers
are location based, survives the existence of asymmetric abilities which may
generate heterogeneous costs. To address this question we employ a three-
stage, innovation-location-price Hotelling (1929) model with quadratic trans-
port costs and make two key assumptions: i) the closer the rms are to each
other, the greater the benet they receive from their rivalse¤orts in R&D;
and ii) rms are a priori heterogeneous with respect to their innovative abili-
ties, dened as the ability to implement cost reductions and assimilate a rivals
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research (absorptive capacity). It is the assumptions, that the rms absorptive
capacities may di¤er, that is new to the literature.
We nd a couple of results that both complement and contrast with the
existing literature. First, contrasting to the existing literature, we nd that
the rms never nd it optimal to (partially) agglomerate, not even if the rms
are a priori symmetric. Instead, the problem of rapidly escalating price com-
petition drives the rms to maximal di¤erentiation, the classic dAspremont
et al (1979) result. Second, and complementing the existing literature, loca-
tion based spillovers, combined with asymmetric rms, leads to increasingly
asymmetric outcomes. This result is driven by the existence of heterogeneous
absorptive capacities. As the rms locate closer to one another, the more able
rm assimilates more knowledge than it leaks to its ine¢ cient rival, and this
allows it to become more predatory. In turn, this increases its ability to drive
a less able rm away from the market, generating greater demand and prots,
and this induces it to invest more. In contrast, a less able rms investment
strategy is related to the heterogeneity of the consumers: when consumers
become increasingly homogenous, the weaker rm must act "soft" to mitigate
price competition and minimise spillovers.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we examine the roles that abilities and venture capi-
tal play in spurring innovation and/or rm success. It has become established
in the empirical literature that venture capital plays an important role in the
promotion of innovation at industry level and the professionalisation of rms
at micro-level (Da Rin et al (2013)). However, whilst the venture capital-
to-success link has been well explored, the mechanisms behind how and why
certain venture-backed rms are, apparently, more successful is important and
has, to the authorsknowledge, been ignored within the majority of the lit-
erature. i) what impact does venture capital have on a rms incentives to
invest in innovation?; ii) how do rival, non-venture capital-backed rms re-
spond?; and iii) does the prospect of receiving venture capital funding in the
future, and its associated benets, spur innovation ex ante? To address these
questions, we consider a stylised two-period, multi-stage game in which inno-
vation is uncertain and rms are of di¤erent innovative abilities. In order to
simplify proceedings, we turn the tables on the existing literature and assume
that venture capital is exogenous or, like the rms of the empirical literature,
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passive. Nonetheless, we try not to lose any of the key features that venture
capital possesses. Therefore, we assume venture capital funding is a package
consisting of three things: i) an equity stake in the rm; ii) pecuniary funds;
and iii) value-adding services such as monitoring, implementing formal HR
procedures or improved marketing.
We nd evidence that venture capital plays an important role in the success
of a rm. First, the addition of venture capital also has a profound impact
on competition directly after it has been granted. In essence, venture capital
tips the balance of competition in favour of the rm that receives it, regard-
less of the rms relative ability level. It does this by inducing the venture
capital-backed rm to invest more and the rival rm less, improving the rela-
tive probability of success for the portfolio rm. Therefore, we suggest that the
commonly held belief that venture capital spurs innovation is too simplistic,
as it clearly damages the prospect of the rms it does not support. We also
nd, somewhat weaker, evidence for venture capitals impact on innovation
indirectly, prior to its provision. Whilst a number of these results suggest an
ambiguous impact of venture capital, this ambiguity should not be misinter-
preted as no e¤ect. Rather, one should interpret our indirect e¤ect results
more broadly: given the specication, it is likely that future venture capital
will have an impact on rst period e¤orts, though it is not possible to say
whether this impact is positive or negative. The reason for this is that venture
capitalists alter future expected payo¤s and, therefore, the rmsincentives to
invest.
The remainder of the thesis is set out as follows. In Chapter 1 we examine
the relevant literature. In Chapters 2 - 4 we present our essays on innovation
and ability. Chapter 5 concludes.
Chapter 1
Literature Review
1.1 Introduction
The research presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 has a clear focus on investment,
research and innovation by rms of asymmetric abilities. The theoretical and
empirical literature relating to investment and innovation has spread to al-
most every important economic concept and, consequently, this leaves a broad
spectrum of possible literature to explore. Our focus, however, spans only two
broad topics: i) Hotellings (1929) linear spatial model and horizontal product
di¤erentiation; and ii) venture capital and its links to innovation and success.
With regards to Hotellings (1929) model of linear spatial competition and
our research, two important observations have been clearly, and repeatedly,
made: i) linear spatial models are sensitive to their specication; and ii) ex
post cost asymmetries are supported in equilibrium if and only if they are
not too large. It is these rigorously explored observations that have been
crucial in allowing Hotellings (1929) model to become an important part of
the Industrial Economists toolbox. However, whilst much has been done to
examine the impact of innovation on a rms location decision, there is an
apparent need to incorporate the innovative process instead of maintaining
the status quo of exogenous cost di¤erentials. Only by explicitly examining
the investment decisions of asymmetric rms, and the subsequent innovative
outcomes, is it possible to understand how such ex post asymmetries arise and
their impact on the nal product market.
Second, we examine the literature examining the interactions, and their
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consequent outcomes, between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The ma-
jority of this subsection is focused purely on the empirical literature; a focus
that persists within the venture capital literature itself.1 Whilst we do ex-
amine some theoretical ideas, this literature is almost exclusively focused on
the deriving an optimal (convertible security) contract to incentivise both the
entrepreneur and venture capitalist to invest e¢ ciently. From an empirical per-
spective, similar results have been repeatedly observed: venture capital spurs
innovation at an industry level and success at rm level. However, regardless
of whether one examines the theoretical or empirical literature, there always
exists an unpalatable, implicit assumption: venture capitalists are the sole
drivers behind their interactions with entrepreneurs. Yet, surely this sugges-
tion must be incorrect because it tells only half of the story. Quite simply, the
literature has frequently, and implicitly, assumed that rms are passive enti-
ties in these interactions and, consequently, overlooked an important question:
how do rms respond to the prospect of receiving venture capital and how do
they behave afterwards?
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, section 1.2 examines the
literature pertinent to linear spatial competition, both broadly and related to
asymmetric rms. Second, section 1.3 explores the venture capitalist literature.
Finally, section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Spatial competition: a review
In this section, we examine literature regarding linear spatial competition.
More specically, the focus of this review is on two specic elements. First, we
examine the broad literature exploring linear spatial competition, à la Hotelling
(1929). In doing so, we examine why this model has become so widely used
within the industrial organisation literature but also uncovering some of the
issues that have led to oft-contradictory results.2 Second, we evaluate the
impact of asymmetric costs and research spillovers within the spatial compe-
1See Da Rin et al (2013).
2In an excellent review of the more general aspects of spatial competition, Biscaia and
Mota (2013, p.856) observe, "spatial competition models have seen regular growth in terms
of the number of publications. Furthermore, most of those models have been published in
journals with at least moderate impact."
1. Literature Review 15
tition literature. However, in this instance we do not simply focus on linear
spatial competition but also examine the role of other specications, most no-
tably Salops (1979) circular city model. This additional literature allows us to
demonstrate that the issues created by cost asymmetries are not the preserve
of linear spatial models but, instead, are present within other spatial settings.
The main conclusions can be summarised as follows. First, the spatial
competition literature suggests that it is, perhaps, the most useful tool for the
analysis of horizontal di¤erentiation. However, it is obvious that the speci-
cation of a Hotelling (1929) style model is important because it is naturally
susceptible to discontinuities and corner issues that one must take care to ad-
dress (Biscaia and Mota (2013)). Yet, the sheer volume of research into these
issues has considerably reduced the number of potential pitfalls that one might
unwittingly encounter. Second, the work on asymmetric costs yields an equally
interesting set of results, most notably that spatial competition can handle cost
asymmetries and, by extension, asymmetric rms. However, these models are
not without their issues. That is, even after accounting for the more specic is-
sues of spatial competition, where cost di¤erentials are su¢ ciently large, issues
of equilibrium existence still arise.
Hotellings (1929) model and extensions
Hotelling (1929) developed what has become one of the most inuential models
in industrial organisations, and the rst to really evaluate horizontal di¤eren-
tiation. In the model, consumers were uniformly distributed along a linear
"city" of unit length and purchased a single unit of a homogeneous good dif-
ferentiated only by their location. Each consumer, upon purchasing the good,
has to pay a linear transportation cost that represents cost of travelling to
collect their preferred good. For the rmspart, they simultaneously select
locations and then prices. The result suggested that the rms would be driven
to agglomerate in the centre of the market because, by moving towards their
rival in the location space, the could steal a rival rms market share. However,
such a conclusion is less than desirable because it leads to a situation in which
both rms earn zero prots; the "Bertrand (1883) paradox".
It is obvious that this model and its results are based on a number of
critical assumptions: i) linear transport costs; ii) rms locating within the
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citys boundaries; iii) homogeneous goods; iv) consumer densities; and v)
simultaneous moves at each stage. We examine the consequence of each of
these assumptions in turn.3
DAspremont et al (1979) (henceforth DGT), examined whether agglom-
eration was really the optimal outcome for rms by examining the role that
transport costs play in equilibrium. By replicating Hotellings (1929) model,
but replacing linear transport costs with ones that were quadratic in distance,
the results were completely reversed. The issue, they found, was that dis-
continuities existed in the original specication where an indi¤erent consumer
was not located between the two rms and the application of quadratic trans-
port costs solved this by eliminating discontinuities in the reaction functions.
Therefore, whilst rms still had an incentive to locate towards the centre (a
direct, market stealing e¤ect), these were more than countered by rapidly in-
tensifying price competition (an indirect, price e¤ect). Thus, the rms prefer
to locate at the opposite extremes of the market.
The importance of the transport cost specication have also been explored
by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) and Anderson (1988). Analysing a Hotelling
(1929) model where transport costs contain both linear and quadratic com-
ponents, they concluded that no price equilibrium existed when the rms are
located too close together and in most cases no location-price equilibrium ex-
isted at all. Again, discontinuities in the reaction functions - identical to those
found by dAspremont et al (1979) - undermine equilibrium and can only be
removed by eliminating the linear portion of the transport cost (Anderson,
1988). In related work, Economides (1986) examined Hotellings (1929) model
using "intermediate" transport costs; between linear and quadratic. Formally,
the model assumes that for a given distance between the rms, d, the transport
cost should be such that f(d) = d where  2 (1; 2).4 The results suggest that
whilst minimal di¤erentiation never obtains, maximal di¤erentiation is not the
only outcome. That is, for a range of  2 (1; 2) it is concluded that rms may
locate somewhere between the maximal and minimal locations. These results
3Other assumptions are made within this model, for example duopoly market and com-
plete information. However, they are not crucial for Chapters 2 and 3 so, for the sake of
brevity, we ignore them here. The more interested reader may with to see Biscaia and Mota
(2012) for a full discussion of all the assumptions.
4Setting  = 1 or 2 is consistent with Hotellings or DGTs models respectively.
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point to one important result: it is the degree of convexity of transport costs,
not convexity per se, that ensures continuous reaction functions and once these
are established minimal di¤erentiation never obtains.
At this point, it is worth noting that the specication of the transport cost
function says something about the types of cost consumers face. With linear
transportation costs, it is realistic to assume that such costs are simply physi-
cal, shoe-leather costs. In contrast, quadratic transport costs better represent
consumer tastes/disutility (Biscaia and Mota (2013)). Nonetheless, given the
obvious importance of transport costs for the existence of equilibrium, it is
likely be that Hotellings (1929) model handles information about a product
characteristics better than physical locations.
To this end, Hotellings (1929) model has been expanded to incorporate
multi-dimensional product characteristics. Irmen and Thisse (1998), extends
the DGT model by allowing for an n-dimensional product space in which
consumers may have a preferred product characteristic. They nd that where
consumers prefer one product characteristic su¢ ciently more than the others,
both rms maximise di¤erentiation in this one product space and minimise
di¤erentiation in all others. That is, maximising product di¤erentiation across
a single product characteristic may be su¢ cient to soften price competition
enough to support minimal di¤erentiation across all others. This prompts
them to conclude that "Hotelling was almost right" because both minimal
and maximal di¤erentiation occur within the same model despite the use of
quadratic transport costs.5 A similar result is derived by Ben-Akiva et al
(1989) but, in this model, each rm locates within a linear city but is also
given a "brand" - essentially another product characteristic. Similar to Irmen
and Thisse (1998), they nd agglomeration only occurs if brand heterogeneity
is su¢ ciently large or price competition is softened su¢ ciently to allow them to
both locate in the centre of the market without exacerbating price competition.
Consumer densities also play a crucial role in determining the locations of
the rms. Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) examine what occurs if the original uni-
form density were replaced by a triangular density with the peak at the centre
point of the market. Under this assumption, "when the density is concave,
5Tabuchi (1994) had previosuly found an identical result but only within a 2-dimensional
product space.
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symmetric and not too muchdi¤erent from the uniform density, there ex-
ists a unique Nash location equilibrium" in which rms locate symmetrically
(Tabuchi and Thisse, 1995, p.223). However, when concavity is "excessive"
only asymmetric equilibria exist, despite the model remaining symmetric. An-
derson et al (1997) nds similar results using log-concave density functions
observing that symmetric equilibria exist if and only if the distribution of
consumers is neither too asymmetric nor too concave. When the density func-
tion is too concave, similar to Tabuchi and Thisse (1995), only asymmetric
equilibria exist.
Tabuchi and Thisse (1995), and Lambertini (1994, 1997) also examine the
possibility that rms can locate outside of the market.6 Given a quadratic
transport cost function to ensure an equilibrium, the models suggest that price
competition is so erce that the rms would prefer to locate outside of the
market. Formally, for an unbounded city with consumers uniformly distributed
over [0; 1], the result is a symmetric equilibrium in which the rms locate at
 1=4 and 5=4 respectively. Intuitively, this result is driven by the contrasting
forces discussed within the DGT framework: i) direct e¤ects (market stealing);
and ii) strategic e¤ects (exacerbating price competition). Given that rms
strictly prefer to locate outside of the citys boundaries, it is clear that the fear
of exacerbating price competition is, indeed, incredibly strong.
The author has found this assumption to yield the most vocal complaints
and divide opinion. Whilst such a scenario is easy to imagine for physical
locations, for example out-of-town retailers, exploring this assumption within
the framework of consumer tastes is less intuitive. As an example, imagine a
city bounded by [0; 1] where 0 represents "sweet" chocolate and 1 represent
"bitter" chocolate. The existence of rms outside of the consumer distribution
simply suggests that rms produce product types that were either unknown
by consumers ex ante or that the rms produce goods that are not the exact
preference of any consumer. Whilst this is not good from a social welfare
perspective, there is no reason why rms cannot, or should not be able to,
produce goods that are not meet any single consumers specic preferences.
Finally, Lambertini (2002), examines the impact of sequential entry into
the Hotelling model and evaluates the impact that time between moves plays
6Under this assumption the rms are free to locate anywhere along the real axis.
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on the location choices of each rm. Within the paper he notes that within
single-period Stackelberg games the equilibrium collapses to the simultaneous
move (maximal di¤erentiation) game due to the severity of price competition.7
However, as the time between the rmsmoves increases, the closer to the
centre the Stackelberg leader locates with the late entrant locating at one
extreme end of the market.
The main conclusion to be drawn regarding the basic, linear-city model as
proposed by Hotelling (1929) is that it o¤ers a malleable and useful tool for
examining the impact of horizontal di¤erentiation on product market compe-
tition. However, as can be seen from extension work, it is not a completely
predictable tool and can be particularly sensitive to the specication of the
model. Moreover, even a slight tweak to the original models specication
can have huge implications for equilibrium solutions and welfare implications.
However, the linear spatial model - with complete information - has seen much
work done to evaluate all the possible implications and is now well understood
(Biscaia and Mota (2013)). Consequently, potential pitfalls have been well
mapped and this has strengthened the importance of spatial competition as a
tool for industrial economists to draw upon in evaluating horizontal di¤eren-
tiation.
Asymmetric costs
Schultz and Stahl (1985) were the rst to propose an examination of the reasons
for non-existent equilibrium within linear spatial models other than mill price
undercutting or transport cost issues. After observing that payo¤s are not
determined by the rmslocations per se but the distance between them, they
explore reasons that may push rms from established equilibria and note that
asymmetric production technologies were a likely cause. Ziss (1993) formalised
this idea, analysing exogenous cost asymmetries within a DGT model. The
model implied that, despite price equilibria existing for all cost di¤erentials, a
location equilibrium can only be supported where the cost di¤erential between
the rms is not too large. Matsumura and Matsushima (2009) then proposed
two extensions. In the rst, they allow the rms to locate anywhere on the real
7See also Nevin (1987) and Bonnano (1987)
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axis, nding the rms optimally choose to locate asymmetrically outside of the
city with the low cost (e¢ cient) rm locating more centrally.8 Second, they
questioned whether pure strategies are the only equilibria within this model,
observing that for all "large" cost di¤erentials a solution in mixed strategies
always existed. Intuitively, for large cost di¤erentials the equilibrium becomes
an e¤ective game of "cat and mouse" with the ex ante e¢ cient rm attempting
to prevent entry by locating next to the ine¢ cient rm and the ine¢ cient rm
trying to get away.
It is for this reason that the Hotelling (1929) model is [assumed] incon-
venient for investigating endogenous production costsas a full examination
of location equilibrium conditions is di¢ cult to obtain (Matsumura and Mat-
sushima, 2009: p216). Nonetheless, from a theoretical standpoint, the exis-
tence of mixed strategy solutions may explain di¤erences in market structure
across seemingly similar markets; especially where rms face asymmetric costs.
Bester et al. (1996), using a DGT model, nd an innity of mixed strategy
equilibria and argues that, without some coordination mechanism, rms face
a strictly positive probability that they would locate at the same point. Thus,
where rms face asymmetric production costs, simple coordination failure can
be the di¤erence between a high cost rm remaining in the market or being
driven out of business. Whilst this result is intuitive, Martin (2001) o¤ers an
alternative - and equally depressing argument for this result. If rms do not
randomly select locations but make such decisions in private, this would create
the same propensity for coordination failure and drives a similar result.
Unfortunately, within these models no rms select their own costs but,
instead, are randomly assigned as either the high or low cost rm. Whilst
some work has been done to examine endogenous cost selection within a linear
spatial setting, more often than not they make assumptions that prevent cost
di¤erential undermining equilibrium outcomes. Matsumura and Matsushima
(2004) and Kumar and Saha (2008) examine cost reduction decisions where
one rm is publicly owned and the other privately. Where the level of public
ownership is high, the private rms costs will become lower than those of the
public rm due to its excessive investment and the public rms incentive to
8Given that the rms are also able to locate further from one another a larger cost
disparity is supported than in Ziss(1993) original specication.
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maximise social welfare. However, when the level of public ownership is low,
the standard DGT result obtains. Therefore, in this framework, it is possible
that the incentives of the rms never clash and asymmetric rms can compete
without issue. Similarly, Matsumura and Matsushima (2010a, 2010b) also
acknowledge that any level of cost di¤erential can be supported if the rms
are able to license their innovations. Quite simply, the lower cost rm licenses
its innovation to a high cost rm but extracts all of its rivals prots in the
process, again preventing a clash of incentives.
One reason that might explain this dearth of cost reduction literature
within the linear spatial eld is that there has been a much greater focus on
models that examine spillovers. Building on the seminal works of dAspremont
and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al (1992), who introduced the concept of
exogenous spillovers, much headway has been made analysing the implications
of endogenising spillovers within a spatial setting.9 The addition of spillovers
to spatial models is a good match because it is often assumed that spillovers
should only act locally, or inversely proportional to the distance between the
rms. Moreover, anecdotal evidence, such as agglomeration in Silicon Valley,
are often cited as examples of rms agglomerating in order to benet from
positive spillover e¤ects between local rms.
Mai and Peng (1999) were the rst to use a linear spatial setting to ex-
amine the incentives for rms to invest in cost-reduction if spillover rates are
inversely proportional to the distance between the rms. The equilibrium bal-
ances both competitive and cooperative forces, similar to the original DGT
results. However, now the lure of additional cost reductions through spillovers
o¤er rms an added incentive to locate closer to one another and, when the
cooperative force becomes dominant, it is possible that minimal di¤erentiation
is restored. Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005) examine a similar model but
assume R&D is quality-improving. Again, the spillover rate is linked to the
distance between the rms but, in this case, is never su¢ ciently large to lead
9See Kamien and Zang (2000), Amir et al (2003) and Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) for
examples of endogenous spillovers outside of a location setting.
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to agglomeration.10 ; 11
Zhang and Li (2013), similar to Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) and
Kumar and Saha (2008), examine a public-private rm relationship with in-
novation spillovers. They nd that the spillover rate is the key determinant
of whether it is the public or private rm that invests more. For su¢ ciently
small spillover rates the Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) result holds. How-
ever, above a certain level the public rm is induced to heavily invest in
cost reduction in order to maximise social welfare. In addition, the private
rm suppresses investment with high spillovers in order to maximise its prof-
its. However, neither agglomeration nor maximal di¤erentiation are supported
equilibria.
Despite all of this work within the linear spatial eld, much has been done
in non-linear markets, especially using a Salop (1979) model. Salop, in an
attempt to mitigate the corner di¢ culties associate with Hotellings (1929)
model, analysed a model in which consumers were located around a circular
city. Whilst the paper does not analyse a two-stage location-price game, as-
suming locations to be exogenous, it has been inuential in opening up new
avenues of spatial research.
Within such a framework, both Aghion and Schankerman (2004) and Syver-
son (2004) analyse exogenous cost asymmetries and the impact of public policy
aimed at intensifying competition. Both apply a Bayesian set-up, with rms
knowing only their own (stochastic) production costs and assume prices are
set prior to learning their rivalslocations and costs; though the distribution
of costs are common knowledge. Similar to the linear spatial literature, an
issue again arises due to the potential for price undercutting. Syverson (2004)
assumes that an Eaton and Lipsey (1978) "no mill-price undercutting rule"
10Interestingly, Sun (2013) nds no di¤erence between cost-reducing or quality-improving
R&D. Using a three-stage (location-investment-price) model, with linear, endogenous
spillovers dependent on distance, Sun (2013) evaluates the di¤erences between the two
R&D types. They conclude that there exists a duality between cost-reducing and quality-
improving investments given symmetric conditions and knowing one outcome allows a simple
derivation of the other.
11A number of papers also examine similar models but within a location-quantity setting.
The results are similar, suggesting that the spillover rate plays a key role in determining
the locations of the rms, but the models are su¤ciently divergent in their approach to
not completely t within our discussion. Consequently, they are ommited (see Long and
Soubeyran (1998) and Mota and Brandão (2004)).
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must be satised, similar to that derived by Ziss (1993). This assumption
ensures that each rm always faces a positive market share in any state of the
world. However, it is observed that heightened competition makes it harder
for ine¢ cient producers to operate protably and high cost rms are forced
out of the market.12
Aghion and Schankerman (2004) take a di¤erent approach and assume that
decisions are based upon average costs which, as noted by Alderighi and Piga
(2010), suggests rms only needs a positive market share on average. Under
these conditions similar results obtain regarding the structure of the market
and market entry. However, they add the benets from enabling increased
competition come in three forms: i) high cost rms face reduced market shares;
ii) increased incentives to reduce costs; and iii) stimulating entry by new
low cost rms. Nonetheless, Aghion and Schankermans (2004) assumptions
regarding the rmsdecisions are not strong enough as the result imply that
some rms may have negative market shares in equilibrium (Alderighi and Piga
(2010)). This occurs because, by ignoring the possibility that one rm may
be able to undercut another, "a highly e¢ cient rms reach could potentially
extend beyond its nearest neighbours position" (Alderighi and Piga, 2008,
p.3).
It is also possible to extend these result by allowing rms to select their
own locations. Vogel (2008) adds endogenous locations to this framework and
observes that more e¢ cient rms are more isolated in equilibrium. However,
most intriguing is the result that the marginal cost of its rival does not matter
per se, but does through the mechanism by which it alters the average marginal
cost, whether or not they are direct competitors.
Research into endogenous cost reductions within a Salop framework have
also been attempted. Scalera and Zazzaro (2005) examine the impact of chang-
ing market conditions on a rms incentives to reduce their costs. They nd
that cost reducing investments are increasing in market size and entry costs.
In related work, Ebina and Shimizu (2012) allow rms to invest in both cost-
reducing and quality-improving R&D. In line with the literature on multiple
dimensions, rms only di¤erentiate in one aspect, cost reduction. Whilst,
12Syverson (2004) also tests his results empirically and observes persistent productivity
di¤erences. This is chalked up to "spatial substitution barriers" (Syverson, 2004, p.1218).
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strictly speaking, minimum di¤erentiation is not achieved in either dimension
they suggest that the idea is, essentially, the same.
To summarise, the cost asymmetry literature is not without its issues. How-
ever, it is comforting to note that the problems that create di¢ culties in the
linear spatial cases are also an issue in the circular city model. The most no-
table similarity is that, regardless of the spatial setting, one must make one
crucial assumption: an Eaton and Lipsey (1978) no mill-price undercutting
condition. However, what has been noted in the linear spatial models is that,
even where a pure strategy location equilibrium cannot be guaranteed, a mixed
strategy solution must exist. Such a result is not yet present within a Salop
framework.
1.3 Venture capital and innovation: a review
In this section we consider literature linking venture capital (henceforth VC)
backing to greater levels of innovation and success amongst VC-backed rms.
Rather than examining all literature relevant to venture capital, we take an
empirically focused approach to help us derive a theoretical model (see Chap-
ter 4) that captures the reasons why such a link exists. Whilst we do examine
some theoretical literature, we do this to highlight two points: i) the theoret-
ical literature is focused on the derivation of optimal contracts; and ii) there
is an implicit assumption that the venture capitalist drives this relationship.
Obviously, this dearth of theoretical literature within our review may overlook
some relevant theoretical ideas but, given the nature of empirical research, we
should still capture relevant theoretical ideas that we have omitted.
After examining a cross-section of the theoretical literature, we examine
the empirical observations which can be split into three broad areas. First,
we examine the impact of VC at an industry level, observing a consistent
link between VC-backing and innovation. Second, we examine the impact of
venture capitalists on individual rms. The results here are also consistent:
VC does not spur innovation amongst individual rms but does, in general,
lead to stronger rm performance. Finally, we evaluate the empirical evidence
that suggests why VC may help spur success; through a hands-on approach
and their provision of value-adding services.
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1.3.1 Theoretical literature
The bulk of the theoretical VC literature focuses heavily on how the design
of optimal contracts can drive e¢ cient investment by an entrepreneur and an
optimal level of involvement by a venture capitalist. At the heart of this discus-
sion has been the increasing realisation that the venture capitalists contract
of choice involves convertible securities: a debt-like security which the ven-
ture capitalist has the option to convert into an equity-like security. However,
such contracts are rarely used by more traditional nancing methods or, as
Schmidt (2003, p.1140) observes, "convertible securities are very rarely used
by banks or other outside investors who nance the bulk of small (but more es-
tablished and less risky) companies". Consequently, the established literature
examines how convertible securities impact the venture capitalist-entrepreneur
relationship in three ways: i) how such contracts act as an impetus for venture
capitalists to exert their own, uncontractible e¤ort; ii) how venture capital-
ists decide to renance or liquidate existing deals; and iii) how such contracts
a¤ect control rights (the rights a venture capitalist may have over a portfolio
rms decisions). We examine i) and iii) in turn.13
First, Schmidt (2003) examines a double moral hazard model in which a
venture capitalist only exerts e¤ort after an entrepreneur has done so. With
convertible contracts, a venture capitalist will only exert e¤ort if they have
exercised their conversion rights, and this will only happen if the entrepreneur
has exerted enough e¤ort initially. Therefore, conversion acts as a way of
inducing both agents to invest e¢ ciently.14 Using a similar double hazard
model, Hellman (2006) argues that convertible securities may take many forms
- not simply debt-to-equity - and explores the case in which nal outcomes
may di¤er based on the exit decision of the venture capitalist (either by IPO
or acquisition). The main nding is that such cash ow rights do, indeed,
di¤er between the two exit cases. In the IPO case the entrepreneurs equity
stake is automatically preserved (and this ensures e¢ cient investment) but, for
13We ignore the question of renancing as this is irrelavent to our model in Chapter 4.
However, an interested reader may wish to read Repullo and Suarez (2004) and Dessí (2005),
both of which nd convertible securities to be optimal in the renancing decision.
14See also Casamatta (2003) who examines the possibility of an outsider o¤ering value-
adding services and that the provision of convertible contracts is dependent on the level of
"advice" given.
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acquisitions, additional cash ow rights (additional payments from the rms
future prots) are allocated to the venture capitalist.
Second, within an incomplete contracting framework, Berglöf (1994) found
an intuitively appealing result in which control rights are given to the entre-
preneur in good states and the investor in bad states. Simply, when things
are less risky, there is less need for a venture capitalist to "step in". However,
more recently, Cestone (2002) examined a model in which cash ow rights
and control rights are o¤ered independently and nd: i) these rights follow a
joint pattern; and ii) risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control
rights. The latter result, it is argued, is driven by the inclusion of contractual
contingencies: by appropriately designing a contract, entrepreneurs can induce
venture capitalist e¤ort and limit interference. However, one big issue with
this body of literature is that control rights are not discrete - to be o¤ered only
to a venture capitalist or entrepreneur - but are instead a specic set of voting
rights that proportionally divide control. To this end, de Bettignies (2008)
examines a model with an additional element of joint control and nds that
convertible contracts work well in this situation, especially where the e¤orts of
a venture capitalist and entrepreneur complement each other well.
Whilst a lot has been done regards contracting - including optimally induc-
ing entrepreneur and VC e¤ort - the literature still ignores many key questions.
The most obvious is how, given the apparent usefulness of convertible contracts,
would rms react ex ante and ex post to the potential opportunity to accept
such deals. If such contracts induce optimal levels of e¤ort, then surely this
would also act as an incentive for rms to invest more e¢ ciently even prior
to being o¤ered such a contract. However, as is also the case in the empirical
literature, the rms are assumed to be passive.
1.3.2 Empirical Literature
Before reviewing the empirical literature linking VC to increased innovation, we
observe that testing this hypothesis is fraught with endogeneity issues because
VC and innovation are linked in two opposing ways (Hirukawa and Ueda (2011)
and Da Rin et al (2013)).15 On the one hand, VC may lead to a direct
15See also Sørensen (2007)
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increase in innovation through the provision of value-adding services, such as
monitoring the rms performance or professionalising the rm (VC-rst). On
the other hand, with greater levels of innovation one would also expect venture
capitalists to have more opportunities to fund innovative rms (innovation-
rst). This endogeneity issue has been dealt with particularly well at industry
level, using changes to VC legislation to remove the issue of innovation-rst VC.
At rm level, this issue is harder to remove because it would require examining
a mixture of rms that are randomly assigned VC (Dessí and Yin (2010)).
This, then, may go some way to explaining why the VC-to-innovation link is
observed regularly in the industry level data and not in rm level analysis,
though this still demonstrates better performance post-VC funding.16
Industry level
At the industry level, Kortum and Lerner (2000) were the rst to observe a
signicant link between VC funding and innovation. Examining data across 20
US manufacturing industries between 1965-92, they estimated the impact that
VC funding had on patent counts. To remove the possibility that innovation
may drive growth in VC funding, they split the data using a 1979 clarication
to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act that allowed pension funds
to invest in venture capital. This sudden expansion in VC funds was, therefore,
unrelated to technological progress and o¤ered a natural way of examining a
link from VC to innovation. Their conclusion was clear, despite only account-
ing for less than 3% of corporate R&D, VC accounted for 8% of innovation in
the US during the relevant period.
Hirukawa and Ueda (2008) replicated these results using data across 19
US industries but a longer time period (1968-2001). These results were more
pronounced and survived a period of extremely high VC-growth in the late
1990s. However, using total factor productivity (TFP) as a measure of inno-
vation they nd VC has no impact. Hirukawa and Ueda (2011) then explicitly
test which way Granger-causality runs: VC-rst or innovation-rst? Using
both patent counts and TFP as measures of productivity, they observe mixed
16This interesting issue is also picked up by Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2001) when they
observe that some of the most succesful high-tech innovators in the US, such as Microsoft
and Apple Computers, have beneted from VC backing.
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results. Within the patent data results, they nd no evidence for either hy-
pothesis. In contrast, using TFP o¤ered evidence for both hypotheses. These
nal results are an important observation within the literature as they suggest
a keen understanding of intertemporal e¤ects is important within this analysis.
Similar results exist within Europe. Popov and Roosenboom (2009), exam-
ining data across 21 European economies between 1991-2004, estimating that
whilst private equity investment accounts for 8% of aggregate industrial spend-
ing (R&D and private equity), it accounts for between 8-12% of innovation.
Popov and Roosenboom (2012) then conduct a similar study but examine the
VC-impact disparity between high- and low-VC economies. They nd that,
even within Europe, VC can be a potent stimulus for innovation - at similar
levels to the US - but this only holds for high-VC economies. Specically,
they found that within economies with more VC-friendly structures (i.e. lower
barriers to entrepreneurship or lower taxes on capital gains) private equity ac-
counts for around 3.9% of corporate R&D spending but 10.2% of innovation.
Work by both Faria and Barbosa (2013) and Geronikolau and Papachistou
(2012) use European data to check which direction Granger-causality runs.
Similar to the work of Hirukawa and Ueda (2011), both hypotheses receive
some empirical support.
These empirical studies suggest that venture-capital does appear to play a
crucial role in harbouring innovation at industry level. More importantly, de-
spite VCs relatively small stake in the funding of R&D, it has become widely
accepted that it has played a huge part in the success story of US innovation
(Dessí and Yin (2010)). Worryingly, the US approach has been seen as cru-
cial to the promotion of VC across the globe, without really understanding
how it promotes such impressive levels of innovation. Therefore, at a macro-
level, there is much to be done to fully understand the impact of numerous
macroeconomic factors on VCs success before employing such sweeping policy
changes.17
17It is important to note that Popov and Roosenboom (2012) do hint that venture capital
may be impacted by public policy within an economy. However, they do not examine this
specically.
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Firm level
At rm level, VC appears to have no link to innovation per se but does appear
to have other, real impacts on a rms potential for success. It has been
argued that this lack of evidence with regards to innovation may be caused by
rm-level endogeneity - i.e. "forward-looking selection e¤ects" (Da Rin et al,
2013). That is, empirical work in this area compares similar VC- to non-VC-
backed rms to minimise the impact of potential selection bias. However, in
comparison to the industry-level analysis, it is much harder to completely, or
even satisfactorily, eliminate this problem. In fact, as Dessí and Yin (2010)
despair, the only way to truly eliminate such an issue would be to randomly
assign a group of rms a variety of nancing sources which, obviously, is not
possible.
Hellman and Puri (2000), using a selection of survey and commercially
available data for 173 hand-picked Silicon Valley start-ups, observe that rms
pursuing an innovator strategy are more likely to obtain VC funding and see a
reduction in time needed to bring a product to market. Most intriguing, how-
ever, is their assertion that, "rms are more likely to consider VC a milestone
event than obtaining nancing from some other kind of nancier" (Hellman
and Puri, 2002, p.962). Though a reason for this is not given, all three of these
ndings are consistent with a venture capitalist possessing at least one of two
skills: i) a higher ability to seek out innovative rms ex ante; or ii) o¤ering ben-
ets beyond those of traditional nance methods through the use value-adding
services ex post. Also using US rm level data, Puri and Zarutskie (2012) com-
pare VC- and non-VC-backed rmsgrowth rates. Whilst the results suggest
that VC may be irrelevant in the creation of new rms (accounting for only
0.11% of new rms), they note consistently faster growth, though this does
not necessarily translate into larger prots. Peneder (2010), using data on 132
Austrian rms, found similarly impressive results: VC-backed rms grew 70%
quicker than equivalent non-VC-backed rms.
Two studies o¤er potential explanations for these results. First, Chem-
manur et al (2011) examine US census data and observe TFP is signicantly
higher both pre- and post-VC compared to non-funded rms. Therefore, it
may be that VC selection e¤ects are being captured and that venture capi-
talists simply back those rm predisposed to grow faster. However, Da Rin
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and Penas (2007), using Dutch data, nd that TFP growth is signicantly
larger with VC-backing because venture capitalists push their portfolio rms
into adopting more in-house R&D practices as well as investing in absorptive
capacity. Consequently, even though pre-selection e¤ects may be captured,
these may not completely undermine the rm level growth results but suggest
they are simply upwardly biased.
To examine whether ex ante or ex post e¤ects are important, Kaplan et al
(2009) and Baum and Silverman (2004) examine the characteristics that at-
tract venture capitalists to certain rms. Kaplan et al (2009) examine whether
venture capitalists are more likely to back "the horse" (the rms business idea)
or "the jockey" (the management team). They observe that whilst VC-backed
rms do, indeed, grow much faster, it was the business idea - not management
team - that was the most important factor.18 Baum and Silverman (2004),
using data on 204 Canadian biotechnology start-ups and 407 incumbents, ex-
amine whether venture capitalists "pick" (ex ante selection) or "build" (ex post
mentoring) their chosen rms. They nd a combination of both e¤ects with
venture capitalists more likely to invest in rms that have demonstrated some
innovation (alliance participation or patents) and, thereafter, they perform
better.19
Our biggest criticism of this literature is not that it is impossible to com-
pletely remove selection bias but, instead, that rms are treated in a rather
unusual way. Whilst venture capitalists o¤er various levels of funding and
value-adding services, the decisions of the rms are completely ignored. Da
Rin et al (2013) are especially scathing about this issue with respect to its ex
ante implications. They argue that given the potential benets hinted at in
the empirical literature it would make sense that rms were not passive pre-VC
but would rather change their initial actions to improve the likelihood of ob-
18In a related result, Wasserman (2003) nds that manager turnover is more likely when
managers have succesfully developed a product rather than when they have performed
poorly. Simply, once a rm has developed, the skills that made the initial CEO so suc-
cesful in developing a product or idea may be less important once the rm faces a di¤erent
scenario.
19In related literature, there is some evidence that venture capitalists attempt to eliminate
asymmetric information before making such as choice. Dahiya and Ray (2011) and Hoenen
et al (2012) suggest that a venture capitlaist may use a range of signals, for example patents,
to screen weaker rms before choosing either the "horse" or the "jockey."
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taining this competitive advantage. It is this underlying assumption that, from
an industrial organisations point of view, we object to and one that may un-
derstate the benets of VC in spurring innovation by ignoring pre-VC success
driven by the lure of future benets.
Value adding services
Given the overwhelming body of evidence that VC-backed rms are more suc-
cessful and industries more innovative, the question should be why do we
observe this? We begin by noting a consistently observed empirical fact: ven-
ture capitalists are far from passive investors and this is often assumed to be
a key reason behind the VC-to-success link. As Bottazzi et al (2008, p.489)
observe, "the VC literature identies a broad role for the investor, which goes
beyond the simple provision of nance. Venture capitalists may engage in a
number of value-adding activities, including monitoring, support, and control.
Those activities are largely non-contractible, yet may have real consequences".
Quite simply, venture capitalists do not just invest money but also time and
considerable amounts of e¤ort which have signicant benets for a rm.20
The most obvious use of a venture capitalists time, and in line with tra-
ditional nancing methods, is monitoring. Monitoring is made easier by the
large amount of time that venture capitalists spend with their portfolio rms,
which has been estimated at around 80 hours per year on-site and a further
30 hours on the phone with senior management (Sahlman (1990) and Gorman
and Sahlman (1989)). Similar to what one would expect, the empirical results
suggest that monitoring increases as and when the need arises; as measured by
management changes (Lerner, 1995) or agency costs (Gompers, 1995). How-
ever, monitoring is far from being the only value-added service that venture
capitalists o¤er.
A number of studies have examined the scope of "professionalisation" of
VC-backed rms. Hellman and Puri (2002), analysing data on 170 young high-
tech Silicon Valley start-ups, examined the impact of VC on the development
20A large body of literature examines venture capital from an alternative angle; screening.
Caselli et al (2009), using Italian data, found that rm is more likely to recieve VC funding if
it has already demonstrated some innovative ability. Similar results have been found within
the US (Hellman and Puri, 2000; Mann and Sager, 2007) and Germany (Engel and Keilbach,
2007).
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new rms nding that venture capitalists alter a rms inner workings. By far
the biggest impact came from the professionalisation of the rm, with ven-
ture capitalists implementing improvements at every level of the rm; from
replacing the original founders with external CEOs to simply formulating HR
policies or improving a rms marketing strategies. Both Wasserman (2003)
and Kaplan et al (2012) also observe a "paradox of success" in which VC-
backed rms appear to more frequently replace existing senior management
with external CEOs in spite of their initial success.21 This willingness to bring
in new management, despite success, suggests that they are willing to make
tough decisions to improve a rms prospects. Finally, Hochberg (2012), ex-
amining 2,827 IPOs between 1983-94, found that even after controlling for
endogeneity issues these improvements to corporate governance were not sim-
ply a consequence of ex ante selection biases. To put it another way, venture
capitalists did not select "better" rms per se.22
Venture capitalists, though, do not simply impact on a rms inner work-
ings but also on their external interactions. Lindsey (2008) examined an un-
common, yet important, value-adding service in the form of strategic alliances
between rms with a common venture capitalist. The results suggest that hav-
ing a common venture capitalist blurs the lines between the rmsboundaries
and increased the probability that two rms would work together. Hsu (2006)
nds similar results, demonstrating a signicant increase in cooperation be-
tween rms if they are VC-backed. In related literature, Ozmel et al (2013)
argues that strategic alliances can alter the relationship between a rm and
its backer. Using data on biotechnology rms, the study found that whilst
accepting VC increased the chances of future VC and alliance activity, alliance
activity only increased the chances of future alliance activity. The reason for
this result is that alliance activity is likely to conict with a venture capitalists
21Though Kaplan et al (2012) do note that after accounting for the skills of managers,
there is no di¤erence between the performance of internal and external CEOs.
22These results regarding activity, monitoring and pro¤esionalisation are dependent on
many, often overlooked, factors. First, the importance of legal systems is discussed by
Botazzi et al (2009). Second, trust between the rm and its backer are examined in Botazzi
et al (2012). Third, the impact on innovation may depend on whether the backer is private or
government run and what the funds are invested for (Bertoni and Tykvová (2012); Cumming
et al (2005)). Fourth, a venture capitalists tolerance to failure (Tian and Wang (in press)).
Finally, the scale of risk involved and contract types play a role too (Kaplan and Strömberg
(2003, 2004)).
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interests. Lerner et al (2003) nd similar results but add that the likelihood
of turning to a strategic partner is inversely related to the quality of public
markets.
The main issue with this body of literature is that a rms ex ante strategic
decisions may be viewed as assuming that rms are passive. In fact, the empir-
ical literature exclusively examines the impact of VC on rms whilst trying to
remove any selection (rm) e¤ects. However, this decision has created a large
gap in the literature that, as yet, no one has attempted to ll. Specically,
from the rms perspective, three non-trivial questions can be examined: i)
how does the promise of VC change a rms ex ante innovation decisions?; ii)
how does VC improve a rms probabilities of success; and iii) does VC alter
the decisions of a rm ex post? As of yet, no work - empirical or theoretical -
has been o¤ered to answer these questions. Instead, it has been the case that
such questions have been ignored in favour of implicitly assuming that VC was
the impetus between the VC-to-success link. However, it is necessary to ask
whether a combination of both rm and venture capitalist e¤ort is required
for such benets to come to fruition.
1.3.3 Summary
There is ample evidence to suggest that venture capitalists do help to promote
innovation at industry level and more general success at the rm level. More
specically, whilst industry level results suggest that VC may spur innovation,
as measured by patents and TFP, at rm level evidence points to the pro-
fessionalisation of rms. Empirically, the professionalisation of rms covers a
wide range of activities and this provision of value-adding services (including
hiring new CEOs, monitoring rm performance and even harbouring more col-
laborative e¤orts) is what adds to the success of rms. Whilst there is ample
evidence to support all of these notions, it is unrealistic to ignore the actions of
rms entirely. Rather, there is scope to explore the decisions of rms both pre-
and post-VC to examine how rms react to both the potential for receiving
VC funding and after they have actually received it.
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1.4 Conclusion
Whilst this review is not exhaustive, it does o¤er a good insight into the
conclusions and issues faced within both elds.
First, within the linear spatial literature, it is obvious that this model has
become an integral part of the analysis of horizontal di¤erentiation. However,
it is also quite apparent that the specication of the model plays an integral
role in determining what equilibria are possible and the strategic decisions of
the rms. Yet, in spite of all of this, so much work has been done in mapping
the e¤ects of all the changes to even the most basic model specications that
these issues are no longer such a problem. That is, the basic DGT model has
become an important tool within the Industrial Economists toolbox.
Second, the addition of cost asymmetries is not without its issues either.
However, the majority of work that has been carried out focuses on a few key
issues. Within the linear spatial work it is well understood when pure strategy
and mixed strategy equilibria exist, but the impact of endogenising the rms
cost reductions has been mostly overlooked. Instead the focus has been on
spillover e¤ects and the impact of these on the rmslocation decisions. Within
the non-linear models, asymmetric costs are not so well established. Rather,
these have been more concerned with examining the impact of competition
boosting policy on social welfare. Nonetheless, these have interesting and real
world applications that should not be ignored.
Finally, within the VC literature, we observe that a huge gap appears to
have been left: how do rms respond to venture capital ex ante and ex post.
Whilst much has been done from the point of view of the venture capitalist,
this is only half of the story. Consequently, much has been left to examine.
Whilst the review was empirically based, these theories are, in essence, testing
theoretical hypotheses and commonly held beliefs about VC. Therefore, the
issues observed here do give an indication of the dearth of certain theoretical
ideas within the literature.
Chapter 2
Spatial Competition and the
Innovative Process
2.1 Introduction
Since Hotellings (1929) seminal work formalised the modelling of linear spa-
tial markets much has been done to examine and adapt his work to examine
horizontal di¤erentiation within duopoly markets. Whilst the addition of cost
asymmetries has o¤ered interesting results, one crucial question has often been
overlooked: how does the innovative process (the ability to spot and imple-
ment new and innovative production methods) determine the composition of
the nal product market. To this end, we propose a model of endogenous cost
selection in which rms are heterogeneous with respect to both their ex ante
abilities to implement a cost reducing technology and their investment timings.
In doing so, it is possible to examine the importance of both investment tim-
ing and innovative ability in determining the composition of the nal product
market or, more interestingly, whether it is possible for an ex ante ine¢ cient
rm to become an ex post market leader. Thus, we extend the linear spatial
competition literature in two ways. First, rms are a priori heterogeneous in
respect of both their ability to implement cost reductions and the timing of
their investments. Second, the ex post cost di¤erential is endogenous. The
results o¤er two interesting additions to the existing literature: (i) if a rm
possesses both an investment timing and e¢ ciency advantage it always be-
comes the ex post e¢ cient rm; and (ii) if a rm possesses only an investment
35
2. Spatial Competition and the Innovative Process 36
timing advantage, it can become the ex post e¢ cient rm if and only if the a
priori ability gap is not too large.
Hotelling (1929) developed a simple model for examining rmsproduct
choices in a spatial setting, nding that rms would have a preference to pro-
duce homogeneous goods. The result suggested that rms would be driven
to agglomerate as, by moving towards their rival in the location space, rms
could steal a rival rms market share. DAspremont et al. (1979) undermined
this result arguing that no pure strategy solution existed in Hotellings original
model specication nding, instead, that equilibrium only exists if transport
costs are quadratic.1 The use of quadratic transport costs, proposed by DGT,
ensures a stable equilibrium for all price-location pairs but, in contrast to
Hotellings (1929) conclusion, suggested that rms would nd it optimal to
produce maximally di¤erentiated products. Furthermore, were rms able to
locate outside of the citys boundaries, it would be optimal for them do so
(Tabuchi and Thisse, 1995; Lambertini, 1997).2
One criticism to be levelled at this body of work is that the rms are as-
sumed to face symmetric production costs. The specic consideration of exoge-
nous cost di¤erentials has been examined within a linear spatial framework by
Schulz and Stahl (1985), Ziss (1993) and Matsumura and Matsushima (2009).
Ziss (1993) introduced heterogeneous production costs into a DGT framework,
nding that maximum product di¤erentiation is the only pure strategy Nash
equilibrium solution, and that this (pure strategy) equilibrium outcome exists
if and only if the cost di¤erential is not too large. Matsumura and Matsushima
(2009) extend this analysis to consider cases in which this small cost di¤erential
assumption is violated. They nd, where cost di¤erentials are large, the rms
face contrasting incentives regarding location with the stronger (weaker) rm
having an incentive to minimise (maximise) product di¤erentiation. Thus,
a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is ensured even where the heterogeneity
between rms undermines a pure strategy solution.
It is for this reason that the Hotelling (1929) model is [assumed] incon-
1DAspremont et al. (1979) will henceforth be denoted DGT.
2In general, the linear spatial competition literature highlights how sensitive these models
are to model specication. These include, but are not limited to, the number of dimensions
in the product space (Irmen and Thisse (1998)), the distribution of consumers (Anderson et
al (1997)) and the specication of transport costs (Anderson (1988)).
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venient for investigating endogenous production costsas a full examination
of location equilibrium conditions is di¢ cult to obtain (Matsumura and Mat-
sushima, 2009: p216). Nonetheless, from a theoretical standpoint, the exis-
tence of mixed strategy solutions may explain di¤erences in market structure
across seemingly similar markets especially where rms face asymmetric costs.
Bester et al (1996), using a DGT model, nd an innity of mixed strategy
equilibria and argue that, without some coordination mechanism, rms face a
strictly positive probability that they would locate at the same point. Thus,
where rms face asymmetric production costs, simple coordination failure can
be the di¤erence between a high cost rm remaining in the market or being
driven out of business. Whilst this result is intuitive, Martin (2001) argues
that rms do not randomly select a location or product mix but, rather, make
such decisions in secret. This generates asymmetric information and inherits
the same propensity for coordination failure.
Some e¤orts have been made to endogenise production costs within a lin-
ear spatial framework, but these have had a signicantly di¤erent focus. Most
similar to this work, Mai and Peng (1999) and Piga and Poyago-Theotoky
(2005) examine the impact of geographic spillover e¤ects on the rmsloca-
tions. Using a three stage, location-R&D-price model with symmetric rms
they observe that the rms are drawn closer to each to benet from a rivals
R&D spillovers. Thus, depending upon the magnitude of the spillover rate
both maximal and minimal di¤erentiation are possible.3 Matsumura and Mat-
sushima (2010b) examine the role of patenting and licensing noting that pure
strategy Nash equilibria are ensured for any level of cost di¤erential as long a
rm can license its innovation.4 Finally, Matsumura and Matsushima (2004)
and Kumar and Saha (2008) examine the di¤erence between public and private
rmscost reductions. The main nding in "mixed duopolies" is that the level
of public ownership is crucial and that when ownership is small the results
degenerate to those of the DGT model. However, when public ownership is
su¢ ciently large, a more socially e¢ cient equilibrium obtains.
Also pertinent to this discussion are models of competition between rms
3Whilst both models examine di¤erent innovations - cost-reducing and quality-improving
respectively - Sun (2013) nds no di¤erence between the specications.
4Matsumura and Matsuhima (2010a) nd similar results but where cost heterogeneity is
exognenous.
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facing heterogeneous costs within a circular city/Salop (1979) framework. Aghion
and Schankerman (2004) and Syverson (2004) adopt a Bayesian set-up, with
rms knowing only their own (stochastic) production costs and assume prices
are set prior to learning their rivals locations and costs. Analogous to the
linear spatial model results, the (pure strategy) equilibrium breaks down for
very large cost di¤erentials as the (low cost) rms incentive to limit price
becomes acute. Interestingly, Alderighi and Piga (2009, 2010), who examine
the maximum permissible cost disparity within these models, observe that an
Eaton and Lipsey (1978) style "no mill-price undercutting rule" must be sat-
ised, similar to that derived by Ziss (1993), or "a highly e¢ cient rms reach
could potentially extend beyond its nearest neighbours position" (Alderighi
and Piga, 2009: p.3). Furthermore, extending this analysis to allow rms to
endogenously select their locations suggests "the distance between two direct
competitors is strictly increasing in the average productivity: all else equal,
more productive rms are more isolated" (Vogel, 2008: p.450).5 Therefore,
whilst issues arising from using a Hotelling model to examine endogenous cost
selection do exist, these problems are comparable to other areas of the spatial
competition literature.
Consequently, to the authors knowledge, no attempt has been made to
examine how the innovative process (the ability to spot and implement inno-
vation/research opportunities) determines the composition of the nal product
market. This paper, rather than simply examining the e¤ect of cost di¤eren-
tials, analyses the cause of cost di¤erentials and their e¤ects.6 That is, we
examine the extent to which a rms ability to innovate - in terms of both
its ability to implement a new production technology and innovation timing
5To the best of the authors knowledge some papers in this area have examined endoge-
nous cost selection. However, their focus is generally on the entry e¤ects of R&D. See Scalera
and Zazzaro (2005) or Ebina and Shimizu (2012).
6It is important to note that this paper only considers process innovation and, conse-
quently, horizontal di¤erentiation. Hotelling (1929) style models often focus on horizontal
di¤erentiation, but can be extended to include quality improving investments and vertical
di¤erentiation. In fact, using a similar model to that presented here, Sun (2013: p.138) nds
that both process and product innovation - cost reduction and quality improving investment
respectively - "share identical strategic properties" and that within a linear spatial model
"[it is possible] to derive the equilibrium strategies of a quality improving R&D model from
the ones of a cost-reducing R&D model, and vice versa". Consequently, the results derived
here would likely transfer to a situation in which the products are vertically di¤erentiated,
or product innovation were used instead. Therefore, such an omission is irrelevant.
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- a¤ects the composition of the nal product market. To do this, we propose
a three-stage model in which the rms sequentially invest in R&D before si-
multaneously competing in locations and then prices. Furthermore, the rms
are assumed to be heterogeneous in their abilities to reduce their costs. Our
results suggest two ndings unique to the literature. First, if a rm possesses
both an investment timing and e¢ ciency advantage it always becomes the ex
post dominant rm (proposition 4). Second, where a rm possesses only an
investment timing advantage, it can become the ex post market leader rm if
and only if the a priori e¢ ciency gap is not too large (summary 9). These
results suggest that the innovation process plays a crucial part in determining
which rm will become the ex post market leader. Additionally, whilst it is
the ex post low cost rm that becomes the market leader, as noted in the
literature, it is possible that this rm could be either the ex ante e¢ cient or
ine¢ cient rm.
Another body of literature to which this paper relates, and another crucial
aspect of the innovative process, examines patent races. Whilst not explicitly
examined here, this body of literature gives some indication as to which rm
has the most incentive to innovate. The early literature, focusing on determin-
istic R&D and complete information regarding the rmsinnovation strategies,
sheds some light as to whether ex ante e¢ cient rms can be "leapfrogged" by
ex ante ine¢ cient rms or if they are destined to maintain their position.7
Gilbert and Newbury (1982), examining the strategic actions of an incumbent
monopolist, concluded that, as monopoly prots are always at least as large of
those in any other market structure, there always exists an incentive to defend
this position by preemptively investing and patenting.8 However, it appears
that these results are not robust to the existence of asymmetric rms. Rather,
when one rm is granted a competitive advantage in innovation, the results
7A more detailed literature review of this can be found in Pollock (2008). However, it
suggests that since the initial work regarding patent races, the examination of patents has
become more focused on: i) patent design; ii) cumulative innovation; iii) licensing; iv)
imitation; and v) the openess of innovation (such as the rise of open source software).
We ignore a discussion of cumulative innovation here as innovation, within this model,
consists of only a single stage.
8Leininger (1991) notes that Gilbert and Newburys (1982) basic model is, in essence,
a simple auction for a patent. Therefore, as rms must compete to "win" the auction,
rents are dissipated compared to the monopoly position. Moreover, where the rms become
increasingly symmetric, rent dissipation is exacerbated.
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become more extreme. Fudenberg et al (1983), Harris and Vickers (1985a;
1985b) and Aoki (1991) all nd that granting a rm any advantage in the
innovation stage - be it a larger reward from obtaining a patent, being better
at R&D, or simply being further along the development path - it will domi-
nate the competition and always wins the patent race.9 Though, this may be
because the "leader" in a patent race invests more heavily than the follower
(Harris and Vickers, 1987). Quite simply, then, the early industrial organisa-
tion literature highlights that a rm with some innate advantage in a patent
race will, inherently, become the winner.
The most recent literature regarding patent races has focused on uncertain
returns to innovation by adopting a real options approach, the right - though
not obligation - to invest in a new technology (Dixit and Pindyk, 1994). Quite
remarkably, similar results obtain in the real options literature, directly com-
parable to those obtained in the earlier work. Or, as Hsu and Lambrecht (2007:
p.21) eloquently state, "one [should] expect qualitative nature of previous re-
sults from the industrial organisation literature on the timing of technological
innovation is likely to remain unaltered by uncertainty and asymmetric infor-
mation".
When the protability of investment is uncertain, and when rms face no
competition, the real options approach suggests it is better to wait for better
information regarding the protability of investment before committing (Huis-
man and Kort ,1999). In contrast, when a rm faces competition, the benets
of waiting are undermined as there is the potential to be preempted which
drives rms to invest earlier than they would have done otherwise; a deci-
sion made to preempt their rivals and win the patent race. Furthermore, this
result becomes more pronounced as the number of rms participating in the
race increases, as each rm faces a stronger threat of preemption which drives
them to invest earlier still (Bouis et al, 2009; Grenadier, 2002).10 However, the
result most pertinent here are those derived between asymmetric rms. Chan
and Kwok (2007) examine a real options model in which the rms face asym-
9These results are robust for both single- and multi-stage innovation. Furthermore, the
issue of rent dissipation, as observed by Leininger (1991), still obtains.
10Grenadier (2002) notes that, at the limit, rms are induced to invest where their ex-
pected returns from investment are zero, or all expected rents are completely dissipated.
In contrast, Bouis et al (2009) nding that almost all expected prots are dissipated when
facing only a single competitor.
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metric costs of innovation, though cost information is common knowledge, and
conclude that it is the most innovative and e¢ cient rm that should win the
patent race. However, this result can be criticised because, if the rms com-
pete with complete information, why dont they simply cooperate to maximise
joint prots?11 However, Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), using a model in
which the rms face uncertainty regarding the costs of their rivals, the rms
still attempt to strategically preempt their rivals, though the extent to which
this occurs depends upon the initial distribution of costs. Nonetheless, it is,
once again, the most innovative and e¢ cient that should win the race.
It is interesting that the existing literature - using two very di¤erent ap-
proaches - nds identical results: where rms compete in deterministic R&D,
it is the rm with some competitive advantage in innovation that will always
win the race.12 In essence, these results suggest that the rms that are better
at innovating - due to, for example, receiving higher payo¤s from innovation,
facing lower R&D costs, or being further along the development path - are the
most likely to be the "winners" and, consequently, have the biggest incentive
to innovate. The results presented here, however, both agree and contrast with
this assertion. On the one hand, if one rm possesses an advantage in inno-
vation then the results derived in the patent race literature do, indeed, align
with the results presented here. That is, the rm with the advantage unam-
biguously becomes the dominant rm and would, therefore, have the biggest
incentive to innovate. On the other hand, and in contrast to the existing liter-
ature, this paper suggests that both rms may possess some advantage in the
innovative process, such as one rm having a timing advantage whilst another
is better at conducting R&D. In this instance, the identity of the "winning"
rm is determined by the balance of these advantages, and the rm with the
most incentive to innovate is the rm with the most potent advantage.
Another related body of literature relates to endogenous entry timing into
the nal product market, or the rms choose when to select their locations.
Within a linear spatial setting, it appears, at least within a single period
11This criticism of complete information is made by both Weeds (2002) and Lambrecht
and Perraudin (2003).
12Indeed, the only di¤erence between the equilibria between complete and incomplete
information cases is that, in the incomplete information case, the rms optimally adjust
their preemptive investment behaviour to take into account the risk associated with uncertain
payo¤s.
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framework with unbounded location spaces, that the timing of entry has a
signicant impact on the composition of the nal product market.13 Indeed,
as such a decision o¤ers a considerable advantage to the rst rm to choose its
location, which rm would like to move rst? Within a two-period Cournot
duopoly game, van Damme and Hurkens (1999) observe that a high cost rm
nds committing to move rst riskier than a low cost rm and so it must be
the low cost rm that emerges as the endogenous Stackelberg leader. This
assertion backed by Branco (2008) who, within a similar framework, also nds
that the low-cost rm becomes the Stackelberg leader. However, both papers
disagree as to whether a Cournot equilibrium would obtain if the rms face
symmetric costs.14
Whilst our analysis does not a¤ord rms asymmetric location timing, let
alone endogenous ones, our results again agree and contrast with those of
endogenous entry games. Whilst the results presented here agree that the ex
post low cost rm would emerge as the market leader, they also suggest that
this rm could be either the ex ante e¢ cient or the ine¢ cient rm. If, as
here, the rms are a priori heterogeneous with respect to their e¤ectiveness at
reducing costs and the timing of their investments then a rms unit cost is no
longer a measure of its e¢ ciency but, instead, a direct consequence of strategic
interactions given the rmsrelative e¢ ciencies (investment timing and cost
reduction e¤ectiveness). Therefore, the van Damme and Hurkens (1999) and
Branco (2008) results ignore the possibility that this rm could be either the
ex ante e¢ cient or ine¢ cient rm. That is, an a priori ine¢ cient rm may, in
fact, possess an incentive to commit to becoming the Stackelberg leader if the
ex ante e¢ ciency gap is not too large.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2.2 describes the models
specication; section 2.3 analyses the model including the equilibrium condi-
tions for prices, locations and cost reduction; and section 2.4 concludes.
13Lambertini (2002) nds that, under such circumstances, the rst mover in the location
stage locates in the centre of the market whilst the follower must locate outside of the
market.
14It is of note that similar models specifying Bertrand competition obtain a reversed
result in which the e¢ cient rm enters rst and the ine¢ cient rm second (see van Damme
and Hurkens (2004) and Tasnádi (2003)). Interestingly, they note that only when the cost
di¤erential between the rms is su¢ ciently large will the ex ante e¢ cient rm become the
ex post dominant rm.
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2.2 Model
Consider a three-stage duopoly model. In the rst stage, the rms compete in
cost reduction sequentially before making symmetric location and price choices
in the second and third periods respectively.
It should be noted that the sequence of moves presented here - innovation
before location - examines only half the story. Within the context of the inno-
vative process, what the sequence of stages should be is not a priori obvious.
In fact, it is possible to make a reasonable case for either : i) rms innovating
before choosing their locations; or ii) locations being chosen before rms im-
plement their investment strategies. Either way, the specication chosen must
suit the particular industry that is chosen. The sequence presented here, with
cost reducing investments being made before choosing a location, works well
for industries in which a piece of capital can produce a wide variety of a single
good. As an example, one could think of the production of chocolate; once
the factory is built it is equally capable of producing any variety of chocolate,
from milk to dark chocolate. Therefore, before committing to the production
of a specic variety of chocolate, the rm can invest in developing a low cost
production method. However, if the R&D required is more specic, for ex-
ample the capital required di¤ers between varieties, then the aforementioned
approach is not appropriate. In such circumstances, a rm must choose what
variety of good it wishes to produce before investing in the appropriate capi-
tal. Thus, it would be erroneous to assume that our specication generalises
to all industries, a claim we do not make, but suggest it is better suited to
industries in which the productive technology is fairly homogeneous, even if
the nal products are not.15
As in dAspremont et als (1979) model, two rms, A and B, supply a
physically homogeneous good from di¤erent locations on the real axis. The
location of rm N is denoted by n 2 R and, consequently, the location of each
15Whilst the order of moves used here is not, by any means, unreasonable, a more practical
reason leads us to use this particular sequence of events. Once the sequence of investment
and location decisions is reversed - with rms locating before innovating - the model becomes
intractable. Consequently, whilst it would be nice to compare the two scenarios directly, it
appears that this is not possible. In fact, this issue of complexity/intractability is noted by
Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005).
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rm is measured from zero. Without loss of generality, we assume a < b.16
Firms maximise prots at each stage.
Consumers are uniformly distributed across a linear city of unit length and
are assumed to have a density of one. For simplicity the city is dened by
[0; 1] 2 R which ensures that any a; b =2 [0; 1] simply implies that a rm is
locating outside of the citys boundaries. It is also assumed that consumers
face unit demands and consume either zero or one units of production. Con-
sequently, a consumer, located at x 2 [0; 1], would only purchase a good from
rm N , located at n, if and only if
Ux = s  pN   t(x  n)2  0
where s is a xed utility of consuming a good, pN is the price charged by
rm N , t is a measure of consumer heterogeneity and t(x  n)2 is a quadratic
transport cost incurred by a consumer having to move a distance of jx  nj
to consume good N . In order to ensure that total demand is equal to one, or
that each consumer purchases one good, s is assumed to be large enough that
Ux  0 for all x 2 [0; 1] for at least one of the rmsproducts and consumers
only purchase the good that maximises their utility.
In the rst stage the rms sequentially invest in cost reduction to reduce
their ex ante production cost. At the beginning of the rst stage, we assume
that both rms face a symmetric production cost, c, but these initial produc-
tion costs can be reduced by 'N(IN) at a cost of CN(IN); where IN is the
investment level of rm N . Furthermore, it is assumed that the cost reduction
schedule and investment cost functions are linear and quadratic in investment
respectively.17 More formally, the cost reduction and investment cost schedules
are given by:
16It is trivial to derive the results for the case a > b.
17Whilst these functional form assumptions are not ideal, they are necessary for two
reasons. First, to make the mathematics more tractible. Attempts were made to generalise
the model using a convex investment cost schedule but these rendered the model intractable.
Second, to keep the model specication in line with other cost selection models within the
linear sptial competition literature. This linear cost reduction schedule is assumed across
a broad range of the literature: georgraphic spillover e¤ects (see Mai and Peng (1999) and
Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005)); licensing (see Matsumura and Matsushima (2004 and
2010a)) and; public vs. private rms (see Matsumura and Matsushima(2010b)).
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'N(IN) = mNIN
CN(IN) =
1
2
I2N
where mN > 0 represents the ability of rm N to implement the cost reducing
technology or the (constant) marginal cost reduction per unit of investment.
The nal unit cost of rm N , used in the price and location stages, is given by
cN = c  'N(IN)
In specifying the rst stage in this manner it is possible to allow rms to
di¤er with respect to both their investment timing and e¢ ciency. In the case
of investment timing this is obvious, as rms move sequentially and this can
be thought of as the rms di¤ering in their abilities to spot new investment op-
portunities. However, the cost reduction schedule allows for rm heterogeneity
with respect to their investment e¢ ciencies if mA 6= mB. Without loss of gen-
erality, the remainder of this paper assumes mA > mB  0 or, more simply,
that rm A is more e¤ective at implementing cost reduction dollar-for-dollar
than rm B. With both of these assumptions in place it is possible to examine
the relative importance of investment e¢ ciency and timing advantages.
One nal, and crucial assumption, is that the results presented here are
derived such that both rms remain active in the nal product market, at all
stages of the game. Whilst the focus of this paper is on the impact the in-
novative process has on the composition of the nal product market, we limit
the analysis to the most interesting cases where both rms remain active. The
consequence of removing this assumption has already been documented by
both Ziss (1993) and Matsumura and Matsushima (2009). Simply, where one
rm can generate a su¢ ciently large ex post cost advantage they begin to act
strategically to deter entry and the model breaks down, with only mixed strat-
egy Nash equilibrium solutions remaining (Ziss, 1993). Therefore, by investing
heavily in the cost reduction stage and generating large ex post cost di¤erential,
the Stackelberg leader in the investment stage can create a game of "cat and
mouse", with the ex post e¢ cient rm attempting to prevent entry by locating
next to the ine¢ cient rm and the ine¢ cient rm trying to "run" away. That
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is, the Stackelberg leader uses its position to become predatory and attempts
to prevent protable entry by the follower, undermining all pure strategy lo-
cation equilibria.18 In fact, these conicting agglomeration strategies lead to
maximal and minimal di¤erentiation appearing with equal probability, or en-
try deterrence being successful with probability 1=2. However, as this result
is already well documented, we omit it here and focus on the cases in which
both rms remain active in the nal product market, or neither rms cost
advantage is su¢ ciently large that it becomes incentivised to try and deter the
entry of its rival.
The game is solved by backward induction and at each stage rms maximise
their prots. Only pure strategy Nash equilibria are examined in this paper.
The game proceeds as follows. In the rst stage, rms select their investment
levels, IN 2 [0;1), sequentially; both cases where rms A and B move rst
are examined. In the second stage, each rm selects its location, n 2 R 8
N 2 fA;Bg, simultaneously. Finally, in the third stage, rms select their
prices, pN 2 [cN ;1), simultaneously.
2.3 Analysis
2.3.1 Price Stage
Recall that consumers i) maximise utility; and ii) can only purchase one unit
of production. In this instance, a consumer, located at x, is indi¤erent between
purchasing either good A or good B if and only if
s  pA   t(x  a)2 = s  pB   t(b  x)2 (2.1)
As a < b by assumption, the total demand for good A is given by all consumers
located to the left of x and demand for good B is the residual demand, 1  x.
18One should expect that this result would also occur here because our model is identical to
that presented by Matsumura and Matsushima (2009), but with the ex post cost di¤erential
determined endogenously.
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Solving equation (2.1) yields the demand functions:
DA = x =
pB   pA
2t(b  a) +
(a+ b)
2
DB = 1  x = pA   pB
2t(b  a) +
(2  a  b)
2
Taking these demand functions as given, rm Ns prots are given by the
expression:19
N = (pN   c+ 'N)DN   CN
Firms simultaneously select prices, pN 2 [cN ;1), to maximise prots, taking
location and investment choices as given. The rst order conditions are:
@A
@pA
=
pB   2pA + c  'A
2t(b  a) +
(a+ b)
2
= 0
@B
@pB
=
pA   2pB + c  'B
2t(b  a) +
(2  a  b)
2
= 0
The second order conditions are given by @
2N
@p2N
=   1
b a < 0 8 N and are, there-
fore, met for all price pairs, (pA; pB). Solving these equations simultaneously
yields the equilibrium prices:
pA =
3c  2'A   'B + t(b  a)(2 + a+ b)
3
(2.2)
pB =
3c  'A   2'B + t(b  a)(4  a  b)
3
(2.3)
From these conditions, it is possible to observe that a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium in prices always exists, regardless of the locations and the
ex post cost disparity between the two rms. Furthermore, the signs of the
components within the equilibrium price functions are as one would expect,
with prices increasing in the a priori unit cost and decreasing in the cost
reduction e¤orts of both rms. However, assuming 'A = 'B, it is notable that
the equilibrium prices of both rms are a¤ected more by changes to their own
19For notational purposes, as IN is known at this stage we abbreviate 'N (IN ) and CN (IN )
to 'N and CN respectively, N 2 fA;Bg.
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ex post unit cost than to changes to a rivals ex post unit cost.
2.3.2 Location Stage
With the equilibrium prices given by equations (2.2) and (2.3), the relevant
prot functions for both rms are:
A =
['A   'B + t(b  a)(2 + a+ b)]2
18t(b  a)   CA
B =
['B   'A + t(b  a)(4  a  b)]2
18t(b  a)   CB
Each rm, N , simultaneously selects its location, n 2 R, in order to maximise
prots taking investment decisions and equilibrium prices as given. The rst
order conditions are given by
@A
@a
= 0 =  2
9
t(1 + a)[t(b  a)(2 + a+ b) + 'A   'B]
t(b  a)
+
1
18
[t(b  a)(2 + a+ b) + 'A   'B]2
t(b  a)2
@B
@b
= 0 =
2
9
t(2  b)[t(b  a)(4  a  b)  'A + 'B]
t(b  a)
+
1
18
[t(b  a)(4  a  b)  'A + 'B]2
t(b  a)2
Solving these equations simultaneously for a and b yields:
a =
('A   'B)
3t
  1
4
b =
('A   'B)
3t
+
5
4
The relevant second order conditions are given by:
@2A
@a2
=
1
486
(4('A   'B) + 9t)(4('A   'B)  27t)
t
@2B
@b2
=
1
486
(4('A   'B)  9t)(4('A   'B) + 27t)
t
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As these equations must be strictly negative, it is trivial to show 'A   'B 2
( 9
4
t; 9
4
t) must hold for both second order conditions to be met, or that the
ex post cost disparity between the two rms is not too large relative to the
transport cost.
This additional condition ensures that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in
locations exists but, unlike the pricing game, only where the ex post production
costs are not too di¤erent. This is because, in allowing for cost heterogene-
ity, a highly e¢ cient rm may have an incentive to drive its ine¢ cient rival
from the market. A similar argument is made by Alderighi and Piga (2008)
and Matsumura and Matsushima (2009). Recalling the demand functions and
substituting in the equilibrium price and location choices yields:
DA =
1
18
(4('A   'B) + 9t)
t
DB =   1
18
(4('A   'B)  9t)
t
Therefore, if 'A   'B  94t then the ex post high cost rm, rm B, would
be driven out of the market whilst the low cost rm, rm A, would serve all
demand.20 It is for this reason that large ex post cost di¤erentials undermine
the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the location stage given
that, for all 'A   'B  94t, rm Bs demand and prots are driven to zero.
Thus, there no longer exists a unique optimal location for rm B as, no matter
where it locates, it would surely be driven from the market. Given that rm
B no longer has a unique optimal location, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
cannot exist. Consequently, we restrict our focus to cases in which j'A   'Bj <
9
4
t, or a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the location stage.
With this restriction placed on the ex post cost di¤erential, it is possible
to say something of the location choice of each rm. First, where 'A = 'B,
both rms locate symmetrically outside of the market (at a =  1
4
and b = 5
4
respectively). As the quadratic transport costs make price competition increas-
ingly erce, rms prefer to locate beyond the boundaries of the city to mitigate
the price competition e¤ects on their prots (Lambertini, 1997). Second, the
structure of the rms locations implies that the distance between the two
20This is because DA  1 and DB  0:
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rms is xed at 3
2
, regardless of the size of the cost disparity. Finally, where
'A 6= 'B, it is the rm with lower unit costs that locates closer to the centre
of the market, with the ine¢ cient rm moving further from the city to shield
itself from aggressive price competition. Additionally, as j'A   'Bj ! 94t the
e¢ cient rms location converges to 1
2
, the centre of the market. Therefore, it
is only an e¢ cient rm that is able to locate within the citys boundaries at
the expense of its ine¢ cient rival who, fearful of limit pricing, is driven away
from the centre of the market.
2.3.3 Investment Stage
In the rst stage of the model, the rms select investment levels, IN 2 [0;1)
8 N , sequentially. This sequential investment assumption obviously a¤ords
one rm a strategic timing advantage, but can also be thought of as another
way in which the rmsrelative investment abilities di¤er. For example, an
investment timing advantage in this case may reect a di¤erence in the rms
abilities to spot new investment opportunities; be a consequence of a disparity
in the skills of the rms respective R&D departments or; more simply, be luck.
Recalling the equilibrium locations, prices and mA > mB  0, the rst
stage prot functions are given by:
A =
1
108
(4(mAIA  mBIB) + 9t)2
t
  1
2
I2A
B =
1
108
(4(mAIA  mBIB)  9t)2
t
  1
2
I2B
In the following sections, the equilibrium investment levels are determined
where (i) the ex ante e¢ cient rm, rm A, moves rst; and (ii) the ex ante
ine¢ cient rm, rm B, moves rst. These are examined in turn.
E¢ cient Firm Moves First
In this case rm A has a Stackelberg leadership advantage in cost reduction
and its investment decision is made taking rm Bs optimal response as given.
Assuming RB(IA), the solution to @B@IB = 0, is the best response function of
rm B to any the investment choice of rm A, the equilibrium investment
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decision of rm A is given by:
arg max
IA
A(IA; RB(IA))
Solving this equation yields rm As equilibrium investment level:
IA =
18tmA(16m
2
B   27t)
216tm2A   (8m2B   27t)2
(2.4)
Substituting IA into RB(IA) = @B@IB = 0 obtains:
IB =
18tmB(16m
2
A + 8m
2
B   27t)
216tm2A   (8m2B   27t)2
(2.5)
In order to obtain a reasonable equilibrium in the cost reduction stage two
conditions must be satised: (i) equilibrium investment levels must be non-
negative; and (ii) the second order conditions must be satised. However,
in order for the game to yield a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium it is also
necessary for the pure strategy equilibria in the cost reduction stage to be
consistent with those in the price and location stages. This occurs if 'A(IA) 
'B(IB) = mAIA  mBIB 2 ( 94t; 94t).
Proposition 1 Equilibrium investment levels are non-negative, the second or-
der conditions are satised and equilibrium investment in the rst stage is
consistent with a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at all stages if and only if
m2A 2 (m2B;
27
16
t  m
2
B
2
) (2.6)
m2B 2 [0;minfm2A;
27
8
t  2m2Ag) (2.7)
Proof. In Appendix 6.1
Equations (2.6) and (2.7) ensure that a reasonable equilibrium is not only
ensured in the investment stage, but also that equilibrium investment decisions
do not undermine the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the
entire game. However, they also imply that, for an equilibrium to exist, the a
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priori heterogeneity between the two rms cannot be too large.21 In fact, given
the simplicity of (2.6) and (2.7) is not too di¢ cult to formalise the maximum
level of heterogeneity permissible in the model. This implies:
Corollary 2 Given conditions (2.6) and (2.7), and taking m2B as given, the
maximum a priori heterogeneity between the rmscost reducing e¢ ciency is
given by
maxfm2Ag  m2B =
27
16
t  3
2
m2B = 
If this holds, then:
(i) m2A 2 (0; 2716t) and m2B 2 [0; 2724t); and
(ii) As m2B ! 2724t, ! 0
All of the above results can be derived very simply from equations (2.6) and
(2.7) assuming m2A > m
2
B  0 and so a formal proof is omitted. However, the
importance of these results comes from their implications for the model with
regards to ensuring a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Given rm A possesses
both an investment timing and e¢ ciency advantage at the beginning of the
game, corollary 2 simply states that the e¢ ciency advantage cannot be too
great or rm As equilibrium actions would undermine the stability of a (pure
strategy) equilibrium solution. Quite simply, then, rm As e¤ectiveness at
cost reduction must be capped relative to that of rm B. If this were not
the case, and the e¢ ciency gap is greater than or equal to , then either:
(i) the equilibrium investment levels could be negative; (ii) the second order
conditions are violated; (iii) the location stage has no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium; or (iv) some combination of (i)  (iii) occurs.
Assuming that conditions (2.6) and (2.7) are met, it is then possible to
make a number of observations regarding the equilibrium investment levels of
the rms.
Proposition 3 For all m2A and m
2
B as dened in (2.6) and (2.7):
(i) IA and IB are strictly positive;
(ii) @IA
@mA
> 0, @IB
@mA
< 0 8 m2B 2 [0; 2724t);
21The conditions derived in proposition 1 are derived under the assumption that both
rms remain active in the nal product market.
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(iii) IB ! 0 as the a priori e¢ ciency gap tends to ; and
(iv) IA > IB
Proof. In Appendix 6.2
Proposition 3 makes four observations regarding the equilibrium invest-
ment levels of the rms if conditions (2.6) and (2.7) are met. The rst, that
the equilibrium investment levels of both are strictly positive, rules out the
possibility that one, or both, rms remain passive in the cost reduction stage.
Moreover, it goes further than the assumption made to derive proposition 1,
that equilibrium investment levels simply be non-negative, and rules out any
case in which one rm would simply "give up" and exit the market.
The second implies that the equilibrium investment decision of rm A (B)
increases (decreases) as rm A becomes more e¢ cient relative to rm B. This
occurs because, as cost reduction in this model is a strategic substitute, rm
A is able to use its investment timing advantage to temper its rivals cost
reducing investment.22 Therefore, as rm A becomes a stronger competitor,
relative to rm B, it is better able to take advantage of its timing and e¢ ciency
advantages by investing more heavily in cost reduction and forcing rm Bs
equilibrium investment to contract.
The third states that, as the e¢ ciency gap converges to , rm A becomes
su¢ ciently aggressive that rm Bs optimal investment decision is to invest
nothing. However, from corollary 2, the maximum level of heterogeneity is
decreasing in m2B and, as m
2
B increases, the maximum a priori e¢ ciency gap,
, converges to zero. Therefore, as the weaker rm becomes relatively stronger
(m2B increases), the size of the e¢ ciency gap required to drive IB to zero
becomes smaller.23 Therefore, it must be that the ex ante e¢ cient rm becomes
more aggressive when competing against relatively tougher rivals.
The nal observation simply notes that the equilibrium investment levels
of rm A are always strictly larger than those of rm B. As cost reductions
in this model are treated as strategic substitutes, an e¢ cient rm has an
incentive to invest heavily in cost reduction in the rst stage to limit the cost
22Here:
R
0
B(IA) =
8mAmB
8m2B   27t
< 0
23Observe @
@m2B
< 0
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reduction of its weaker rival. Therefore, as rm A also possesses an investment
timing advantage, even where the rms are (almost) symmetric, it will use
this advantage to cement its dominance in the nal product market through
aggressive and preemptive investment. Thus, it is intuitive that IA > IB.
Despite all of these observations, both (2.6) and (2.7) ensure that, whilst
rm Bs optimal investment strategy is restricted as its rival becomes more
aggressive, it is always optimal to invest. In fact, rm Bs optimal investment
decision has to satisfy two contrasting incentives: (i) investing in cost reduction
allows the rm to retain a small, but positive, market share; but (ii) cost
reductions exacerbate erce price competition in the nal product market.
Which of these incentives dominates depends on the relative strengths of the
two rms but, in general, it is optimal to make a small investment to protect a
small share of the market whilst ensuring the ex post market is not too ercely
competitive.
Knowing IA > IB and m2A > m
2
B  0 also implies that the ex post cost
reduction of rm A is larger than that of rm B; as the cost reduction form is
simply given by
'i(Ii) = miIi 8 i 2 fA;Bg
Intuitively, then, where IA > IB andm2A > m
2
B  0 it must hold that 'A(IA) >
'B(IB). Therefore, a rm with an investment timing and e¢ ciency advantage
is able, through an aggressive, preemptive investment strategy, to maintain
these competitive advantages into the location and prices stages. For rm A,
the benets of possessing a lower unit cost and serving a larger proportion of
the market are the impetus for it to act aggressively in cost reduction as it is
able to cement its position in the nal product market as the dominant rm.
These equilibrium investment levels yield prots for each rm given by:
A =  3
4
t(16m2B   27t)2
216tm2A   (8m2B   27t)2
(2.8)
B =  81
4
(16m2A + 8m
2
B   27t)2(8m2B   27t)
[216tm2A   (8m2B   27t)2]2
(2.9)
Examining these prot functions leads to one observation: the prots obtained
by both rms are strictly positive. Once again, this is a direct consequence of
proposition 1. Of course, if this were not the case then it would be impossible
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for an equilibrium to be sustained as one rm would have no unique optimal
location.
All this leads to:
Proposition 4 If mA and mB are dened by (2.6) and (2.7) and rm A has
a Stackelberg leadership advantage in the cost reduction stage then:
(i) IA > IB > 0;
(ii) 'A > 'B;
(iii) A > B; and
(iv) a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is ensured across all stages of the
game.
Proof. Follows directly from propositions 1, 3 and Appendix 6.3
The third observation, that rmA obtains larger prots than rmB, should
not come as a surprise given the previous propositions. Firm A invests aggres-
sively in preemptive cost reduction to become the ex post low cost rm and,
consequently, limits the market share that rm B can attain. Quite simply,
the e¢ cient rm marginalises the ine¢ cient rm in the nal product market.
Furthermore, as rm A becomes relatively stronger, the ex post cost di¤eren-
tial becomes larger such that DA ! 1 and DB ! 0. Obviously, as the demand
for rm B becomes smaller and the cost di¤erential increases then the prots
associated with competition are pushed towards zero.
The implications of this result are clear. Where a rm possesses both an
investment timing and e¢ ciency advantage, the ex ante e¢ cient rm invests
aggressively in cost reduction in order to cement its place as the dominant rm
in the nal product market. The e¢ cient rms investment generates lower ex
post unit costs, serves a greater proportion of demand and yields larger prots
than its a priori (and, indeed, ex post) ine¢ cient rival. Nevertheless, whilst
the ex ante e¢ cient rm invests to cement its position as the market leader,
the ex ante ine¢ cient rm still possesses an incentive to invest. However, the
size of the investment must always remain relatively small for two reasons:
rst, investment is used in order to maintain the weaker rms (niche) market
position by reducing the size of the ex post cost asymmetry; and second, the
investment is kept relatively small in order to mitigate the e¤ects of increased
price competition.
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Ine¢ cient Firm Moves First
In this case rm B has a Stackelberg leadership advantage in cost reduction
and makes its investment decision taking rm As optimal response as given.
Assuming RA(IB), the solution to @A@IA = 0, is the best response function of
rm A to the investment choices of rm B, the equilibrium investment decision
of rm B is given by:
arg max
IB
B(RA(IB); IB)
Solving this equation yields rm Bs equilibrium investment level:
IB =
18tmB(16m
2
A   27t)
216tm2B   (8m2A   27t)2
(2.10)
Substituting IA into RB(IA) = @B@IB = 0 obtains:
IA =
18tmA(8m
2
A + 16m
2
B   27t)
216tm2B   (8m2A   27t)2
(2.11)
As in the previous case, a reasonable (pure strategy) equilibrium exists in
the cost reduction stage if two conditions are satised: (i) equilibrium invest-
ment levels must be non-negative; and (ii) the second order conditions must
be satised. However, in order for the game to yield a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium it is also necessary for all pure strategy equilibria in the price and
location stage to be consistent with the investment stage. Again, this occurs
if 'A(IA)  'B(IB) = mAIA  mBIB 2 ( 94t; 94t). This leads to:
Proposition 5 Equilibrium investment levels are non-negative, the second or-
der conditions are satised and equilibrium investment levels in the rst stage
are consistent with a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at all stages if and only
if
m2A 2 (m2B;minf
27
16
t;
27
8
t  2m2Bg) (2.12)
m2B 2 [0;minfm2A;
27
16
t m2Bg) (2.13)
Proof. See Appendix 6.4
The conditions imposed in equations (2.12) and (2.13) ensure that a reason-
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able equilibrium exists in the cost reduction stage that does not undermine a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.24 However, given the form of these restric-
tions it no longer so simple to generalise the maximum level of heterogeneity
supported within the model, but we can still infer from these conditions that
the heterogeneity between the rms cannot be too large. If the e¢ ciency gap
is too large then either: (i) the equilibrium investment levels are negative; (ii)
the second order conditions are violated; (iii) the location stage has no pure
strategy Nash equilibrium; or (iv) some combination of (i)  (iii) occurs.
Keeping this result in mind, it is possible to make some observations re-
garding the equilibrium investment levels of both rms. However, before this,
it is necessary to dene a critical value of m2B, denoted m
I
B, such that, for
any relevant m2A, the equilibrium investment levels of the rms are equal if
m2B = m
I
B.
25 For all other values of m2B, IA 6= IB. With this in mind, we
obtain:
Proposition 6 For all m2A and m
2
B as dened in (2.12) and (2.13):
(i) IA and IB are strictly positive;
(ii) @IA
@mB
< 0, @IB
@mB
> 0 8 m2A 2 (0; 2716t); and
(iii) IA > IB if, 8 m2A 2 (0; 2716t), m2B < mIB 2 [0;maxfm2Bg)
Proof. In Appendix 6.5
Proposition 6 makes three observations about the equilibrium investment
levels where the ine¢ cient rm possesses a Stackelberg leadership advantage
in the cost reduction stage and conditions (2.12) and (2.13) are met. The rst,
that equilibrium investment levels are strictly positive, again rules out that
the possibility that one, or both, rms remain passive in the cost reduction
stage. As in the previous case, this observation goes beyond the assumption
that required equilibrium investment levels be non-negative, which was a key
assumption made to derive proposition 5.
The second implies either rm can be rendered (almost) passive during
the investment stage. That is, because the equilibrium investment levels of
rm A (B) decrease (increase) as rm B becomes relatively more e¢ cient,
the initial level of heterogeneity plays an important role in determining the
24The conditions derived in proposition 5 are derived under the assumption that both
rms remain active in the nal product market.
25A formal denition and derivation of mIB can be found in Appendix 5.5.
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equilibrium investment levels. As in the previous case, rm B remains passive
if the initial level of heterogeneity is very large. In contrast, rm A is only
rendered passive where the initial level of heterogeneity between the rms is
su¢ ciently small. Simply, where the rmsinitial parameters are more "equal",
a timing advantage enables the a priori weaker rm to preemptively invest in
cost reduction and restrict the investment level of rm A. Thus, it can become
a more erce competitor when the rms are more symmetric.
The third observation extends this analysis further. It argues that, for a
given m2A, if m
2
B  mIB the ine¢ cient rm is very weak relative to its rival and,
consequently, its ability to preemptively invest in cost reduction is weak also.
Thus, even with a rst mover advantage in the cost reduction stage, the ex ante
weaker rm is unable and unwilling to act aggressively (or at least reasonably)
to restrict its rivals investment and, consequently, the equilibrium investment
level of rm B is less than or equal to that of rm A. However, oncem2B > m
I
B,
the ine¢ cient rm becomes su¢ ciently strong, relative to its rival, to be able
to take advantage of its timing advantage and cement a position in the market,
beyond simply lling a niche. In this case, rm B becomes more e¤ective at
preemptively investing and, therefore, invests more. In turn, this drives down
the equilibrium investment decisions of rm A and rm B is induced to invest
su¢ ciently to drive IA below IB. Therefore, if the a priori e¢ ciency gap is
not too large then the a priori weaker rm will invest more than its ex ante
e¢ cient rival.
The equilibrium investment observations imply rm B can become the
"investment leader", but are not su¢ cient to ensure that rm B will become
the ex post low cost rm too. Rather, because m2A > m
2
B  0, ensuring
IB > IA does not directly imply mBIB > mAIA. Instead, the cost reduction
of rm B will only be larger if its investment levels, relative to rm As, are
su¢ ciently large to overcome this relative ine¢ ciency. Comparing the rms
cost reductions yields:
'A   'B =
18tmA(8m
4
A   27t(mA  mB)(mA +mB))
216tm2B   (8m2A   27t)2
Again, it is necessary to dene a critical value of m2B, denoted m
'
B, such that,
for any relevant m2A, the equilibrium cost reduction levels of the rms are
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equal if m2B = m
'
B.
26 For all other values of m2B, 'A 6= 'B. Consequently, one
observes:
Proposition 7 For all m2A and m
2
B as dened in (2.12) and (2.13):
(i) 'A > 'B if 8 m2A 2 (0; 2716t), m2B < m'B 2 [0;maxfm2Bg)
(ii) m'B > m
I
B
Proof. In Appendix 6.6
Both observations in proposition 7 imply that an ex ante ine¢ cient rm
can become the ex post low cost rm if: (i) it is not too ine¢ cient relative
to its rival; and (ii) it has a Stackelberg leadership advantage in the cost re-
duction stage. Recall from proposition 6 that ceteris paribus the equilibrium
investment level of rm B (A) increases (decreases) as rm B becomes rela-
tively more e¢ cient and, once m2B > m
I
B, rm Bs equilibrium investment is
larger than that of rm A. However, as rm B is relatively ine¢ cient, for it
to become the ex post low cost rm it is not su¢ cient for rm B to simply
invest more than rm A but, rather, it must invest enough to overcome this
disadvantage. This occurs once m2B > m
'
B > m
I
B. That is, once the di¤erence
between IA and IB is su¢ ciently in rm Bs favour, or the a priori e¢ ciency
gap su¢ ciently small, rm B is induced to reduce its costs to such an extent
that it can overcome its initial ine¢ ciency and become the low cost rm.
Finally, taking into account the equilibrium investment levels, the corre-
sponding prot functions are given by:
A =  81
4
t2(8m2A   27t)(8m2A + 16m2B   27)2
[216tm2B   (8m2A   27t)2]2
(2.14)
B =  3
4
t(16m2A   27t)2
216tm2B   (8m2A   27t)2
(2.15)
Similar to investment and cost reduction, it is possible to make some observa-
tions regarding the prot levels of the rms. Before proceeding, it is necessary
to dene a nal critical value of m2B, denoted m

B, such that, for any relevant
m2A, the equilibrium prot levels of the rms are equal if m
2
B = m

B.
27 For all
other values of m2B, A 6= B. This leads to:
26A formal denition and derivation of m'B can be found in Appendix 5.6.
27A formal denition and derivation of mB can be found in Appendix 5.7.
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Proposition 8 For all m2A and m
2
B as dened in (2.12) and (2.13):
(i) A; B > 0
(ii) A > B if 8 m2A 2 (0; 2716t), m2B < mB 2 [0;maxfm2Bg)
(iii) mB > m
'
B > m
I
B
Proof. In Appendix 6.7
The rst observation of proposition 8 states that the equilibrium prot
levels of both rms are strictly positive if m2A and m
2
B are dened as in (2.12)
and (2.13). Of course, were this not the case then it would be impossible to
sustain a (pure strategy) equilibrium as one rm would have no unique optimal
location. Consequently, proposition 5 ensures this holds by the underlying
assumption that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is ensured in the location
and price stages.
The second and third observations imply an ex ante ine¢ cient rm with
a Stackelberg advantage in the cost reduction stage can only become the ex
post dominant rm, in all respects, if and only if m2B > m

B. Thus, only when
the ex ante ine¢ cient rm is not too ine¢ cient relative to its rival is it able
to fully take advantage of its timing advantage and become the market leader.
The rationale behind this result is analogous to that of proposition 7. As
rm B becomes relatively more e¢ cient, the equilibrium investment levels of
rms A and B decrease and increase respectively. Therefore, as the a priori
e¢ ciency gap becomes smaller, the ex ante ine¢ cient rm becomes better able
to preemptively invest in cost reduction. Once the initial e¢ ciency gap is small
enough, m2B > m

B, rm B is able to use its timing advantage to overcome its
initial disadvantage and become the market leader in terms of costs, demand
and prots.
An additional, and unstated, result can be found within proposition 8. For
all m2A, there exists a possible range of m
2
B such that an a priori ine¢ cient
rm can become the ex post low cost rm but earn lower prots in the nal
product market. Thus, if m2B 2 (m'B;mB), rm B invests more, has lower ex
post production costs and serves a larger proportion of the market but yields
smaller prots. Over this range, the costs incurred by rm B in becoming
the ex post low cost rm are are su¢ ciently large to outweigh the cost and
demand benets gained by the ex post e¢ cient rm. Whilst the ine¢ cient
rm can obtain a larger market share and possesses lower unit costs, in doing
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so, the additional investment costs prevent it from yielding larger prots than
its ex ante e¢ cient rival.
Considering all of these propositions together, it is possible to state:
Summary 9 If m2A and m
2
B are dened by (2.12) and (2.13), m
2
A > m
2
B
and rm B possesses a Stackelberg leadership in the cost reduction stage, four
potential equilibria may obtain for a given m2A 2 (0; 2716t):
1. m2B 2 [0;mIB): IA > IB, mAIA > mBIB and A > B
2. m2B 2 [mIB;m'B): IA  IB, mAIA > mBIB and A > B
3. m2B 2 [m'B;mB): IA < IB, mAIA  mBIB and A > B
4. m2B 2 [mB;m2A): IA < IB, mAIA < mBIB and A  B
Finally, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is ensured across all stages of the
game.
Proof. Follows directly from propositions 5, 6, 7 and 8
This result has a number of interesting implications. However, the key re-
sult is simply that, as the e¢ ciency gap becomes smaller, an ex ante ine¢ cient
rm becomes a tougher competitor if it has a Stackelberg leadership advantage
in the cost reduction stage. When the e¢ ciency gap is su¢ ciently large the
ine¢ cient rm is always either unable or unwilling to invest aggressively in cost
reduction. As the initial e¢ ciency gap becomes smaller, the ine¢ cient rm is
better able to take advantage of its rst mover advantage in the cost reduction
stage and adopts an increasingly aggressive investment strategy. Therefore,
by moving rst it is able to compensate its ine¢ ciency by restricting its ri-
vals investment decision and manipulating a better ex post situation for itself.
Consequently, the initial heterogeneity between the rms plays an important
role in determining the market outcome and, in general, relatively weak rms
"give up" whilst stronger rms "ght".
2.4 Conclusion
This paper examines the e¤ects of endogenous cost selection on a rms product
and pricing decisions where the rms are heterogeneous with respect to their
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ex ante investment e¢ ciencies and investment timing. In doing so, two results
unique to the literature obtain.
First, where an ex ante e¢ cient rm possesses Stackelberg leadership in
cost reduction, they generate lower costs, greater demand and yield larger
prots ex post than their ex ante ine¢ cient rival. This result suggests, where
a rm possesses both an investment timing and e¢ ciency advantage, the ex
ante e¢ cient rm invests aggressively in cost reduction in order to cement its
place as the dominant rm in the nal product market. Thus, the impetus for
the e¢ cient rm to invest are the additional gains of being the dominant rm
in the nal product market. In contrast, the ex ante ine¢ cient rms incentive
to invest is, ultimately, an attempt to balance two contrasting incentives: (i)
to increase investment in order to maintain its market position by reducing the
size of the ex post cost asymmetry; and (ii) to reduce investment so as to mit-
igate increased price competition in the nal product market. In general, the
latter incentive dominates as the a priori e¢ cient rm is able to preemptively
invest in cost reduction and force its rival to act "soft" in order to prevent
itself undermining its prots through tough price competition.
Second, if an ex ante ine¢ cient rm is the Stackelberg leader in the cost-
reduction stage, there are a four potential equilibrium outcomes that depend
on the relative abilities of the two rms. If the a priori e¢ ciency gap is large,
then the ex ante ine¢ cient rm invests simply to protect some market share.
This result obtains because, where the ex ante rm is very weak and unable to
make the most of its timing advantage, investment serves only to increase price
competition in the nal product market and undermine its prots. Therefore,
for a large e¢ ciency gap, the ex ante ine¢ cient rm "gives up". However, as
the initial e¢ ciency gap becomes smaller, the ine¢ cient rm becomes better
able to preemptively invest in cost reduction and temper the investment de-
cision of its rival rm. Consequently, the rm begins to "ght". However, it
is only when the gap between the two rms is su¢ ciently small that the in-
e¢ cient rm is able to overcome this e¢ ciency disadvantage, using its timing
advantage to either invest more than its a priori e¢ cient rival; become the ex
post low cost rm; or, become the dominant rm in the nal product market.
Therefore, the initial heterogeneity between the rms plays an important role
in determining the market outcome and, in general, relatively weak rms "give
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up" whilst stronger rms "ght".
These results are unique in the literature and suggest that the rmsabil-
ities to innovate - in terms of timing and e¢ ciency/ability - play a crucial
role in determining the composition of the nal product market. Furthermore,
whilst the ex post low cost rm always becomes the market leader it is not a
priori obvious whether this will be an ex ante e¢ cient or ine¢ cient rm. Con-
sequently, simply examining the structure of a market in which the rms face
(exogenously determined) cost asymmetries fails to comprehend the role that
innovative abilities play in determining the success, or failure, of the rms.
It is notable, however, that this model only examines the innovative process
within a duopoly setting, when innovation most likely occurs in markets with
more than two rms. Indeed, this is a conscious decision and keeps the as-
sumptions of this paper in line with the overwhelming majority of the existing
literature. Furthermore, given that the focus in the linear spatial competition
literature has been on duopolistic markets suggests that this omission is not
signicant.28 In fact, the existing literature that does extend the basic model
beyond two rms suggests that it is unlikely our results would be robust to
such a change. Using quadratic transport costs and a bounded location space,
Brenner (2005) nds the addition of rms undermines the principal of maximal
di¤erentiation. Simply, the "introducing a market boundary leads to asym-
metry between rms" with boundary rms locating more centrally - partially
agglomerating - to take advantage of their monopoly position in the corners,
allowing these rms to receive higher prices and yield larger prots than more
centrally located rms (Brenner, 2005: p.862).29 Whilst we cannot directly
transpose Brenners (2005) results into our work - as this model assumes an
unbounded city with ex ante asymmetric rms - it does highlight the fact that
28An interested reader may wish to examine the detailed review of the existing spatial
competition literature by Biscaia and Mota (2012) which notes a similar dearth of n rm
models in the eld of linear spatial competition.
29Economides (1993) examines a similar model to Brenner (2005) but maintains Hotellings
original assumption of linear transport costs. Similar to Brenners (2005) result, corner rms
are driven to locate more centrally but, due to weaker price competition, minimal di¤er-
entiation obtains. However, as in Hotellings (1929) original specication, this undermines
the existence of a location equilibrium. Andersen and Nevin (1991) analysed an identical
n-rm model to Economides (1993) but examined Cournot competition in the second stage,
nding that agglomeration in the centre of the market was the unique location equilibrium
outcome.
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equilibrium outcomes, even in the most simple linear spatial setting, can be al-
tered by the addition of rms. Therefore, given the sensitivity of linear spatial
models to the initial specication, including the number of rms, it is di¢ cult
to predict how the results presented here would change, even if one suspects
they will not be robust. Consequently, this is left to future research.
Another intriguing question that comes out of this work concerns whether
rms would, if possible, choose to innovate or locate rst. Such a decision can
be thought as emulating an important question regarding innovation: should
a rm be rst to market or the best product? Indeed, this is a scenario that
has cropped up many times, for example VHS and Betamax, Blu-ray and
HD DVD, and, more recently, the Playstation 4 and Xbox One. This is a
question that warrants further examination and, on the face of it, appears to
be a non-trivial question. On the one hand, the results presented here suggest
that there exists an unambiguous advantage to innovating rst; preemptively
investing in cost reduction enables a rm to temper the investment decision
of its rival and yields higher prots. On the other hand, Lambertini (2002)
notes that within the context of linear spatial competition, with an unbounded
location space, it appears that the rst mover possesses a signicant advantage
in the location stage too. That is, the leader locates in the centre of the
market whilst the follower is forced to locate outside of the market. Of course,
the existence of asymmetric rms, generating asymmetric production costs,
suggests that such an outcome is likely to di¤er but it is intuitively appealing
that some advantage would remain were the ex post high cost rm were to
locate rst.30 Given moving rst in either the investment or location games
leads to a competitive advantage, at the expense of the rival rm, allowing
the rms to endogenously choose whether to be rst to the market or the
best product would be intriguing. However, it is not a priori obvious what
asymmetric rms would choose or how this would depend upon the relative
e¢ ciencies of the rms.
However, as we have already discussed, it is not a trivial matter to simply
reverse the move order and so such a model may not be possible directly.31
30See Ziss (1993) and Matsumura and Matsushima (2009) for a discussion of how asym-
metric costs alter the location decisions with simultaneous moves. These results suggest
that linear spatial models are robust to su¢ ciently small cost di¤erentials.
31As a brief recap, if the sequence of investment and location decisions is reversed - with
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Nonetheless, it would still be interesting to endogenise the investment timing
and location timing decisions. In doing so, it would be possible to explore
whether the existing results in the patent race and endogenous market entry
literature hold within a linear spatial setting. That is: i) do rms with an
innovative advantage choose to invest rst?;32 and ii) do ex ante e¢ cient rms
become ex post market leaders by entering the market rst?33 Whilst there
is some evidence to suggest that results presented here do, at least partially,
agree with the existing literature, it would be interesting to see if these hold
up to more formal analysis. This is left to future research.
Finally, it has been widely noted within the literature that a key element
of R&D and innovation is the existence of knowledge spillovers between the
rms. The addition of spillover e¤ects in this context would be particularly in-
teresting as it would almost certainly alter the rmsincentives to preemptively
invest in the rst stage. That is, whilst the results presented here suggest that
aggressive investment in the rst stage serves to temper a rivals investment
decision, the addition of spillovers would add an opposing e¤ect: aggressive
investment would serve to benet the follower. Quite simply, the more a rm
invests in R&D, the greater the spillover e¤ect that accrues to the rival rm.
Consequently, spillovers may indirectly mitigate some of benets of investing
rst and reduce the potency of this advantage. Therefore, it is likely that
the addition of knowledge spillovers would have an impact on the equilibria
derived here, but a thorough analysis is left for future research.
rms locating before innovating - the model becomes intractable. Consequently, it may be
di¢ cult to give the rms a choice between investing and locating rst.
32See Pollock (2008), Chan and Kwok (2007), and Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003)
33See van Damme and Hurkens (1999), and Branco (2008).
Chapter 3
Cost reductions in a Hotelling
model with location based
spillover e¤ects
3.1 Introduction
In this paper we analyse whether a rms incentive to agglomerate, when
research spillovers are location based, survives the existence of asymmetric
abilities that may generate heterogeneous costs. In essence, should we ever see
asymmetric rms agglomerate, or is this simply the preserve of more symmetric
rms?
The importance of R&D spillovers and their impact on innovation have
been well documented since the seminal works of both dAspremont & Jacquemin
(1988) and Kamien et al (1992).1 Ever since this initial work, it has become
increasingly apparent that research spillovers do not simply rain down on their
beneciaries like manna from heaven but, instead, depend upon a rms ab-
sorptive capacity: their investment in R&D to be better able to both inno-
vate and assimilate the ideas of others. As Kamien and Zang (2000, p.997)
eloquently suggest, it is wrong to assume that "no e¤ort is required of the
recipients, not even purchase of a bucket".
More recently, there has been increasing empirical, anecdotal and theoret-
1Also see Suzumura (1992) and Salant and Sha¤er (1998) for further examples.
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ical evidence that has argued that even this assertion of absorptive capacity
may not tell the whole story, especially as it appears such benets only accrue
locally. Consequently, a new body of spatial competition literature has evolved
to examine whether rms may, quite literally, meet half way (Mai and Peng
(1999), Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005) and Sun (2013)). The results, so
far, have been clear: the greater the spillover rate, the greater the incentive for
rms to cluster with partial agglomeration being the likeliest outcome. Yet,
within this literature the rms are assumed to be homogeneous, mitigating
the potential for asymmetric outcomes in the nal product market. Moreover,
this assumption that rms are identical, especially in terms of research and
development, is not intuitively appealing. Instead, the abilities of rms to un-
dertake R&D can vary for a signicant number of reasons including, but not
limited to: the research skills of their employees; the quality of the equipment
and raw materials they have to work with; or simply a consequence of luck.
To address this question we employ a three-stage, innovation-location-price
Hotelling (1929) model with quadratic transport costs and make two key as-
sumptions: i) the closer the rms are to each other, the greater the benet
they receive from their rivalse¤orts in R&D; and ii) rms are a priori het-
erogeneous with respect to their innovative abilities, dened as the ability to
implement cost reductions and assimilate a rivals research (absorptive capac-
ity).2 ;3 It is the latter of these assumptions that is new to the literature and
asks, does the (partial) agglomeration incentive survive when the rms innov-
ative abilities are asymmetric?4
2Whilst the model assumes that the rms possess symmetric absorptive capacities, we
assume that they di¤er in their ability to implement knowledge spillovers. Consequently,
the results are the same as assuming asymmetric absorptive capacities.
3It is important to note that this paper only considers process innovation and, conse-
quently, horizontal di¤erentiation. Hotelling (1929) style models often focus on horizontal
di¤erentiation, but can be extended to include vertical di¤erentiation. In fact, using a simi-
lar model to that presented here, Sun (2013) nds that there exists a duality between process
and product innovation. That is, cost reduction and quality improving innovation "share
identical strategic properties" and that within a linear spatial model "[it is possible] to
derive the equilibrium strategies of a quality improving R&D model from the ones of a cost-
reducing R&D model, and vice versa" (Sun, 2013: p.138). Consequently, the results derived
here would likely transfer to a situation in which the products are vertically di¤erentiated,
or product innovation were used instead. Therefore, such an omission is irrelevant.
4To the authors knowledge, whilst there has been some examination of asymmetric costs
in the literature, nothing has been done which implies asymmetric absorptive capacity in a
spatial setting.
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Empirical evidence has, for some time, suggested that agglomeration is a
commonly observed phenomenon. Head et al (1995, p.243), examining data
on 751 Japanese manufacturing plants built in the US during the 1980s, found
"Japanese investors [preferred] to site their plants in areas where they [found]
concentrations of previous Japanese investments in the same industry and, for
auto-related rms". They conclude that, given this apparently strong incentive
to agglomerate, these results could not be explained by the location of natural
resources nor specialised labour alone and, instead, suggest that agglomeration
benets must play an important role. In related work, Audretsch and Feldman
(1996) examine which industries are more likely to see agglomeration nding
that those which place a greater relative importance on new economic knowl-
edge often see rms locate closer to one another. Finally, Ja¤e et al (1993)
use patent citations to examine the "locality" of spillovers. The key nding,
that domestic patents are most often cited domestically, is taken to determine
that spillover e¤ects are, indeed, local as has often been assumed.
However, it has taken some time for the theoretical literature to o¤er an un-
derstanding of why this occurs. Using Hotellings (1929) framework, Mai and
Peng (1999), using exogenous cost reductions, examine the incentives for ho-
mogeneous rms to agglomerate if research spillovers are inversely proportional
to the distance between the rms. They nd that, only when the spillover rate
is su¢ ciently large, and convex in the distance between the rms, will rms
nd it optimal to even partially agglomerate, though maximal and minimal
di¤erentiation are both possible. Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005) exam-
ine a similar model but assume: i) endogenous investments; and ii) R&D is
quality-improving. Interestingly, their results also nd that the incentive to
agglomerate is linked to the initial rate and convexity of spillovers, with partial
agglomeration the most likely outcome.5 In related work, Mota and Brandão
(2004) examine cost reductions and spatial agglomeration but in which rms
compete in quantities in the second stage nding that only complete agglom-
eration obtains within the model. So,why is there this discrepancy between
price and quantity competition?
The reason that price competition, in general, only supports partial ag-
5In recent work, Sun (2013) examines the di¤erence bewteen the cost reducing and quality
improving R&D nding that within this framework they are, in fact, equivalent.
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glomeration is a consequence of the transport cost specication. Within a
linear spatial framework, as transport costs become increasingly convex, small
gains in market share from locating closer to a rival are increasingly o¤set
by rapidly escalating price competition (dAspremont et al (1979) and Econo-
mides (1986)). Moreover, with quadratic transport costs this e¤ect becomes
so pronounced that rms would wish to locate outside of the citys boundaries
(Lambertini (1997) and Tabuchi and Thisse (1995)). Consequently, for even
partial agglomeration to be optimal, spillovers must be su¢ ciently large to at
least partially overcome this hurdle and this can only occur if spillovers are
su¢ ciently convex in the distance between the rms.6 However, no such con-
ict exists when rms compete in quantities and, consequently, this means any
incentive to agglomerate leads to complete agglomeration.
However, whether agglomeration would ever be optimal between asym-
metric rms is not a priori obvious. Initially noted by Schultz and Stahl
(1985), the existence of asymmetric costs can undermine pure strategy equi-
libria. Formalised by Ziss (1993), using exogenous cost di¤erentials, it appears
that (maximal di¤erentiation) location equilibria can only be supported where
the cost di¤erential between the rms are not too large. Matsumura and Mat-
sushima (2009) then extended this result in two ways. First, for "small" cost
di¤erentials the rms would prefer to locate outside of the city boundaries,
with the asymmetric rm locating more centrally. Second, for all "large" cost
di¤erentials, a solution in mixed strategies always existed. Intuitively, for large
cost di¤erentials the equilibrium becomes an e¤ective game of "cat and mouse"
with the ex ante stronger rm attempting to prevent entry by locating next to
the weaker rm and the weaker rm trying to get away. It is these result that
lead us to ask a new question: if asymmetric rms may face di¤erent invest-
ment and location incentives, should we ever expect them to agglomerate?
We nd two important results: one that contradicts and one that comple-
ments the existing literature. First, with location based spillovers, the rms
never nd it optimal to (partially) agglomerate and maximal di¤erentiation al-
ways obtains, and this holds even where the rms are symmetric and spillovers
are convex in the distance between the rms. However, this result is not sur-
prising because, once rms have selected their costs, endogenously generating
6See Mai and Peng (1999) and Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005).
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an ex post cost di¤erential, the ferocity of price competition remains in the
location stage.7 Therefore, when the rms are choosing their locations, the
rapidly escalating price competition that occurs as the rms move towards
one another, noted by dAspremont et al (1979) and Economides (1986), acts
as a centrifugal force driving the rms to remain as far from each other as
possible.
Second, and complementing the existing literature regarding cost di¤eren-
tials and spatial competition, the addition of asymmetric rms - and conse-
quently asymmetric spillovers - leads to an increasingly asymmetric outcome.
Where a rm is better able to both reduce its own costs and assimilate a rivals
economic knowledge, it becomes more aggressive in terms of both location and
investment. The location equilibrium ismore asymmetric under location based
spillovers than the generic case because of the existence of asymmetric absorp-
tive capacities. As the rms locate closer to one another, the more able rm
assimilates more knowledge than it leaks to its ine¢ cient rival. Consequently,
this enables it to become more predatory and push its rival further from the
market. In turn, this incentivises the rm to increase its initial research e¤orts
because of the greater rewards, particularly market share and prots, that it
is able to obtain from doing so. The impact of location based spillovers on
a less able rm are less straightforward and related to the level of consumer
heterogeneity. When consumers are relatively homogeneous, and can switch
between products easily, this makes a more able rm more of a "threat". Un-
der such circumstances, the less able rm reduces its investment and locates
further from the market in order to mitigate price competition and minimise
spillover between the rms. For large transport costs, where consumers nd
it harder to switch between goods, the more able rms predatory threat is
less pronounced. Consequently, a less able rm may invest more because it
considers itself better protected from the more able rms predatory threat.
Another body of literature to which this paper relates, and another crucial
aspect of the innovative process, examines patent races. Whilst not explicitly
examined here, this body of literature gives some indication as to which rm
has the most incentive to innovate. The early literature, focusing on determin-
istic R&D and complete information regarding the rmsinnovation strategies,
7This is akin to Matsumura and Matsushima (2009) but with endogenous cost selection.
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sheds some light as to whether ex ante e¢ cient rms can be "leapfrogged" by
ex ante ine¢ cient rms or if they are destined to maintain their position.8
Gilbert and Newbury (1982), examining the strategic actions of an incumbent
monopolist, concluded that, as monopoly prots are always at least as large
of those in any other market structure, there always exists an incentive to
defend this position by preemptively investing and patenting.9 However, it
appears that these results are not robust to the existence of asymmetric rms.
Rather, when one rm is granted a competitive advantage in innovation, the
results become more extreme. Fudenberg et al (1983), Harris and Vickers
(1985a; 1985b) and Aoki (1991) all nd that granting a rm any advantage
in the innovation stage - be it a larger reward from obtaining a patent, being
better at R&D, or simply being further along the development path - it will
dominate the competition and always wins the patent race.10 Though, this
may be because the "leader" in a patent race invests more heavily than the
follower (Harris and Vickers, 1987). Quite simply, then, the early industrial
organisation literature highlights that a rm with some innate advantage in a
patent race will, inherently, become the winner.
The most recent literature regarding patent races has focused on uncertain
returns to innovation by adopting a real options approach, the right - though
not obligation - to invest in a new technology (Dixit and Pindyk, 1994). Quite
remarkably, similar results obtain in the real options literature, directly com-
parable to those obtained in the earlier work. Or, as Hsu and Lambrecht (2007:
p.21) eloquently state, "one [should] expect qualitative nature of previous re-
sults from the industrial organisation literature on the timing of technological
innovation is likely to remain unaltered by uncertainty and asymmetric infor-
mation".
8A more detailed literature review of this can be found in Pollock (2008). However, it
suggests that since the initial work regarding patent races, the examination of patents has
become more focused on: i) patent design; ii) cumulative innovation; iii) licensing; iv)
imitation; and v) the openess of innovation (such as the rise of open source software).
We ignore a discussion of cumulative innovation here as innovation, within this model,
consists of only a single stage.
9Leininger (1991) notes that Gilbert and Newburys (1982) basic model is, in essence,
a simple auction for a patent. Therefore, as rms must compete to "win" the auction,
rents are dissipated compared to the monopoly position. Moreover, where the rms become
increasingly symmetric, rent dissipation is exacerbated.
10These results are robust for both single- and multi-stage innovation. Furthermore, the
issue of rent dissipation, as observed by Leininger (1991), still obtains.
3. Cost reductions in a Hotelling model with location based spillover e¤ects 72
When the protability of investment is uncertain, and when rms face no
competition, the real options approach suggests it is better to wait for better
information regarding the protability of investment before committing (Huis-
man and Kort ,1999). In contrast, when a rm faces competition, the benets
of waiting are undermined as there is the potential to be preempted which
drives rms to invest earlier than they would have done otherwise; a deci-
sion made to preempt their rivals and win the patent race. Furthermore, this
result becomes more pronounced as the number of rms participating in the
race increases, as each rm faces a stronger threat of preemption which drives
them to invest earlier still (Bouis et al, 2009; Grenadier, 2002).11 However, the
result most pertinent here are those derived between asymmetric rms. Chan
and Kwok (2007) examine a real options model in which the rms face asym-
metric costs of innovation, though cost information is common knowledge, and
conclude that it is the most innovative and e¢ cient rm that should win the
patent race. However, this result can be criticised because, if the rms com-
pete with complete information, why dont they simply cooperate to maximise
joint prots?12 However, Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), using a model in
which the rms face uncertainty regarding the costs of their rivals, the rms
still attempt to strategically preempt their rivals, though the extent to which
this occurs depends upon the initial distribution of costs. Nonetheless, it is,
once again, the most innovative and e¢ cient that should win the race.
It is interesting that the existing literature - using two very di¤erent ap-
proaches - nds identical results: where rms compete in deterministic R&D,
it is the rm with some competitive advantage in innovation that will always
win the race.13 In essence, these results suggest that the rms that are better
at innovating - due to, for example, receiving higher payo¤s from innovation,
facing lower R&D costs, or being further along the development path - are the
11Grenadier (2002) notes that, at the limit, rms are induced to invest where their ex-
pected returns from investment are zero, or all expected rents are completely dissipated.
In contrast, Bouis et al (2009) nding that almost all expected prots are dissipated when
facing only a single competitor.
12This criticism of complete information is made by both Weeds (2002) and Lambrecht
and Perraudin (2003).
13Indeed, the only di¤erence between the equilibria between complete and incomplete
information cases is that, in the incomplete information case, the rms optimally adjust
their preemptive investment behaviour to take into account the risk associated with uncertain
payo¤s.
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most likely to be the "winners" and, consequently, have the biggest incentive
to innovate. The results presented here are, in some way linked, by suggesting
that, as in the patent race literature, the rm with the innovative advantage
has the most to gain. That is, our results suggest that the rm that is better
at R&D, in terms of both implementing their own research and assimilating
knowledge spillovers, unambiguously dominate the ex post product market.
Consequently, it is likely that, were rms able to choose when to invest in cost
reduction, it would be the rm with the innovative advantage that would be
the most likely to invest rst.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 3.2 we present the
model. In sections 3.3 - 3.5 we solve the game using backward induction, rst
nding equilibrium prices, then locations and nally investment levels. Section
3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model
Consider a three-stage simultaneous-move duopoly model. In the rst stage,
the rms compete in cost reducing innovation before making location and price
decisions in the second and third periods respectively. Firms are heterogeneous
with respect to their cost reducing abilities.
This particular sequence of moves, innovation-location-price, makes sense
as a way of interpreting agglomeration strategies. As observed in the empirical
evidence regarding agglomeration, it is themost innovative rms and industries
that tend to agglomerate (Head et al, 1993; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996).
Moreover, it is the most innovative rms that are more likely to have started
or committed to an innovative strategy prior to deciding a location.14 If this is
the case, then it is the impact of the rms initial investment decision, as well as
the decisions of its rivals, that prompts it to choose its location and, therefore,
whether or not to agglomerate. This is especially true when one considers that
14As a more up-to-date example, one can consider Sonys development of the Playstation
4 console. The development cycle began with the very broad goal of "freeing developers
from technological barriers" (IGN, 2013a). However, later in the development cycle Sony
began to focus on developing a unique set of product characteristics, or locations. In this
instance, a keen focus on improving the social aspects of gaming (IGN, 2013b). Therefore,
whilst developing a new and innovative product, Sonys initial investment was kept broad
before developing specic set product characteristics at a later date.
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the rms also take into account: i) the magnitude of the knowledge spillovers,
a function of both investment and the distance between the rms; and ii) their
ability to assimilate the knowledge leaked by their rivals.15 Therefore, as the
rmsinitial investment decisions has both direct and indirect implications for
the agglomeration decision, this sequence of moves appears to t the empirical
observations well.
However, there is another, and more practical, reason for the adoption
of this approach: changing the order of moves is non-trivial extension. In-
deed, where rms are allowed to locate before making investment decisions
the model: i) becomes intractable in its current form; or ii) yields meaning-
less/nonsensical results when using simplifying assumptions. With respect to
the latter, some of the existing literature has been able to overcome the issue of
complexity, but this has involved assuming that the rms locate symmetrically
around the centre of the market (Piga and Poyago-Theotoky, 2005; Sun, 2013).
However, where rms are a priori asymmetric, it is not intuitively appealing
to make such an assumption.16 Consequently, it appears that it is not possible
to reverse the order of moves without making an unappealing assumption.
As in Hotellings (1929) seminal work, two rms, A and B, supply a physi-
cally homogeneous good from di¤erent locations on the real axis. The location
of rm N is denoted by n 2 R and, consequently, the location of each rm is
measured from zero. This implies that rms are free to locate anywhere on the
real axis and, without loss of generality, we assume a < b.17 Firms maximise
prots at each stage.
Consumers are uniformly distributed across a linear city of unit length and
are assumed to have a density of one. For simplicity the city is dened by
[0; 1] 2 R which ensures that any a; b =2 [0; 1] simply implies that a rm is
located outside of the citys boundaries. Consumers face unit demands and
consume either zero or one units of production. Consequently, a consumer,
located at x 2 [0; 1], would only purchase a good from rm N , located at n, if
15A recent paper by Matsumura and Matsushima (2012) use a similar sequence of stages
to examine the di¤erence between R&D in bounded and unbounded cities. However, unlike
here, they assume that the rms are symmetric.
16See Ziss (1993) and Matsumura and Matsushima (2009).
17It is trivial to derive the results for the case a > b.
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and only if
Ux = s  pN   t(x  n)2  0
where s is a xed utility of consuming a good, pN is the price charged by
rm N , t is a measure of consumer heterogeneity and t(x  n)2 is a quadratic
transport cost incurred by a consumer having to move a distance of jx  nj to
consume rm Ns good.18 In order to ensure that total demand is equal to one,
or that each consumer purchases a good, s is assumed to be large enough that
Ux  0 for all x 2 [0; 1] for at least one of the rmsproducts and consumers
only purchase the good that maximises their utility.
In the rst stage the rms simultaneously invest in cost reduction to reduce
their ex ante production cost. At the beginning of the rst stage, we assume
that both rms face a symmetric production cost, c, that can be reduced by
'N(IN) (the specication of this function is given below) at a cost of CN(IN)
by undertaking investment IN , N 2 fA;Bg. For simplicity we assume that the
cost-reduction function, 'N(IN), is a linear function of a rms own investment
level. Thus the nal unit cost of rm N (used in the price and location stages),
is given by
cN = c  'N(IN)
We assume that the investment cost schedule CN(IN) is quadratic as fol-
lows:
CN(IN) =
1
2
I2N
In this paper we assume that the cost-reducing investment undertaken by
a certain rm can also benet its rival i.e. the cost-reducing investment has a
spillover e¤ect. Moreover, we assume that these spillover e¤ects are location
based : the closer a rm is to its rival, the more it can benet from its rivals
cost-reducing activities. The specic functional form of the cost-reduction used
is given by:
18The assumption of quadratic transport costs is to ensure pure strategy Nash equilibria
in the location and pricing stages (see dAspremont et al (1979)).
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Firm A : 'A(IA) = IA +
IB
1 + b  a (3.1)
Firm B : 'B(IB) = IB +
IA
1 + b  a (3.2)
where  2 (0; 1) represents the fact that rm B is relatively ine¢ cient or
has a lesser ability to implement a cost reducing technology. The second
term in equations (3.1) and (3.2) illustrates the location based spillover e¤ects
experienced by a rm due to the cost-reducing activities undertaken by its rival.
In line with both Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005) and Mai and Peng (1999),
this spillover rate is convex in the distance between the rms; a necessary
condition for agglomeration in the current literature. There are two crucial
observations to be made about the second term in the cost reduction schedule.
First, whilst the spillover rate,  2 (0; ), is symmetric between the two rms,
absorptive capacities are asymmetric as the rate of assimilation is increasing
in the ability of the rm.19 Second, the strength of this spillover e¤ect is
inversely related to the distance between two rms, with the maximum spillover
occurring where the rms agglomerate.
To exemplify the contribution of the model, and further examine the im-
portance of location based spillovers, we also consider a benchmark case where
spillover e¤ects are not location based. In this generic spillover case, the cost-
reduction functions take the following forms:
'A(IA) = IA + IB
'B(IB) = IB + IA
These functions o¤er a useful comparison because they allows for similar asym-
metries - both in terms of costs and absorptive capacities - to be realised as
those in the location based case. Thus, they allow for some insight into how
endogenising the spillovers between rms may impact upon the nal product
market and whether agglomeration is ever optimal when the rms are asym-
19At rst, the assumption that  2 (0; ) seems intuitively unappealing. However, it
simply states that a more able rm cannot get more from a rivals research than the rival
itself.
3. Cost reductions in a Hotelling model with location based spillover e¤ects 77
metric.
Finally, we make one additional, and crucial, assumption.
Assumption 1. t > 16
27
(1  16
25
)2
This assumption is made for two reasons. First, this assumption ensures
that the results presented here are derived such that both rms remain active
in the nal product market. In essence, it is an Eaton and Lipsey (1978) "no
mill price undercutting" assumption that is common within the spatial com-
petition literature.20 When such an assumption is not met, no pure strategy
Nash equilibria exist as all location equilibria are undermined (Ziss, 1993).
The reason for such a result is that, were this assumption to be undermined,
one rm would generate a su¢ ciently large ex post cost di¤erential that the
rmsincentives at the location stage become opposite extremes. That is, two
contradictory agglomeration strategies emerge: i) the ex post e¢ cient rm
wishes to completely agglomerate to minimise the costs of entry deterrence;
and ii) the ex post e¢ cient rm "gives up", invests nothing and tries to keep
maximal di¤erentiation by "running away" (Ziss, 1993; Matsumura and Mat-
sushima, 2009). In fact, these contradictory strategies lead to maximal and
minimal di¤erentiation appearing with equal probability, or entry deterrence
being successful with probability 1=2. However, it is apparent that the exis-
tence of strategic entry deterrence completely undermines one rms incentive
to agglomerate. Consequently, in order to examine whether it is ever optimal
for asymmetric rms to agglomerate, it is necessary to remove the possibility
of strategic entry deterrence, or assume that both rms remain active in the
nal product market.21 Second, this assumption enables a direct comparison
between the equilibrium investment and location decisions derived under the
generic and location based spillover regimes.
The game proceeds as follows: In the rst stage, rms select their invest-
ment levels, IN 2 [0;1) simultaneously; in the second stage, each rm selects
its location, n 2 R 8 N 2 fA;Bg, simultaneously. Finally, in the third stage,
20For example, both Ziss (1993) and Matsumura and Matsuhima (2009) make similar
assumptions when examining the impact of cost asymmetries on linear spatial competition.
21Given that the consequence of removing this assumption has already been well docu-
mented by both Ziss (1993) and Matsumura and Matsushima (2009), its omission is incon-
sequential.
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rms select their prices, pN 2 [cN ;1), simultaneously. We solve the game
using backward induction.
3.3 Price Stage
A consumer, located at x, is indi¤erent between purchasing either good A or
good B if and only if
s  pA   t(x  a)2 = s  pB   t(b  x)2 (3.3)
As a < b by assumption, the total demand for good A is given by all consumers
located to the left of x and demand for good B is the residual demand, 1  x.
Solving equation (3.3) yields the demand functions:
DA = x =
pB   pA
2t(b  a) +
(a+ b)
2
DB = 1  x = pA   pB
2t(b  a) +
(2  a  b)
2
Taking these demand functions as given, rm Ns prots are given by the
expression:22
N = (pN   c+ 'N)DN   CN
Firms simultaneously select prices, pN 2 [cN ;1), to maximise prots, taking
location and investment choices as given. Simultaneously solving the rst
order conditions with respect to own price for each rm yields equilibrium
prices given by
pA =
3c  2'A   'B + t(b  a)(2 + a+ b)
3
(3.4)
pB =
3c  'A   2'B + t(b  a)(4  a  b)
3
(3.5)
From the second order conditions, it is possible to observe that a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in prices always exists, regardless of the locations and
22For notational purposes, as IN is known at this stage we abbreviate 'N (IN ) and CN (IN )
to 'N and CN respectively.
3. Cost reductions in a Hotelling model with location based spillover e¤ects 79
the ex post cost disparity between the two rms.23 Furthermore, the signs of
the components within pN are all as one would expect, with prices increasing
in the a priori unit cost and decreasing in the cost reduction e¤orts of both
rms. The reduced form prot functions for both rms are then:24
A =
['A   'B + t(b  a)(2 + a+ b)]2
18t(b  a)   CA (3.6)
B =
['B   'A + t(b  a)(4  a  b)]2
18t(b  a)   CB (3.7)
where CN = 12I
2
N and 'N , N 2 fA;Bg, is given by equations (3.1) and (3.2).
3.4 Location Stage
In this section we examine the location decisions of both rms under generic
and location based spillovers before comparing the two cases.
3.4.1 Benchmark: spillovers are independent of location
In this case, the equilibrium locations can easily be demonstrated to be
ag =
(1  )IA   (  )IB
3t
  1
4
(3.8)
bg =
(1  )IA   (  )IB
3t
+
5
4
(3.9)
where the subscript g represents the optimum location values for the generic
spillover case.
Within this framework, we are able to observe a number of comparative
statics.
23The relevant second order conditions are given by
@2N
@p2N
=   1
t(b  a) < 0 8 N 2 fA;Bg
Thus, prots are maximised for all location pairs where b > a as we assume.
24For notational purposes, as IN is known at this stage we abbreviate 'N (IN ) and CN (IN )
to 'N and CN respectively, N 2 fA;Bg.
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Remark 10 In the generic spillover case, rm N 2 fA;Bg moves towards its
rival if it increases it own investment and away if a rival does so. Moreover, as
the rms become increasingly symmetric,  ! 1, the rms locations become
increasingly symmetric. The impact of the spillover rate and transport costs
are ambiguous for both rms. Formally, for rm A25
@ag
@IAg
=
1  
3t
> 0
@ag
@IAg
=
   
3t
< 0
@ag
@
=  IAg + IBg
3t
< 0
@ag
@
=  1
3
IAg   IBg
t
@ag
@t
=  1
3
(  )IBg   (1  )IAg
t2
In many respects, remark 10 is as one would expect. First, as a rm
invests more, or its rival less, this increases the cost disparity between the
rms and makes it relatively more e¢ cient. This creates an incentive for the
rm with relatively lower unit costs to locate more aggressively by moving
towards its rival to secure a greater market share and larger prots. In turn,
this induces the rival rm to "run" (move away from the more e¢ cient rm)
in order to mitigate rapidly escalating price competition and preserve some of
its market share. Second, as the rms become increasingly symmetric, ! 1,
the weaker rm becomes an increasingly able rival. At all levels of investment,
increasing  reduces the cost disparity and leaves the e¢ cient rm less able
to "push" its rival away. In fact, once the rms are identical, a symmetric
location equilibrium obtains, à la Lambertini (1997) and Tabuchi and Thisse
(1995), such that (ag; bg) = ( 14 ; 54).26 Finally, the ambiguity of the transport
cost and spillover rate equations is driven by the fact that they a¤ect both
rms. Moreover, the impact that they have on both rms is dependent on
the prevailing investment levels of both rms. Therefore, no general result
25Given the identical functional forms of ag and bg, the comparative statics are identical
for both rms.
26This symmetric equilibrium result is, in part, driven by the fact that once  = 1 the
rms will also invest symmetrically.
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obtains.27
Whilst how the rms move given changes to the initial parameters is im-
portant, the next remark observes an equally important result.
Remark 11 Regardless of the investment levels, the relative abilities and the
spillover rate, the distance between rms A and B is constant. More precisely,
b  a = 3
2
Proof. The proof is trivial and omitted.
This result states maximal di¤erentiation always obtains in the generic
spillover case, or the comparative statics are identical for both rms: if one
rm moves closer to its rival, the rival moves away by the same amount. In
fact, this result o¤ers additional support for a result that has frequently ob-
tained within linear spatial models with unbounded location spaces: maximal
product di¤erentiation in an unbounded linear space occurs where rms main-
tain a distance of 3=2 from each other (Tabuchi and Thisse, 1995; Lambertini,
1994, 1997 and 2002). Furthermore, Matsumura and Matsushima (2009) nd
that this result is robust to su¢ ciently small, exogenously determined cost
asymmetries.28 In all of the aforementioned examples, the cause of this level
of di¤erentiation is rapidly intensifying price competition exacerbated by even
small moves towards a rival rm, which acts as a centrifugal force keeping the
rms apart. Furthermore, the generic spillover specication o¤ers no incentive
to agglomerate, with spillovers being "manna from heaven" regardless of where
the rms locate, and so there is no centripetal force incentivising the rms to
locate closer to one another. Consequently, it is intuitively appealing that this
commonly observed result would also appear here.
27Despite being ambiguous from the point of view of the location stage, once equilibrium
investments are accounted for we observe that both are strictly negative. Formally,
@ag
@
=
2
9
(1  )(1 + ) [16(1  )(   )  27t]
t

8(1 + 2)(1 + 2)  32   27t2 < 0
@ag
@t
=   6(1  )(1 + )(1  )(1 + )
t

8(1 + 2)(1 + 2)  32   27t < 0
28Assumption 1 ensures that the cost di¤erentials derived here are su¢ ciently small that
a similar result obtains.
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3.4.2 When spillovers depend on locations
Even though cost reducing investments are undertaken in the rst stage,
the rms locations now determine the extent of spillover benet that rm
N 2 fA;Bg can reap from its rival. Using the equations (3.1) and (3.2), the
equilibrium locations are given by
al =
1
75
(25  22)IA   (25  22)IB
t
  1
4
(3.10)
bl =
1
75
(25  22)IA   (25  22)IB
t
+
5
4
(3.11)
where the subscripts l represent the optimal location when there is location
based spillover e¤ects.
Interestingly, the comparative statics are similar to the previous case.
Remark 12 In the location based spillover case, rm N 2 fA;Bg moves to-
wards its rival if it increases its own investment and away if a rival does so.
Moreover, as the rms become increasingly symmetric,  ! 1, the rms lo-
cations become increasingly symmetric. The impact of the spillover rate and
transport costs are ambiguous for both rms. Formally, for rm A
@al
@IAl
=
(25  22)
75t
> 0
@al
@IBl
=  (25  22)
75t
< 0
@ag
@
=  22IAl + 25IBl
75t
< 0
@al
@
=  22
75
IAl   IBl
t
@al
@t
=   1
75
(25  22)IAl   (25  22)IBl
t2
The intuition behind these results is identical to those of the benchmark
case. Any change that makes a rm relatively more e¢ cient ex post, which
tips the balance of competition in their favour, drives that rm to locate more
aggressively and its rival less so.
However, as the next remark demonstrates, agglomeration is never sup-
ported in equilibrium.
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Remark 13 In the location based spillover model maximal di¤erentiation al-
ways obtains, or
b  a = 3
2
On the face of it, this result implies that regardless of the additional benets
that the rms could reap through (partial) agglomeration, this never happens.
More surprising still is the fact that this holds true for even symmetric rms,
where  = 1. In fact, this result, it appears is robust to simple changes in the
specication of the model, such as: i) allowing the ex ante weaker rms ability
to complete its own research and absorb spillover e¤ects to di¤er; ii) changing
the specication of the spillover function; and iii) allowing spillovers, if rms
were to agglomerate, to become innite.29
29For completeness, we o¤er some results here.
First, under the original specication, allowing the ex ante weaker rm to di¤er in its
ability to complete its own research and absorb spillovers implies
'B(IB) = a1IB +
a2IB
1 + b  a
where a1  a2. In this case, we obtain
a =
1
75
IA(25  22a2)  IB(25a1   22)
t
  1
4
b =
1
75
IA(25  22a2)  IB(25a1   22)
t
+
5
4
where the distance between the rms is constant at 32 .
Second, we adopted a more simplistic spillover specication:
'A(IA) = IA + (1 + a  b)IB
'B(IB) = 1IB + 2(1 + a  b)IB
In this case
a =
2IA(2  52)  2IB(5   21)
3t
  1
4
b =
2IA(2  52)  2IB(5   21)
3t
+
5
4
Again, it is trivial to check that the distance between the rms remains constant at 32 .
Finally, consider a functional form in which the spillover benet would be innite were
the rms to locate next to one another,
'A(IA) = IA +
IB
b  a
Under this specication, as the rms locate closer together we would expect them to benet
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Whilst this result appears to be robust to a variety of changes in speci-
cation of the spillover function, and consequently quite surprising, it should
be noted that this result is not unexpected. Whilst there are clearly bene-
ts to agglomeration, by increasing the amount of knowledge absorbed from
a rival rm and subsequently lower production costs, there is a simple and
intuitive explanation for the lack of agglomeration. The model presented here
is very much of the style used by that of Matsumura and Matsushima (2009)
except, in this case, the rms endogenously select the ex post cost asymme-
try before selecting their locations and prices. This means that the ferocity
of price competition, well documented in the linear spatial literature, remains
in the location stage and acts as a centrifugal force.30 Consequently, the fact
that the rms choose not to agglomerate - for any specication of the spillover
function - simply implies that the cost of exacerbating price competition al-
ways dominates the benet of agglomeration. Indeed, this explanation would
also explain why agglomeration is not optimal for symmetric rms. Therefore,
it would appear that, where rms choose their costs prior to deciding on their
locations, agglomeration is optimal, and it is this result is robust to changes
from rapidly increasing cost reductions. However, despite the tweak in functional form and
di¤erent location equilibria, the constant distance equilibrium still obtains. Formally,
a =
(1  2)IA   (  2)IB
3t
  1
4
b =
(1  2)IA   (  2)IB
3t
+
5
4
This suggests that, within this specication, the erceness of price competition is su¢ ciently
strong to keep them apart.
Second, a more simplistic spillover specication - à la Piga and PoyagoTheotoky (2005)
and Sun (2013) was used:
'A(IA) = IA + (1 + a  b)IB
'B(IB) = 1IB + 2(1 + a  b)IA
In this case
a =
2IA(2  52)  2IB(5   21)
3t
  1
4
b =
2IA(2  52)  2IB(5   21)
3t
+
5
4
Again, the distance between the rms remains constant at 32 .
30See DAspremont et al (1979), Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) and Lambertini (1994; 1997;
and 2002).
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in the specication of the spillover function.31
Despite the similarities between the two spillover regimes, the following
proposition demonstrates that the rmslocations do depend upon the spillover
type.
Proposition 14 Regardless of the relative abilities of the rms and the initial
spillover rate, the high ability rm locates more aggressively. Formally, where
rm A is the high ability rm
al > ag
bl > bg
Proof. See Appendix 7.1
Proposition 14 observes that rm A, the ex ante high ability rm, locates
more aggressively when spillovers are location based. In both spillover cases,
the low cost rm is able to locate more centrally by using its cost advantage
and the threat of erce price competition to drive its rival away. However,
when spillovers are location based, this gives the more able rm even more
power: by moving towards the less able rm it threatens to to obtain an even
greater cost disparity by absorbing more information than can be assimilated
by its ine¢ cient rival. This creates an added incentive for the high ability
rm to locate more aggressively. In contrast, the low ability rm is now more
fearful of its rival, in particular the high ability rms ability to act in an
increasingly predatory manner. It is this fear that, in turn, induces it to locate
further away from the market than it otherwise would have done to mitigate
price competition and spillovers between the rms.
This aggression is also apparent in how the rms respond to changes in
investment as the following proposition demonstrates.
Proposition 15 Regardless of the rms relative abilities and the spillover
rate, the rms are more responsive to changes in investment levels when spillovers
31As we have already mentioned, it is not trivial to reverse the order of moves. Conse-
quently, it is has not been possible to check that it is, indeed, the order of moves that is
driving this result. However, given the results presented here, it would appear that this is
the most likely cause.
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are location based. Formally,
@al
@IAl
>
@ag
@IAg
@al
@IBl
<
@ag
@IBg
Proof. See Appendix 7.2
Comparing the investment comparative statics implies that an increase in
own investment or a decrease in a rivals is met by a greater, more aggressive,
location response when spillovers are location based. As noted above, when
spillovers are location based, increasing one rms investment induces it to
locate closer to a rival because, by doing so, it threatens to further reduce
its production costs whilst also increasing price competition. It is this added
research stealing incentive, that does not exist in the generic spillover case,
that incentivises the rm to locate more aggressively in response to a changes
in its own investment levels. In contrast, this additional threat of predation
makes the rival rm more fearful of this extra investment and induces them to
locate further from the market than they otherwise would have done.
3.5 Investment Stage
In this section we examine the investment decisions of both rms under generic
and location based spillovers. In the generic spillover case, the reduced form
prot functions are given by
Ag =
1
108
[4IA(1  )  4IB(  ) + 9t]2
t
  1
2
I2A (3.12)
Bg =
1
108
[4IA(1  )  4IB(  )  9t]2
t
  1
2
I2B (3.13)
Solving the relevant rst order conditions obtains
IAg =
2
3
(1  )(16(  )2   27t)
8(1 + )2(1 + )2   32   27t (3.14)
IBg =
2
3
(  )(16(1  )2   27t)
8(1 + )2(1 + )2   32   27t (3.15)
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Similarly, in the location based spillover case, the reduced form prots are
given by
Al =
1
67500
[4IB(25  16)  4IA(25  16)  225t]2
t
  I2A (3.16)
Bl =
1
67500
[4IB(25  16)  4IA(25  16) + 225t]2
t
  I2B (3.17)
In this instance, the equilibrium investment levels are given by
IAl =
2
75
(25  16)[16(25  16)2   16875t]
8(2562 + 625)(1 + 2)  12800   16875t (3.18)
IBl =
2
75
(25  16)[16(25  16)2   16875t]
8(2562 + 625)(1 + 2)  12800   16875t (3.19)
As the following proposition demonstrates, both spillover regimes yield
similar results in general.
Proposition 16 Regardless of the spillover regime, and for all relative abili-
ties, spillover rates and transport costs, we observe that the ex ante high ability
rm, rm A, becomes the dominant rm in all important respects. More for-
mally, for x 2 fg; lg
1. IAx > IBx > 0;
2. 'Ax(IAx) > 'Bx(IBx);
3. The ex post cost di¤erential ensures a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in
the location stage; and
4. Ax > Bx > 0
Proof. For the proof of the generic (location based) spillover case see Appendix
7.3 (7.4)
Essentially, proposition 16 acts as a summary of the key results that obtain
under each spillover regime. What is apparent is that the ex ante high abil-
ity rm becomes dominant in all respects: investing more, generating lower
costs and obtaining strictly larger prots. Given the investments derived in
equations (3.14) - (3.19) it is clear that these results are interlinked. Given
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its greater cost-reducing ability, rm A is induced to invest more and obtain a
lower ex post unit cost. In turn, this creates an incentive for the rm to locate
more centrally; pushing the ex post ine¢ cient rm away due to the fear of
erce price competition. Consequently, the e¢ cient rm has a greater market
share and is able to use this to generate increased prots.
Whilst the ex ante high ability rm always becomes the dominant rm in
the ex post product market, the following proposition demonstrates that the
extent of the rms dominance is dependent upon the initial parameters.
Proposition 17 Regardless of the spillover regime, and for all relative abili-
ties, spillover rates, and transport costs, the high ability rms investment is
strictly decreasing in its rivals ability and the spillover rate. Formally, for all
x 2 fg; lg
@IAx
@
< 0
@IAx
@
< 0
In contrast, the low ability rms investment is strictly increasing in its rela-
tive ability and increasing (decreasing) in the spillover rate if and only if the
transport cost is su¢ ciently small (large). Formally,
@IBx
@
> 0
@IBx
@
 0, t  tx
@IBx
@
< 0, t > tx
where tx is the critical value at which @IBx
@
= 0.32
Proof. For the proof of the generic (location based) spillover case see Appendix
7.5 (7.6)
Proposition 17 observes that, regardless of the spillover regime, the rms
invest in a similar way. First, as the rms become relatively more symmetric,
! 1, the investment level of rm A falls whilst rm Bs rises. Quite simply,
32At present we cannot say anything about the relationship between tg and tl.
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when the rms become increasingly symmetric, the investment levels converge
or, when the ex ante ine¢ cient rm becomes relatively less ine¢ cient, it makes
it harder for the more able rm to dominate a less able rm. Consequently,
the more able rm is induced to invest less, and its rival more, until the rms
are symmetric. Moreover, once the rms are symmetric, and investment levels
identical, they locate symmetrically around the centre of the market, (a; b) =
( 1
4
; 5
4
); the classic result of Lambertini (1997) and Tabuchi and Thisse (1995).
Second, as the spillover rate increases, a more able rms investment falls
because additional investment further reduces the cost of its rival. For large
transport costs, a similar result obtains for the ex ante less able rm. However,
when the transport cost is small, it makes it increasingly easy for consumers to
switch "brands". Consequently, whilst rm A reduces its investment, this gives
rm B an opportunity to increase its market share; increasing its investment
levels.
As the following proposition demonstrates, despite the similarities between
the cases, investment levels are not symmetrical across the spillover regimes.
Proposition 18 Irrespective of the initial parameter values, the more able
rm always invests strictly more in the location based case, or IAl > IAg.
However, for all relative abilities, spillover rates and transport costs, there
exists a critical value of t, given by ty, that lies within the relevant range of t,
such that for all t > ty, IBl > IBg. For all t < ty, IBg > IBl.
Proof. See Appendix 7.7
For rm A, proposition 18 highlights that it invests more aggressively when
the rms face location based spillovers. Moreover, this result does not disap-
pear when the rms are symmetric.33 This suggests that even with symmetric
rms, who will invest identical amounts, rm A is induced to invest more
despite the fact that the rms do not locate closer to one another.
The question is then, why does rm A invest more aggressively when facing
location based spillovers? The answer is simple. When rms are asymmetric,
 2 (0; 1), the ex ante more able rm faces an additional benet from investing
heavily in the rst stage: the ability to locate closer to a rival and assimilate
more knowledge that it gives away. This additional predatory threat makes
33IAl   IAgj=1 = 625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the more able rm a more potent competitor and enables it to push its rival
further from the market. In turn, it is induced to invest more. Yet, even when
rms are symmetric,  = 1, the potential benets from investing aggressively
remain. Therefore, even under the symmetric case, rm A invests more heavily
than it would have done in the generic spillover case.34
In the case of rm B, it appears that it will only invest more under location
based spillovers if the level of consumer heterogeneity is su¢ ciently large. As
consumers become less willing to travel to purchase a good, it becomes harder
for a more able rival rm to "steal" them using price alone. Thus, even when
rm A invests heavily, the less able rm is, to some extent, protected. With the
more able rm less able to use predatory behaviour, the ex ante weaker rm is
more condent to invest and does so. However, when transport costs are low,
consumers are more ckle and more likely to switch between rms. In these
circumstances, rm As predatory actions are more potent and pose a much
greater threat to its less able rival. Consequently, rm Bs strategy changes
to one of survival. In order to mitigate erce price competition and minimise
spillovers it acts "soft", reducing its investment level and locating further from
the market. Consequently, a less able rms situation is much more volatile
and dependent upon the homogeneity of consumers within a market: the more
homogeneous the consumers, the more likely it is that it will have to "run".
3.6 Conclusion
This paper examined whether the incentives for rms to agglomerate, whilst
facing location based spillovers, survive the existence of asymmetric rms.
More importantly, we extend the existing literature by allowing rms to di¤er,
simultaneously, in two ways: i) the rms are a priori heterogeneous with
respect to their innovative abilities; and ii) they have asymmetric absorptive
capacities. Given the potential disparities that may arise under this setting,
we asked: is it reasonable for asymmetric rms to agglomerate.
Our results, in one crucial respect, go beyond this question. With location
based spillovers and an investment-location-price specication, the rms never
nd it optimal to (partially) agglomerate and maximal di¤erentiation always
34In many ways, this is a classic "prisoners dilemma".
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obtains. In fact, not even symmetric rms nd it optimal to locate closer to
one another. This result is driven by the ferocity of price competition that
acts as a centrifugal force, pushing the rms away from one another. In other
words, the classic dAspremont et al (1979) result of maximal di¤erentiation
holds. However, it is likely that once the order of moves is reversed, or rms
locate before innovation, the incentive to agglomerate returns.
Our results also complement the existing literature regarding asymmetric
rms and spatial competition. It appears that location based spillovers, com-
bined with asymmetric rms, leads to increasingly asymmetric outcomes. Were
the rms to face no spillovers, the classic results of Ziss (1993) and Matsumura
and Matsushima (2009) would surely obtain. Yet, the addition of asymmetric
absorptive capacities compounds the situation. Now, as the rms locate closer
to one another, the more able rm assimilates more knowledge than it leaks to
its ine¢ cient rival. Consequently, this enables it to become more threatening
and push its rival further from the market. In turn, this incentivises the rm to
increase its initial research e¤orts because of the greater rewards, particularly
market share and prots, that it is able to obtain from doing so. In contrast,
the weaker rms decisions are more reliant upon the level of consumer hetero-
geneity. With more homogeneous consumers, the weaker rm faces a greater
threat of predatory behaviour. To mitigate this increased threat, and reduce
price competition, the rm invests less and moves further from the market.
However, when consumers are less "ckle", this threat is reduced and the rm
is willing to invest more.
Whilst this paper set out to examine whether agglomeration is undermined
by the existence of asymmetric rms, we cannot say that this is the case: as
even symmetric rms would never optimally agglomerate, our results are in-
conclusive. Future work should continue to examine this important issue, es-
pecially as clustering is a commonly observed phenomenon. However, the best
way to do this is unclear. Whilst some work has found a theoretical support
for agglomeration within a spatial setting, these often make assumptions that
are objectionable (Piga and Poyago-Theotoky, 2005; Mai and Peng, 1999).
Yet, it is apparent that without such assumptions it may not be possible to
determine an equilibrium outcome if rms are able to choose a location prior
to investing in cost reduction (Piga and Poyago-Theotoky, 2005). Therefore,
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in spite of being the most appealing setting for examining agglomeration, a
spatial setting may not be suitable for such research.
It should also be noted that one area of criticism for this work is the as-
sumption that the market consists of only two rms when, in reality, innovative
markets would consist of more rms. However, this is a conscious decision and
one that has been made to keep this paper in line with the majority of the
linear spatial literature. Indeed, the dearth of oligopolistic linear spatial mod-
els suggests: i) this is a non-trivial addition; and/or ii) this oversight is not
signicant.35 In fact, the existing literature that does extend the basic model
beyond two rms suggests that it is unlikely our results would be robust to
such a change. Using quadratic transport costs and a bounded location space,
Brenner (2005) nds the addition of rms undermines the principal of maximal
di¤erentiation. Simply, the "introducing a market boundary leads to asym-
metry between rms" with boundary rms locating more centrally - partially
agglomerating - to take advantage of their monopoly position in the corners,
allowing these rms to receive higher prices and yield larger prots than more
centrally located rms (Brenner, 2005: p.862). Similar agglomeration results
have also been found by Economides (1993), using linear transport costs, and
Andersen and Nevin (1991), where rms compete in quantities not prices in
the nal stage, though, in both of these cases, the rms are symmetric and the
location space is bounded. Whilst it would appear that the addition of rms
may generate agglomeration in this model, such an assertion is not possible.
Given the sensitivity of linear spatial models to their initial specication, it is
not a priori obvious how the addition of more asymmetric rms, that are able
to locate outside of the city, would a¤ect the results presented here. However,
it is unlikely that our results would remain unchanged, and this extension is
left to future research.
35As an example of this dearth of literature, Biscaia and Motas (2012) extensive review
of the linear spatial literature highlights only two oligopolistic extensions.
Chapter 4
Who Becomes the Winner?
E¤ects of Venture Capital on
FirmsInnovative Incentives - A
Theoretical Investigation
4.1 Introduction
It has become established in the empirical literature that venture capital
(henceforth VC) plays an important role in the promotion of innovation at
industry level and the professionalisation of rms at micro-level (Da Rin et al
(2013); Dessí and Yin (2010)). In spite of consistent empirical evidence that
supports this VC-to-success link at the micro level, very little has been done
to give a theoretical insight into an important and, as yet, still unanswered
question: how does VC spur such success? This question is not simply theoret-
ically interesting but has important implications for public policy in fostering
an environment conducive to innovation. As Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2001)
observe, some of the most successful high-tech innovators in the US, such as
Microsoft and Apple Computers, have beneted from VC backing. Therefore,
understanding the mechanisms behind how and why certain venture-backed
rms are, apparently, more successful is important and has, to the authors
knowledge, been ignored within the majority of the literature. We diverge
from the established literature by examining the e¤ects from the rms per-
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spectives and aim to answer three important questions: i) what impact does
VC have on a rms incentives to invest in innovation?; ii) how do rival, non-
VC-backed rms respond?; and iii) does the prospect of receiving VC funding
in the future, and its associated benets, spur innovation ex ante?
Before examining the relevant literature, we note that our review of the
existing work is exclusively focused on the empirical literature. Whilst theo-
retical VC literature does exists, it is generally focused on optimal contract
theory. An excellent review of all the theoretical literature can be found in Da
Rin et al (2013) but, for the sake of brevity, we simply acknowledge its exis-
tence here. Yet, this dearth of theoretical literature should not be a problem
because, by examining the relevant empirical literature, relevant theoretical
ideas should be caught by hypothesis testing.
At the industry level, there exists a long established strong, positive rela-
tionship between VC and innovation.1 However, at rm level, VC appears to
have no link to innovation per se but does appear to have other, real impacts
on a rms potential for success. Nonetheless, the results o¤er some interesting
insight into the potential benets to rms of receiving the backing of a venture
capitalist. Hellman and Puri (2000), using a selection of survey and commer-
cially available data for 173 hand-picked Silicon Valley start-ups, observe that
rms pursuing an innovator strategy are more likely to obtain VC funding and
see a reduction in time needed to bring a product to market. Most intrigu-
ing, however, is their assertion that, "rms are more likely to consider VC a
milestone event than obtaining nancing from some other kind of nancier"
(Hellman and Puri, 2002, p.962). Though a reason for this is not given, all
three of these ndings are consistent with a venture capitalist possessing at
least one of two skills: i) a higher ability to seek out innovative rms ex ante;
or ii) o¤ering benets beyond those of traditional nance methods through
the use value-adding services ex post.
Other work has found remarkably similar results. Puri and Zarutskie
(2012), using US rm level data between 1981-2005, compare VC- and non-
VC-backed rms to examine relative growth rates. Whilst the results suggest
1Given our focus on a micro level model, we do not discuss industry level results here.
However, for more information see Kortum and Lerner (2000), Hirukawa and Ueda (2008),
Hirukawa and Ueda (2011), Popov and Roosenboom (2009), Popov and Roosenboom (2012),
Faria and Barbosa (2013) and Geronikolau and Papachistou (2012).
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that VC may be irrelevant in the creation of new rms (accounting for only
0.11% of new rms within the sample), they note consistently faster growth
though this does not necessarily transfer to protability. Peneder (2010), ex-
amining the impact of VC on 132 Austrian rms, founds that such rms grew
70% quicker than equivalent non-VC-backed rms, though this growth did not
extend to innovation. Chemmanur et al (2011), using US census data, adds
that total factor productivity (TFP) is also an important signal to venture
capitalists and is signicantly higher both pre- and post-VC compared to non-
funded rms. Da Rin and Penas (2007) nd remarkably similar results using
Dutch rm level data. O¤ering some additional insight into the growth of TFP
they suggest venture capitalists push the rms they back into adopting more
in-house R&D practices as well as investing in absorptive capacity.
To compare whether ex ante or ex post e¤ects are more apparent, both
Kaplan et al (2009) and Baum and Silverman (2004) examine the factors
that are important for a rm to possess in order to receive VC backing. Ka-
plan et al (2009) examine whether venture capitalists are more likely to back
"the horse" (the rms business idea) or "the jockey" (the management team).
They observe that whilst VC-backed rms do, indeed, grow much faster than
those that did not receive such funding, the core business ideas also remained
relatively consistent in comparison to management. Moreover, whilst man-
agement may make a rm more attractive, these are not related to post-VC
performance.2 In similar work, Baum and Silverman (2004), using data on
204 Canadian biotechnology start-ups and 407 incumbents, examine whether
venture capitalists "pick" (ex ante selection) or "build" (ex post mentoring)
their chosen rms. They nd a combination of both e¤ects with venture capi-
talists more likely to invest in rms that have demonstrated some innovation
(alliance participation or patents) and, thereafter, they perform better.
In fact, these result should not be a surprise given the active role that
venture capitalists have been empirically demonstrated to play within a rm.
As Bottazzi et al (2008, p.489) astutely stated, "the VC literature identies
2In a related result, Wasserman (2003) nds that manager turnover is more likely when
managers have succesfully developed a product rather than when they have performed
poorly. The reason for this is that, once a rm has become a success, the skills that made
the initial CEO so succesful in developing a product or idea may be less important once the
rm faces a di¤erent scenario.
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a broad role for the investor, which goes beyond the simple provision of -
nance. Venture capitalists may engage in a number of value-adding activities,
including monitoring, support, and control. Those activities are largely non-
contractible, yet may have real consequences". Monitoring is perhaps the most
obvious, and empirically tested, of all of these adding-value services. Lerners
(1995) examination of biotechnology rms nds monitoring and control, as
measured by venture capitalist board representation, were increasing in the
need for oversight, as measured by CEO turnover. Gompers (1995) nds a
similar relationship between agency costs and the monitoring within a sample
of 794 VC-backed rms. More surprisingly, it appears that venture capitalists
focus more investment on early-stage projects for which information asymme-
tries are more pronounced.3
However, monitoring a rms activity is far from a venture capitalists only
value-adding service. Hellman and Puri (2002), analysing data on 170 young
high-tech Silicon Valley start-ups, examine the impact of VC on the develop-
ment of new rms. Similar to Chemmanur et al (2011), the results suggested
that a venture capitalists biggest impact was on the professionalisation of the
rm. This impact is rm wide with benets at both the top, by replacing the
original founders with external CEOs, and at the bottom, by formulating HR
policies and improving marketing strategies. Interestingly, this result of VC
rms being more likely to replace founder CEOs with external candidates is
supported by Wasserman (2003) who suggests founder CEOsskills are often
outstripped by the rapid success that VC-backing o¤ers.4 Hochberg (2012)
also nds evidence of stronger corporate governance within VC-backed rms
and this result is made stronger when accounting for endogeneity. Finally, Bot-
tazzi et al (2008), using survey data collected from 124 VCs across Europe,
note that the aforementioned benets may, in fact, be related to the prior
3Dahiya and Ray (2011) observe a similar result to Gompers (1995). However, they
add that venture capitalists may use staging as a screening tool to combat asymmetric
information and abandon failing projects earlier.
Hoenen et al (2012), evaluating 1500 US based technology rms, nd that venture capi-
talists use other signals, for example patents, to screen weaker rms and o¤er stronger rms
more investment. After initial round funding the impact of such signals diminishes - no
further funding benets - adding weight to a screening argument.
4Despite the apparent benets of venture capitalists replacing existing CEOs, Kaplan et
al (2012) nd no performance di¤erence between internal and external candidates once skills
are accounted for.
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business experience of the venture capitalist. To summarise their results, the
more business experience a venture capitalist has, the more active it is within
the rm.
Before discussing our model, we highlight an important point made by Da
Rin et al (2013). Whilst empirical work has done well to shed some light on how
venture capitalists add-value, little has been done with regards to "forward-
looking selection e¤ects". Simply put, the empirical literature assumes that
the rms ex ante actions are passive and that venture capitalists are the
driving force behind the VC-to-success relationship. From the viewpoint of
the rms, this seems a little unfair but an idea that persists. For example,
Caselli et als (2009) examination of 154 Italian IPOs (including 37 VC-backed
rms) noted that VC was more likely to go to those rms that had already
demonstrated some innovation and similar results have been demonstrated for
the US (Hellman and Puri, 2000; Mann and Sager, 2007) and Germany (Engel
and Keilbach, 2007). But why would such decisions by rms be passive? And
wouldnt rms change their strategic decision knowing that the addition of
VC-backing will improve their chances of success in the future?
To address this issue, we consider a stylised two-period, multi-stage game
in which innovation is uncertain and rms are of di¤erent innovative abilities.
In order to simplify proceedings, we turn the tables on the existing literature
and assume that VC is exogenous or, like the rms of the empirical literature,
passive. Nonetheless, we try not to lose any of the key features that VC
possesses. Therefore, we assume VC funding is a package consisting of three
things: i) an equity stake in the rm; ii) pecuniary funds; and iii) value-
adding services such as monitoring, implementing formal HR procedures or
improved marketing.5 By examining both pre- and post-VC funding decisions,
we analyse whether VC spurs innovation: i) directly after being granted; ii)
indirectly by incentivising rms to increase initial research e¤orts to increase
their chances of receiving VC funding (and its associated benets); or iii) a
combination of both. To our knowledge, this is the rst paper of its kind to
approach VC in this way.
We obtain a number of theoretical results that have not been observed
5To an extent, one can think of an increase in funding and/or value-adding services as a
proxy for the quality of the venture capitalist (see Bottazzi et al (2008)). However, we do
not believe the specication of our model enables us to read too much into this.
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before, not even empirically. In the second stage, post-VC, we observe that,
regardless of VC funding, "success breeds success". That is to say, we nd
that a good predictor of the likelihood of future success is past success: ceteris
paribus, a rm that innovates early is more likely to develop a high quality
product. Nonetheless, the addition of VC also has a profound impact on
competition directly after it has been granted. In essence, VC tips the balance
of competition in favour of the rm that receives it, regardless the rms relative
ability level. It does this by inducing the VC-backed rm to invest more and the
rival rm less, improving the relative probability of success for the portfolio
rm. Therefore, we suggest that the commonly held belief that VC spurs
innovation is too simplistic, as it clearly damages the prospect of the rms
it does not support. Instead, VC only spurs innovation amongst the "lucky",
chosen few, but unambiguously suppresses innovation of non-VC-backed rms;
an idea that has been overlooked in the empirical literature. However, the
magnitude of this result is sensitive to the relative homogeneity between the
rms. When rms are of relatively similar abilities, VC has a more pronounced
impact on the composition of the nal product market. In fact, it can single-
handedly determine which rm is likely to be more innovative. In contrast, as
rms become more heterogeneous, whilst still altering equilibrium investment
levels, VC is unable to prevent the high ability rm from being the most likely
innovator.
In the rst stage, we observe two important results. First, rms may treat
e¤orts as either strategic complements or substitutes, depending upon the
relative sizes of expected future prots between subcases. When expected
prots are relatively higher in the symmetric (duopoly) cases, the e¤orts of
a rival are positively correlated with a rms expected prots, inducing it to
invest more when a rival does. In contrast, when asymmetric outcomes are
more valuable, the rms "compete" in e¤ort. Second, and most important,
we nd that VC does impact on the rms e¤ort choices indirectly, by altering
their future expected payo¤s. The equity stake of the rm impacts on initial
e¤orts in two ways: i) it directly reduces initial e¤orts by reducing expected
future prots; and ii) it indirectly increases (decreases) e¤orts if the rms
treat e¤orts as strategic substitutes (complements). Thus, the equity stake
is negatively correlated with e¤ort in the rst stage if the rms treat e¤orts
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as strategic complements, and ambiguously correlated if treated as strategic
substitutes. The impact of pecuniary funding and venture capitalist expertise
are also ambiguous. However, this ambiguity should not be misinterpreted as
no e¤ect. Rather, one should interpret our indirect e¤ect results more broadly:
given the specication, it is likely that future VC will have an impact on rst
period e¤orts, though it is not possible to say whether this impact is positive
or negative.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 4.2 we specify the model
in more detail. Section 4.3 analyses the benchmark, no-VC, case. In section
4.4, we examine the impact of venture capital on the rmse¤ort decisions.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Model
We consider a two-period, multi-stage, asymmetric duopoly model in which
the quality of innovation is uncertain. We assume that two rms, i and j; have
asymmetric "innovative" abilities, ai > 0; aj > 0 such that ai  aj i.e. rm i
is of higher ability than rm j. The structure of the game can be detailed as
follows:
First period
At the beginning of the rst period, given the above abilities, rms invest
in e¤ort in order to develop a prototype product that can either be of high
quality (qh) or low (ql), the actual value of which becomes known only at the
end of the rst period. The probability of discovering a certain quality of
prototype depends on a rms ability as well as on its e¤ort level. We denote
the (unconditional) probability that rm i develops a high-quality output in
a certain period by 'ti; t = 1; 2. This probability then is a function of rm is
e¤ort level eti in period t as well as its initial ability ai i.e. '
t
i = '
t
i(ai; e
t
i):
6
Thus the probability that a rm develops a high or low quality prototype (qh
6This probability function however may change in the second period, depending upon
whether the rm discovers a high quality prototype or not - see below for the description of
the second period game.
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or ql) in the rst period is given by
Pr[qh] = '
1
i (ai; e
1
i ) (4.1)
Pr[ql] = 1  '1i (ai; e1i )
where e1i is rm is e¤ort level in period one. The following assumptions
characterise the function 'ti(ai; e
t
i).
A1. @'ti(ai; e
t
i)=@e
t
i > 0; @
2'ti(ai; e
t
i)=@ (e
t
i)
2
< 0; 'ti(ai; 0) = 0; @'
t
i(ai; e
t
i)=@ai >
0:
A2. @2'ti(ai; e
t
i)=@e
t
i@ai > 0:
A1 says that the probability function is strictly concave in e¤ort, that a
rm can never develop a high-quality product if it puts in no e¤ort, and that,
for a given level of e¤ort, the more able the rm is, the greater its probability
of success. Assumption A2, which states that a rms marginal returns to
e¤ort are increasing in its ability, captures the idea that a more able rm is
better able to target its e¤ort along more e¤ective research paths.
We assume that the marginal cost of e¤ort, c, is constant in every period
with c > 0. Firms choose their e¤ort level, e1i 2 [0;1), to maximise their ex-
pected prots. Output is then realised and the quality of the rmsprototypes
are revealed to all players. There are now four possible scenarios to consider
for the second period game:
Case (i).
 
qil ; q
j
l

: When both rms develop low quality prototypes.
Case (ii).
 
qih; q
j
l

: When rm i develops high quality prototype while rm j
develops low.
Case (iii).
 
qil ; q
j
h

: When rm i develops low quality prototype while rm j
develops high.
Case (iv).
 
qih; q
j
h

: When both rms develop high quality prototypes.
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Second period
At the beginning of the second period, given the above realisation about
the quality of the prototypes, rms compete again with respect to their e¤ort
(investment) levels to produce output that can either be high (Qh) or low
(Ql): The realisation of the second period output Q is uncertain ex ante. The
quality of output Q however, determines a rms future as follows: if only one
rm innovates (i.e. develops a high quality good) whilst its rival does not,
then that rm becomes a monopolist (e.g. through the grant of some kind
of a patent right) and earns a monopoly prot M in the future period whilst
its rival earns zero; if both rms innovate (i.e. if both develop Qh) then both
earn duopoly prots of DH whereas if neither innovates (i.e. produce the low
quality product Ql) then each makes a duopoly prot of DL in the next period.
Without any loss of generality, we assume that
M > 2DH > 2DL
Obviously, rms aspire to become monopolists at the end of the second
period and choose e¤ort levels e2i 2 [0;1) to maximise their expected payo¤s
at a marginal cost of c.
Our model incorporates a learning by doinge¤ect in the following sense: if
a rm has been successful in discovering qh, then even without any VC backing,
this puts the rm in a better position to produce Qh in the second period. We
capture this idea by assuming that the probability of success function is now
conditional on the discovery of qh i.e.
Pr[Qh] = i(ai; e
2
i ) if qh in the rst stage (4.2)
Pr[Ql] = 1  i(ai; e2i ) if qh in the rst stage
with
i(ai; e
2
i ) = '
1
i (ai; e
2
i ) (4.3)
 2 (0; 1)
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Equation (4.3) then simply states that, at any level of e¤ort, e2i 2 [0;1), a
rm that has developed a high quality prototype has a strictly higher success
probability.7 Consequently, assumptions similar to the ones made in A1 and
A2 also hold for i(ai; e
2
i ) and are summarised by A3 (i.e. i(ai; e
2
i ) is a strictly
concave function of e, is increasing in ai and shows increasing marginal return
to investment with respect to ai):
A3. @i(ai; e2i )=@e
2
i > 0; @
2i(ai; e
2
i )=@ (e
2
i )
2
< 0; i(ai; 0) = 0; @i(ai; e
2
i )=@ai >
0; and @2i(ai; e
2
i )=@e
2
i@ai > 0:
Now, in this model we consider the possibility that a rm can obtain back-
ing from a venture capitalist. The presence of a venture capitalist then sub-
stantially changes the above scenario. First of all, whether a rm receives any
assistance from a venture capitalist depends entirely upon the fact whether it
has developed a high quality prototype (qh) in period 1 or not. Moreover, a
VC packages is only o¤ered to a single rm: where only one rm has devel-
oped a high quality prototype, the VC o¤ering goes to that rm; if both rms
developed qh in the rst period then each faces equal probability of securing
VC funding (which ultimately is assigned randomlyor on the basis of certain
outside criteria that are not considered in our model). Finally, VC comes in a
package consisting of:
1. An equity stake in the rm, s: The equity stake that is required by the
venture capitalist as compensation for its risk.
2. Pecuniary funding, F : This denotes the nance o¤ered to the rm.
3. Value-adding services, E: This denotes the additional benets a venture
capitalist o¤ers to the rm beyond nance such as mentoring and expert
advice.
The above assumptions keep our modelling of VC in line with those of
Bottazzi et al (2008) in so far as they imply a venture capitalist plays a far
broader role in the rm than traditional nancing methods.
7Note that this assumption ensures that all the properties of '1i are also transferred to
i since  is a scaler.
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How does the acquisition of a VC package a¤ect the winning rms proba-
bility of success? With VC funding, a rms probability of success in producing
Qh is further enhanced over and above the one given by i(ai; e
2
i ): The prob-
ability of innovation is now also a function of the amount of funding received,
F , and the value-adding services, E: We denote this function as follows:
Pr[Qh] = ^i(ai; e
2
i ) = i(ai; e
2
i ; E; F ) if qh and VC-backed (4.4)
Pr[Ql] = 1  ^i(ai; e2i ) if qh and VC-backed
where, for any e2i and ai
^i(ai; e
2
i ) > i(ai; e
2
i )
if E or F are positive. Consequently, assumptions similar to that given in A3
also apply here (and hence are not repeated). The following assumption now
captures the specic benets of receiving VC backing, namely, how mentoring
and funding a¤ect the probability of innovation8.
A4. (i) @^i(ai; e2i )=@F > 0; (ii)@ ^i(ai; e
2
i )=@E > 0; and (iii) @
2^i(ai; e
2
i )=@e
2
i@E >
0:
A4 says that the impact of receiving mentoring and funding are strictly
positive for the rm. Additionally, part (iii) of A4 highlights the indirect e¤ect
of mentoring via a rms e¤ort level: the more value-adding services that are
o¤ered by a venture capitalist, the better able a rm becomes at targeting its
e¤orts and so the marginal returns to e¤ort increase.
Finally, if a rm developed a low-quality prototype in the rst period (i.e.
ql), then its probability of innovation remains exactly as is specied by the
function 'ti i.e. it is given by '
2
i (ai; e
2
i ) in the second period.
The timing of the game can now be summarised as follows:
Stage 1: Start of rst period. Firms choose e¤ort levels, e1i 2 [0;1) given
their abilities ai; aj: Output is produced and the quality of the prototype
qs; s 2 fh; lg, is revealed to all players. End of rst period.
8We use the reduced form, ^i(ai; e
2
i ), throughout.
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Stage 2: Start of second period. The VC package (F;E; s) is assigned to
the winning player who then enjoys a probability of success given by
^i(:): If both have developed high quality prototypes then VC funding is
o¤ered to each of them with equal probability. If neither rm discovers
qh; neither receives VC backing. Players who do not receive VC funding
have a probability of success given by '2i (:): Firms then invest in their
e¤ort levels. Output is realised at the end of period 2, and rms earn
(future) payo¤s according to their position in the market.
We solve the game using backward induction.
4.3 Benchmark: the no-VC case
In order to appreciate the impact of VC o¤ering, we rst consider the scenario
where there is no possibility of receiving a VC package. If so, then the second
period probability of innovation is given by (4.2).
4.3.1 Second stage equilibrium
First we compute the expected second stage prots corresponding to each of
the cases (i)-(iv). Thus, the expected prot functions are
Case (i).
 
qil ; q
j
l
  both rms develop low quality prototypes
il;ljt=2NV C = (1  '2i )(1  '2j)DL + '2i'2jDH + '2i (1  '2j)M   ce2i 8 i
Case (ii). (qih; q
j
l ) - rm i develops high quality prototype while rm j devel-
ops low
ih;ljt=2NV C = (1  2i )(1  '2j)DL + 2i'2jDH + 2i (1  '2j)M   ce2i
jh;ljt=2NV C = (1  2i )(1  '2j)DL + 2i'2jDH + '2j(1  2i )M   ce2j
Case (iii). (qil ; q
j
h) - rm i develops low quality prototype whereas rm j de-
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velops high
il;hjt=2NV C = (1  '2i )(1  2j)DL + '2i2jDH + '2i (1  2j)M   ce2i
jl;hjt=2NV C = (1  '2i )(1  2j)DL + '2ijDH + 2j(1  '2i )M   ce2j
Case (iv). (qih; q
j
h) - both rms develop high quality prototypes
ih;hjt=2NV C = (1  2i )(1  2j)DL + 2ijDH + 2i (1  2j)M   ce2i 8 i
In the above notation for expected prots, the rst superscript denotes
which rms prots we are discussing; the rst subscript, x; y, denotes the
case in which rm i has developed a prototype of quality x 2 fh; lg and j of
quality y 2 fh; lg; the second superscript denotes the period, t 2 f1; 2g; and
the second subscript whether this is the benchmark case (NV C) or the VC
case (V C).
In each of the above cases, rms maximise prots by choosing respective
e¤ort levels. With some manipulation of the relevant rst order conditions, we
obtain the following set of equations corresponding to each case:
Case (i). (qil ; q
j
l )
@'2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)
8 i (4.5)
Case (ii). (qih; q
j
l )
@2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)
@'2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  2i (M  DL  DH)
Case (iii). (qil ; q
j
h)
@'2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  2j(M  DL  DH)
@2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  '2i (M  DL  DH)
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Case (iv). (qih; q
j
h)
@2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  2j(M  DL  DH)
8i
The solutions to the above rst order conditions then yield a rms reaction
function. The following proposition shows how the optimal e¤ort level of a
certain rm changes in response to its rivals.
Proposition 19 Second period e¤orts are strategic substitutes regardless of
the quality of the prototypes discovered at the end of the rst period.
Proof. See appendix 8.1
According to proposition 19, second period e¤ort levels are strategic sub-
stitutes. Any increase in one rms optimal e¤ort level leads to a decrease in
that of its rivals. The impetus for this result is the fact that, regardless of the
prototypes developed by the rms, an increase in rm is investment has two
opposing e¤ects on rm js expected prots. First, it unambiguously decreases
the chances that rm j will become a monopolist in the nal product market
and, consequently, reduces their expected returns to e¤ort. Second, it increases
the expected prots of becoming a duopolist by making it more likely that the
rms will act as high quality duopolists in the nal product market. However,
given assumptions A1, A3 and M > 2DH > 2DL, it is trivial to demonstrate
that it is the former of these e¤ects that dominates. Therefore, should rm is
e¤ort level increase, rm js expected prots are strictly lower, at all levels of
e2j , than they would have been otherwise. It is this reduction in the expected
benets of investment that drives rm j to cut its investment level in response
to an increase by rm i.
The next proposition shows that regardless of the type of prototype discov-
ered, the optimal e¤ort level of a rm increases in its own ability but decreases
in its rivals ability. Hence,
Proposition 20 Regardless of the type of prototype discovered
de2i
dai
> 0;
de2j
dai
< 0
Proof. See Appendix 8.2
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The importance of this proposition is that it suggests that a rms ability
level is positively correlated with its e¤ort; ceteris paribus, a more able rm
invests more. The rationale behind this is a consequence of assumptions A1
and A2. As a rms ability increases, it is induced to invest more for two
reasons. First, assumption A1 states that, for a given level of e¤ort, the
more able the rm, the greater its probability of success. Consequently, at all
e¤ort levels, each unit of investment yields a higher expected return which,
in turn, induces the rm to increase its investment level. Second, assumption
A2 implies that a rms marginal returns to e¤ort are increasing in its ability
because the rm is better able to target its e¤ort along more e¤ective research
paths. This further increases the returns to e¤ort, once again spurring a rm
to invest more. This increased investment of a more able rm, combined with
proposition 19, suggests that whilst a higher ability rm will invest more, its
rival will be induced to invest less.
Proposition 20 is also interesting and implies that it is possible to deter-
mine, in every case, which rm will invest the most. In the symmetric cases,
(qil ; q
j
l ) and (q
i
h; q
j
h), this analysis is fairly trivial. Assuming that, initially, the
rms are symmetric with respect to their abilities, ai = aj, we are ensured that
equilibrium e¤ort levels are symmetric too. However, where rm i is allowed
to become the high ability rm, ai > aj , propositions 19 and 20 state that this
will unambiguously increase the e¤ort level of rm i and reduce that of rm j.
Therefore, in the cases in which the rms have developed prototypes of similar
qualities, the high ability rm invests more and is the more likely innovator.
A similar result holds in the case in which rm i has developed a high
quality prototype and rm j low quality. In this case, after applying equation
(4.3) to the relevant rst order conditions, we observe
@'2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)
(4.6)
@'2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  '2i (M  DL  DH)
(4.7)
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Assuming both rms are of the same ability and that investment levels are
identical yields
@'2i
@e2i
<
@'2j
@e2j
or that a symmetric equilibrium cannot be supported. In fact, given equations
(4.6) and (4.7), it is obvious, given a symmetric starting point, rm i would
always prefer to invest more than rm j and vice versa. Therefore, even with
symmetric rms we would expect to observe rm i as the more likely innovator.
In fact, the addition of asymmetric abilities, ai > aj , serves only to widen the
gap between the rmsinvestment levels (proposition 20). Therefore, it is once
again the high ability rm that is the most likely "winner".
It is the nal case, where rm i has developed a low quality prototype and
rm j high quality, that is the most interesting. With symmetric rms, ai = aj,
the result of the previous case is reversed; rm j invests strictly more than rm
i. However, the addition of asymmetric abilities, ai > aj, suggests that the
identity of the likeliest innovator becomes ambiguous. Where rm is ability
has increased above that of rm j, propositions 19 and 20 state the investment
level of rm i (j) must unambiguously increase (decrease). Consequently, even
where the more able rm has developed a lower quality prototype, it is surely
possible - if it is su¢ ciently able - that it may still become the more likely rm
to develop a high quality nal product.
Finally, it is useful to order the e¤ort levels and, in doing so, we observe
Proposition 21 Regardless of the quality of a rivals prototype, a rm always
invests strictly more e¤ort when it has discovered a high quality prototype.
More formally:
e2i jqih;qjs > e
2
i jqil ;qjs
for all s 2 fl; hg.
Proof. See Appendix 8.3
This result suggests that a rm will invest more, and be more likely to
innovate, if it was successful in developing a high quality prototype at the end
of the rst stage. In essence, one clear result obtains from proposition 21: past
success is a good indicator of the likeliness of future successes. In a nutshell,
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once a rm has demonstrated an ability to successfully innovate, it becomes
more likely to innovate in the future than if it had failed to innovate initially.
This ability to order the e¤ort levels also enables us to order the rms
prot levels.
Corollary 22 Regardless of the quality of a rivals prototype, a rms expected
prots are higher when it has developed a high quality prototype. Formally,
ih;sjt=2NV C > il;sjt=2NV C
for all s 2 fl; hg
Proof. This proof is trivial and so it is omitted.
Given the result in proposition 21, corollary 22 should come as no surprise.
If assumptions A1, A3 and equation (4.3) hold, it is obvious that the expected
returns to e¤ort, in terms of both expected monopoly and duopoly prots, are
strictly greater when a rm has developed a high quality prototype. That is
to say, when a rm has been successful in developing a high quality proto-
type, each additional unit of e¤ort yields larger increases in expected prots.
These additional returns on investment induce a rm to increase their innov-
ative e¤orts which, in turn, yield higher levels of expected prots. Moreover,
this intuition is independent of the quality of the rivals prototype. Therefore,
initial success has tangible consequences: a greater level of e¤ort and expected
prots compared to the scenario in which the rm had failed to innovate ini-
tially. To reiterate a previous point, these results suggest past success is a
good indicator of the likeliness of future successes.
4.3.2 First stage equilibrium
In the rst period, the rmsexpected prot functions are given by
ijt=1NV C = (1  '1i )(1  '1j)il;ljt=2NV C + '1i'1jih;hjt=2NV C
+ '1i (1  '1j)ih;ljt=2NV C + (1  '1i )'1jil;hjt=2NV C   ce1i
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jjt=1NV C = (1  '1i )(1  '1j)jl;ljt=2NV C + '1i'1jjh;hjt=2NV C
+ '1i (1  '1j)jh;ljt=2NV C + (1  '1i )'1jjl;hjt=2NV C   ce1j
With a little manipulation of the relevant rst order conditions one obtains
@'1i
@e1i
=
c
(1  '1j)(ih;ljt=2NV C   il;ljt=2NV C) + '1j [ih;hjt=2NV C   il;hjt=2NV C ]
(4.8)
@'1j
@e1j
=
c
(1  '1i )(jl;hjt=2NV C   jl;ljt=2NV C) + '1i [jh;hjt=2NV C   jh;ljt=2NV C ]
(4.9)
These follow a similar functional form to those in the second stage but are now
dependent on the second periods expected prots. However, as the following
proposition demonstrates, each rms rst period e¤orts may be treated as
either strategic substitutes or complements.
Proposition 23 First period e¤orts can be treated as either strategic substi-
tutes or complements. Furthermore, it is possible that one rm treats e¤orts
as a strategic substitutes whilst the other treats them as complements.
Proof. See appendix 8.4
It is interesting that, in contrast to second period e¤orts, rms may treat
e¤ort either as strategic substitutes or complements. It turns out that rms
only "compete" in e¤ort (treat e¤ort as strategic substitutes) if and only if
the expected prots of becoming the sole developer of a high quality proto-
type are su¢ ciently large. In this scenario, additional investment by one rm
strictly decreases the probability that the rival rm will be able to become
the sole developer of a high quality prototype. As this makes up a signicant
proportion of a rms expected prots, relative to the other cases, an increase
in the e¤orts of one rm signicantly reduces the expected prots of the other.
Therefore, investment by one rm reduces the incentives of its rival to invest
in the rst place and, consequently, the rival rms e¤ort level falls. In con-
trast, in the strategic complements case, where the expected prots of being
the sole developer of a high quality prototype are smaller, there becomes a
greater emphasis on the expected payo¤s in the symmetric (duopoly) cases.
When these are su¢ ciently large, the investment of a rival actually increases
the expected protability of the rm. In essence, the prots of a rm are
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positively correlated with a rival rms investment. Therefore, when one rm
increases its e¤ort levels, this induces the other rm to do the same.
An interesting third possibility emerges here too: both rms may treat
e¤ort di¤erently. Simply, when the rms are of asymmetric abilities, expected
prots must be di¤erent too. Thus, it is possible that one rms reaction
function slopes down whilst the other rms slopes up. In essence, the rms
e¤ort decisions becomes a game of "cat and mouse", with one rm trying to
match the other, which is trying to get away.9 In fact, this additional result
may o¤er some theoretical grounding for the empirical observation that some
rms adopt "innovator" strategies whilst others adopt "imitator" strategies
(Hellman and Puri , 2000). In our model, the "innovators" are those rm
that expect to make relatively large prots if they can innovate early (the
rm that treats e¤orts as substitutes). In contrast, "imitators" are driven
to invest not because they expect to be innovators alone, but because their
expected prots are positively correlated with the e¤orts of their rival (the
rm that treats e¤orts as complements). Therefore, in equilibrium, both rms
are trying to balance two opposing forces. In the case of the "innovator", they
wish to maximise their prots without attracting too much investment by an
"imitator". In contrast, an "imitator" wishes to invest as much as possible,
without suppressing too much innovative e¤ort of the "innovator".
4.4 E¤ects of VC on rmsinnovative incen-
tives
Now consider the possibility that a rm can receive o¤erings from a venture
capitalist. The possibility of securing VC backing then changes the above
scenario substantially. Recall that a VC package, (s; E; F ), is given to only
one rm that has developed a high quality prototype where the winning rm
9Mathematically this is not problematic so long as the reaction functions allow for stabil-
ity and uniqueness. To that end, we must ensure that rms do not "overreact" to a change
in a rivals choice. Formally (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991),R0i R0j < 1
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now has a probability of innovation function given by equation (4.4). Further,
recall that if both rms developed a high quality prototypes then each receives
VC with equal probability, where the rm that is not successful in receiving the
VC o¤ering (despite the fact that it had developed a high-quality prototype)
faces the probability i(ai; e
2
i ). Finally, recall that the probability of success
function for the rm that developed a low quality prototype remains unchanged
i.e. it is given by '2i (ai; e
2
i ) = i(ai; e
2
i ; 0; 0) - see equation (4.3)
As in the No-VC case, we start our analysis with the second stage game.
4.4.1 Second stage equilibrium
In the presence of VC, the expected prots for each case are given by
Case (i). (qil ; q
j
l )
il;ljt=2V C = (1  '2i )(1  '2j)DL + '2i'2jDH + '2i (1  '2j)M   ce2i 8 i
Case (ii). (qih; q
j
l )
ih;ljt=2V C = (1  s)

(1  b2i )(1  '2j)DL + b2i'2jDH + b2i (1  '2j)M   ce2i 
jh;ljt=2V C = (1  b2i )(1  '2j)DL + b2i'2jDH + '2j(1  b2i )M   ce2j
Case (iii). (qil ; q
j
h)
il;hjt=2V C = (1  '2i )(1  b2j)DL + '2i b2jDH + '2i (1  b2j)M   ce2i
jl;hjt=2V C = (1  s)

(1  '2i )(1  b2j)DL + '2i b2jDH + b2j(1  '2i )M   ce2j
Case (iv). (qih; q
j
h). Here,
(a) If rm i received VC
ih;hjt=2V Ci = (1  s)

(1  b2i )(1  2j)DL + b2i2jDH + b2i (1  2j)M   ce2i 
jh;hjt=2V Ci = (1  b2i )(1  2j)DL + b2i2jDH + 2j(1  b2i )M   ce2j
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(b) If rm j received VC
ih;hjt=2V Cj = (1  s)

(1  b2i )(1  2j)DL + b2i2jDH + b2i (1  2j)M   ce2i 
jh;hjt=2V Cj = (1  b2i )(1  2j)DL + b2i2jDH + 2j(1  b2i )M   ce2j
Note the altered second subscript in the symmetric, high quality case, V Cx.
This simply states that rm x 2 fi; jg received VC when both rms were
eligible.
Each rm now maximises their second period payo¤s. Then, using the rst
order conditions - and with a little manipulation - we nd that, for each of the
cases (i) - (iv), the rmse¤ort level decisions are given by
Case (i). (qil ; q
j
l )
@'2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  '2j)(M  DL  DH)
8 i
Case (ii). (qih; q
j
l )
@^2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  '2j)(M  DL  DH)
@'2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2i )(M  DL  DH)
Case (iii). (qil ; q
j
h)
@'2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2j)(M  DL  DH)
@^2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  '2i )(M  DL  DH)
Case (iv). (qih; q
j
h)
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i) If rm i received VC
@^2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  2j)(M  DL  DH)
@2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2i )(M  DL  DH)
ii) If rm j received VC
@2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2j)(M  DL  DH)
@^2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  2i )(M  DL  DH)
Again, these functions all act as a basic reaction function for each rm. With
some manipulation one obtains
Proposition 24 Second period e¤orts are always strategic substitutes regard-
less of the quality of prototype developed.
Proof. The proof is identical in style to that of proposition 21 and so is
omitted. Nonetheless, the result still hinges on the assumptions made in A1 -
A3 and M > 2DH > 2DL.
The intuition behind proposition 24 is also similar to that of proposition
21. As a brief recap, regardless of the prototypes developed by the rms, an
increase in rm is investment decreases rm js expected prots at all levels of
e2j . The reason for this is that increases to rm is e¤ort makes it less likely that
rm j will become a monopolist, whilst strictly increasing the probability that
rm j will become a high, and not low, quality duopolist. Given assumption
A1, A3 and M > 2DH > 2DL, it is trivial to check that the reduction in
expected monopoly prots dominates, and it is this that incentivises rm j to
cut back on its investment.
First we make the observation that, similar to the No-VC case, second
period e¤ort levels are determined by a rms relative ability.
Remark 25 Regardless of the type of prototype discovered
de2i
dai
> 0;
de2j
dai
< 0
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Proof. The proof is almost identical to that of proposition 20 and so is omitted.
Nonetheless, the result still hinges on the assumptions made in A1 - A3 and
M > 2DH > 2DL.
The intuition behind remark 25 is identical to that of proposition 20 and is
driven by assumptions A1 and A2. A higher ability makes a rm more likely
to develop a high quality good and better able to target its e¤orts, increasing
the expected returns to e¤ort. Consequently, the rms are induced to invest
more when they are of higher ability.
However, it is no longer just ability that plays a role in the determining
the future successes of the rms. Instead, the VC package plays a crucial role
too. The following proposition demonstrates the impact VC has on the rms
incentives to innovate.
Proposition 26 Assuming that rm i receives VC backing, we observe10
de2i
dE
> 0 (4.10)
de2j
dE
< 0 (4.11)
de2i
dF
> 0 (4.12)
de2j
dF
< 0 (4.13)
de2i
ds
=
de2i
ds
= 0 (4.14)
Proof. See Appendix 8.5
The crucial element of proposition 26 is that VC unambiguously increases
the probability of successful innovation for the rm that is chosen, by inducing
them to invest more. In contrast, a rm that must compete against a VC-
backed rival becomes less likely to develop a high quality good. Consequently,
VC tips the balance of competition in favour of the rm it backs.
It is two particular elements of the VC package that generate this result.
First, the addition of pecuniary funding, F , makes a rm more likely to inno-
vate at all levels of e¤ort. Thus, a rm with nancial backing is, in a sense,
10Results for rm j can be derived by symmetry.
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able to buy success, regardless of their e¤orts or ability, as the rm may now
have access to new equipment or better quality materials. It is the addition of
nance, and the greater likelihood that they innovate successfully, that makes
e¤ort more valuable and induces them to invest more. Second, it is likely that
a venture capitalist would o¤er value-adding services, from simply mentoring
rms and improving marketing strategies to overhauling corporate governance
completely. No matter the level involvement, a venture capitalists own e¤orts
are likely to have two impacts: i) increases to E may simply raise the prob-
ability of success at all e¤ort levels by allowing entrepreneurs more time to
focus on innovation; or ii) a venture capitalist may use its expertise and mar-
ket knowledge to channel the entrepreneurs e¤orts down more fruitful research
pathways. In both cases, these strictly increase the returns to each additional
unit of e¤ort. Therefore, the existence of value adding services also create an
environment that enables a rm to invest more.11
In fact, given proposition 26, we are able to determine whether a rm would
invest more or less compared to the no-VC case, as the following corollary
explains.
Corollary 27 Compared to the benchmark case, a rm that has received VC
funding invests strictly more than it would have done without VC-backing.
Furthermore, a rm invests strictly less, compared to the benchmark case, when
it faces a VC-backed rival.
A formal proof of this corollary 27 is unnecessary as it follows directly from
proposition 26. Moreover, the intuition behind this result follows directly
from the benets of funding and venture capitalist expertise: by increasing the
returns to each additional unit of e¤ort, venture capitalists induce VC-backed
rms to invest more. In contrast, if one rm has increased its investment level,
the other must invest less (proposition 24).
This corollary is interesting, but it has one important and overlooked result
contained within. Whilst VC does spur innovation and increases the probabil-
ity of success for the rm that receives it, there are also casualties. This result
is unique within the literature, capturing a new impact of VC that has not yet
11Given the specication of the model it is not possible to determine which e¤ect, E or
F , is larger.
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been observed. If a rm is competing against a VC backed rival it becomes
less likely to develop a high quality nal good than if no VC were present.
Consequently, whilst VC does spur the future innovative e¤orts of an early
innovator, it suppresses the e¤orts of rms that failed to innovate initially.
Therefore, this result contrasts with the oft-empirically observed result that
VC only spurs success. Instead, whilst venture capitalists drive success for the
chosen few, it holds back the rms that must compete against their portfolio
rms.
Given these results, we are able to compare the relative e¤ort levels between
each case, as we do in the following proposition.
Proposition 28 Regardless of the quality of a rivals prototype, a rm invests
strictly more if it has developed a high quality prototype. Moreover, in the
cases in which a rm has developed a high quality prototype, it invests more if
it receives VC-funding than if does not.
e2i jqih;qjsjV Ci > e
2
i jqih;qjsjV Cj > e
2
i jqil ;qjs
Proof. See Appendix 8.6
This result is analogous to that of proposition 21: regardless of the proto-
type developed by a rival, a rm is always more likely to develop a high quality
product if it has developed a high quality prototype. Interestingly, this propo-
sition suggests that this result holds regardless of which rm actually receives
venture capital. Simply, whether or not a rm receives venture capital, it is
always more likely to successfully innovate in the future if it has demonstrated
an ability to innovate in the past. This suggests that, even with VC-backing
of a rm, "success still breeds success" or a good indicator of future success
is still past success. However, one should not ignore the fact that VC-backing
strictly improves a rms chances of being innovative. In essence, VC augments
a rms innovative process, suggesting that VC-backed success is more likely.
Corollary 29 Regardless of the quality of a rivals prototype, a rms expected
prots are higher when it has received VC funding. More formally,
ih;sjt=2V Ci > ih;sjt=2V Cj > il;sjt=2V C
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Proof. The proof is trivial and so it is omitted.
Even though "success breeds success", the question is why? Given assump-
tions A1 - A4 and equation (4.4), it becomes apparent that, with no additional
e¤ort on the part of the entrepreneur, its expected prots are larger if it has
successfully innovated a high quality prototype. Therefore, each additional
unit of e¤ort is more valuable and generates higher levels of marginal prot.
This incentivises the rm to invest more and generates larger expected prots
than if it had failed to innovate at the end of the rst stage.12
Finally, it is important to understand which rm is most likely to develop a
high quality nal good.13 Assuming that rm i is the high ability rm, ai > aj,
it is obvious that in the (qih; q
j
l ) and (q
i
h; q
j
hjV Ci) cases rm i is more likely to
succeed. This follows directly from remark 25 and proposition 26.
However, there are now two ambiguous cases where rm j has received
VC funding: (qil ; q
j
h) and (q
i
h; q
j
hjV Cj). Intuitively, assuming that the rms are
initially of equal ability, it must be that rm j invests more in the (qil ; q
j
h) and
(qih; q
j
hjV Cj) cases, where it is VC-backed. However, by remark 25, an increase
in rm is ability will unambiguously increase e2i and decrease e
2
j . This implies
that for any VC package, (s, E, F ), as long as ai is su¢ ciently large the more
able rm is the more likely rm develop a high quality nal product regardless
of the quality of its prototype. However, as E and F increase this becomes
harder and, therefore, less likely. For large values of E and F it is more proba-
ble that the likely winner is determined by who is chosen to receive VC funding.
That is, the rm that receives the VC becomes, somewhat automatically, the
stronger rm. Therefore, depending the entrepreneursrelative abilities and
the specication of the VC package on o¤er, VC funding may have either a
small or large impact on the likely composition of the nal product market.
Therefore, VC funding does have an impact upon the second period deci-
sions of the rms. A rm receiving VC funding becomes unambiguously better
o¤ whilst its rival becomes less likely to develop a good quality nal product.
However, the extent to which this disadvantages the more able rm is depen-
12It is the shape of the probability functions that drives this result. As ^ and  lie strictly
above ', rms are more likely to succeed, at any level of ability or e¤ort, if they have
demonstrated some initial innovative ability.
13We ignore the case in which both rms develop low quality prototypes as this is identical
to the no-VC case.
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dent upon the relative sizes of the VC package and the asymmetry between the
rms. Consequently, VC does spur innovation but it unambiguously spurns
innovation for all rms that do not receive it. Therefore, we would expect
di¤erent impacts across di¤erent industries. Those industries that support a
few highly innovative rms should, more often than not, observe more able
rms developing the high quality products. However, where rms are more
symmetric, we would expect VC to aid the development of rms that would
otherwise have been unexpected to become an innovator - i.e. those that may
have been initially thought to be of a lower ability.
4.4.2 First stage equilibrium
The rst stage expected prots are given by
ijt=1V C = (1  '1i )(1  '1j)il;ljt=2V C +
1
2
'1i'
1
j
h
ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj
i
+ '1i (1  '1j)ih;ljt=2V C + (1  '1i )'1jil;hjt=2V C   ce1i
jjt=1V C = (1  '1i )(1  '1j)jl;ljt=2V C +
1
2
'1i'
1
j
h
jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj
i
+ '1i (1  '1j)jh;ljt=2NV C + (1  '1i )'1jjl;hjt=2NV C   ce1j
Where the rst order conditions yield
@'1i
@e1i
=
c(
(1  '1j)

ih;ljt=2V C   il;ljt=2V C

+'1j
h
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

  il;hjt=2V C
i ) (4.15)
@'1j
@e1j
=
c(
(1  '1i )

jl;hjt=2V C   jl;ljt=2V C

+'1i
h
1
2

jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj

  jh;ljt=2V C
i ) (4.16)
Similar to the No-VC case, rst period e¤orts are determined by expected
future prots. However, as the following proposition demonstrates, the reac-
tion functions of each rm can be either upward or downward sloping.
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Proposition 30 In the VC case, rst period e¤orts can be treated as either
strategic substitutes or complements. Additionally, one rm may treat e¤orts
as a strategic substitutes whilst another treats e¤orts as complements.
Proof. See Appendix 8.7
Interestingly, a similar mechanism to proposition 23 is the impetus behind
this result. Once again, it appears that rms only "compete" in e¤ort if and
only if the expected prots of becoming the sole developer of a high quality
prototype are su¢ ciently large. Even the addition of venture capital, which
unambiguously increases (decreases) expected prots for the VC-backed (non-
VC-backed) rm, does not alter this intuition. Simply, when the expected
gains are disproportionately large in the case in which only one rm develops
a high quality prototype, any increase in e¤ort by a rival rm signicantly re-
duces a rms expected prots. Consequently, an increase in one rms e¤ort
reduces the incentive for the other to invest, regardless of whether that rm
is VC-backed or not. In contrast, when the expected prots from symmetric
innovation are relatively large, the expected prots of one rm become posi-
tively correlated with the e¤ort of its rival. Therefore, when a rival rm invests
more, a rm is incentivised to invest more too.
The result here is interesting because it suggests that, whilst VC funding
clearly has an impact on e¤ort levels by inuencing expected second period
prots, the mechanisms by which the rms compete remain unchanged. Both
rms may still treat e¤ort as strategic complements, substitutes or a combi-
nation of the two, but they still act in a similar way to the no-VC case. This
is, perhaps, one of venture capitals greatest strengths: whilst it does inuence
the outcome, it does not a¤ect the mechanism.14
In spite of this observation, one important question remains: does the lure
of VC have an impact on the rst period e¤ort levels of the rms?
Remark 31 The impact of pecuniary funding, F , and venture capitalist ef-
fort, E, on rst period e¤ort is ambiguous, regardless of whether rms treat
e¤ort as strategic substitutes or complements.
Proof. See Appendix 8.8
14It is the use of an equity stake that is the reason for this observation. This is, perhaps,
why venture capitalists use equity shares and not traditional methods, so as to avoid altering
the incentives of the rms (see Brander and Lewis (1986)).
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The inability to sign these equations, and determine their impact, should
not be taken as an indication that they dont a¤ect initial e¤ort decisions.
Instead, the issue lies with our inability to gauge the magnitude of their nu-
merous e¤ects. Consequently, we suggest that funding and mentoring should
have an impact on initial e¤ort decisions, but whether these e¤ects are positive
or negative is impossible to determine given the current specication.
However, one element of the VC package, the equity stake, does have an
interesting impact on the decisions of the rms as the following proposition
demonstrates.
Proposition 32 When rms treat e¤ort as strategic complements, the higher
the equity stake in the rm, the lower the e¤ort level, or
de1i
ds
< 0 8 i
However, when rms treat e¤orts as strategic substitutes the e¤ect of the equity
stake can be either positive or negative.
Proof. See Appendix 8.9
What proposition 32 reveals is that the venture capitalists equity stake has
both a direct and indirect impact on a rms e¤ort choice. The direct e¤ect
is unambiguously negative: as the venture capitalists equity stake becomes
larger, a rm will want to invest less in the rst period. Intuitively, as a the
venture capitalists share of future prots become larger, there is less incentive
for the rm to invest because the expected prots of innovation are reduced.
In contrast, the indirect e¤ect accounts for a rms reaction to a fall in a rivals
investment caused by an increase in the equity stake. Where the rms treat
e¤orts as strategic substitutes, one rm will increase its research e¤orts in
response to a reduction in a rivals. Therefore, as an increase in the equity
stake unambiguously puts downward pressure on the investment decisions of
both rms, this indirectly induces the rms to invest more; a positive indirect
e¤ect. Consequently, whether rms actually invest more or less is determined
by the balance of these opposing forces. In contrast, where rms treat e¤orts
as strategic complements, a fall in a rivals investment will induce a rm to
invest less too; a negative indirect e¤ect. The reason for this is that, in this
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case, a rms expected prots are positively correlated with the e¤ort level of
its rival. Therefore, as a higher equity stake reduces the rival rms incentives
to invest, this also leads a rm to reduce their e¤ort levels too. Thus, in the
strategic complements case both the direct and indirect e¤ects act in the same
direction, and it must be that increasing the equity stake reduces investments.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper set out to address a notable imbalance in the VC literature, that
venture capitalists were the sole force behind the VC-to-success link. Diverg-
ing from the existing literature, we examined the VC-to-success link from the
rms perspectives, examining pre- and post-VC funding decisions to deter-
mine whether VC-funding spurred innovation: i) directly after being granted;
ii) indirectly by incentivising rms to increase initial research e¤orts to in-
crease their chances of receiving VC funding (and its associated benets); or
iii) a combination of both. This paper nds some reasoning for VC having
both direct (ex post) and indirect (ex ante) implications for a rms investment
decisions.
The second stage results clearly demonstrate a direct link between VC and
innovation/success. First, it appears that "success breeds success", in so far as
a predictor of future innovation appears to be past innovative success. Whilst
the model presented is of a static game, this result comes from the intertem-
poral connection between success in the rst and second stages. Quite simply,
the model implies that if a rm is successful in the initial stages of research,
it is more likely to reach a fruitful conclusion. Second, and most important,
the addition of venture-backing to a rm tips the balance of competition in its
favour. The addition of funding enables rms to, in essence, "buy success",
by spending money on better equipment or materials. The addition of value-
adding services is equally important for two reasons: i) it directly increases the
likelihood of success by enabling an entrepreneur to focus on innovation; and
ii) a venture capitalists expertise may indirectly benet a rm if it is able to
direct it along more fruitful research pathways. Yet, the addition of VC only
benets the rm that receives it and unambiguously reduces the likelihood of
innovation for all other rms. Therefore, the commonly held belief that VC
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spurs innovation may only be a partial truth. Instead, VC may, in general,
spur innovation, but this is dependent on the balance of these two, contradic-
tory e¤ects. However, the extent to which VC can determine which rm is the
likely innovator depends upon the level of heterogeneity: the more symmetric
the rms, the more likely that VC is an important factor in determining the
composition of the nal product market.
We also nd evidence of indirect impacts on initial e¤ort levels, before VC
is o¤ered to rms. By altering future expected prots, VC indirectly impacts
upon the rms initial, pre-VC, e¤ort decisions. However, given the general
specication of the model, it is not possible to determine whether the impact
of nance and value-adding services are positive or negative. In contrast, the
venture capitalists equity stake in the rm impacts on initial e¤orts in two
ways: i) it directly reduces initial e¤orts by reducing expected future prots;
and ii) it indirectly increases (decreases) e¤orts if the rms treat e¤orts as
strategic substitutes (complements). Nonetheless, this "ambiguity" should not
be misinterpreted as there being no indirect e¤ect. Rather, it is likely that VC
does, indeed, have an impact and this is left for future work.
Future work should focus on three areas. First, the model needs to be
generalised to incorporate a larger number of both rms and venture capital-
ists, though this appears to be a rather trivial addition. Extending this model
to incorporate n asymmetric rms and m venture capitalists, one should ex-
pect that a similar outcome obtains if the underlying assumptions remain
unchanged.15 That is, VC-backed rms should be more likely to innovate at
the expense of their unselected rivals and, regardless of a rivals prototype,
a rm invests more if: i) it has developed a high quality prototype; and/or
ii) it receives VC funding. In essence, so long as the functional forms remain
unchanged and each venture capitalist can fund a single entrepreneur then the
general principals of propositions 26 and 28 should remain the same regardless
of the number of rms or venture capitalists. That is, the results presented
here are likely robust to additional rms and venture capitalists.
Second, and more interesting, the addition of a greater number of venture
capitalists and rms would also allow for a broader examination of the question
15In reality, whether n or m is larger depends upon the situation. For example, after the
development of a brand new technology it is more likely that n < m. However, for rms
setting up in well established industries it is more likely that n > m.
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at hand: do venture capitalists spur innovation? Within the extended, n-
rm, m-venture capitalist framework, it would be interesting to examine what
happens when: i) a single venture capitalist could nance more than a single
rm; and ii) rms with a common backer can form strategic alliances. The
recent empirical literature notes that these two factors are intertwined and
o¤er additional benets above and beyond those assumed in this paper; the
existence of a common backer makes rms more likely to work together and,
consequently, more innovative.16 It would be interesting to see how these
additions would alter the nature of the result presented here; would joint-
VC-backed rms be increasingly likely to innovate at a greater expense of
non-VC-backed rms?
Finally, it would be useful to examine the model using a specic functional
form. A number of the analytical issues presented here are a consequence
of not being able to determine the magnitude of certain e¤ects. Therefore,
specifying the (unconditional) functional forms may enable a more detailed
analysis of the model at hand. Indeed, this issue would allow for a more
complete examination of the rst stage equilibria and see to what extent VC
impacts upon a rms initial e¤ort levels.
16See Lindsey (2008), Ozmel et al (2013) and Lerner et al (2003).
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to explore three of the numerous ways in which
the relative abilities of rms can inuence their innovation strategies and the
composition of the nal product market. Driven by the observation that, in
many situations, innovation and success go hand in hand, the three essays we
presented were an e¤ort to understand why certain rms are more likely to
innovate successfully than others. In a broad sense, we observe that abilities
play an important role in determining research strategies of rms, with more
able rms being the likeliest to become an ex post market leader. Indeed, this
view has been repeatedly observed empirically and anecdotally as we high-
lighted in the introduction and Chapter 1. Yet, the essays presented here, as
well as being able to o¤er some important results themselves, are only the
start of a theoretical underpinning of the transmission mechanisms by which
abilities inuence an industrys innovative output. The tools for examining
this important issue already exist but, to the authors knowledge, little else
has been done to examine how ability inuences the composition of the nal
product market.
Chapter 2 evaluated the impact of abilities on the innovative process. In
essence, rather than simply examining the e¤ect of cost di¤erentials, this essay
analysed the cause of cost di¤erentials and their e¤ects. That is, we examine
the extent to which a rms relative ability to innovate - in terms of both
its ability to implement a new technology and innovation timing - a¤ects its
innovative potential. To do this, we proposed a three-stage model in which the
rms sequentially invest in R&D before simultaneously competing in locations
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and prices. In this setting two unique results were obtained.
First, where an ex ante more able rm possesses a Stackelberg leadership
advantage in cost reducing investment, they generate lower costs, greater de-
mand and yield larger prots ex post than their ex ante less able rival. Simply,
if a rm is a "better" innovator (in terms of both timing and implementing
new technologies) it will invest aggressively in cost reduction in order to ce-
ment its place as the dominant rm in the nal product market. In reality, one
could think of Google as such a rm because, given its innovation strategies,
it is likely better able to both spot and implement new technologies. More-
over, this result is consistent with Googles persistent pursuit of new ideas and
technologies that have enabled them to remain a dominant force within all the
markets in which it operates. In contrast, under such circumstances a less able
rival is forced to act "soft" in order to prevent itself undermining its prots
through exacerbating price competition. This may go some way to explaining
why some rms, such as Google, may continue to dominate a market whilst
others, such as Bing and Yahoo!, are forced to serve a niche.
Second, if an ex ante less able rm is the Stackelberg leader in the cost
reduction stage, there are a four potential equilibrium outcomes that depend
on the relative e¢ ciencies of the two rms. To summarise, the more symmetric
the rms, the better able a less e¢ cient rm is at overcoming this the "ability
gap" if it is able to spot new opportunities early. That is, a rm has to
be su¢ ciently able, relative to its rival, to be able to take advantage of its
timing advantage. This result helps to explain two phenomena. First, when
a market is dominant by a relatively very able rival, no matter when a rm
spots an opportunity one should always expect the ex ante dominant rm to
maintain its position. Again, one may think of Google. Second, where an
industry is made up of relatively symmetric rms, the most likely innovator
is not a priori obvious. Consequently, in such circumstances we would expect
the initial innovator, often a relatively unheralded rm, to become the most
dominant. As an example, one might consider the rise of McDonalds in the
1950s from within a relatively homogeneous market.
Chapter 3 then examined whether agglomeration between asymmetric rms
is ever optimal. More importantly, we extend the existing literature by allowing
rms to di¤er, simultaneously, in two ways: i) the rms are a priori heteroge-
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neous with respect to their innovative abilities; and ii) they have asymmetric
absorptive capacities. Simply, if the rms face di¤erent market conditions,
would they still wish to agglomerate?
Our results suggest that rms, facing location based spillovers and whether
or not they are asymmetric, never nd agglomeration optimal. Rather, max-
imal di¤erentiation always obtains. Simply, the ferocity of price competition
remains as a potent centrifugal force, keeping the rms from locating closer to
one another. This result holds even when spillovers that are convex in distance,
as used to nd partial agglomeration results in other spatial models.
However, we also observe that location based spillovers, combined with
asymmetric rms, leads to increasingly asymmetric outcomes. More speci-
cally, the existence of asymmetric absorptive capacities drives the additional
asymmetry, beyond the results obtained by Ziss (1993) and Matsumura and
Matsushima (2009). As the rms locate closer to one another, a more able
rm assimilates more knowledge than it leaks to its less able rival and it is this
additional ability that enables a more able rm to become more predatory. By
moving towards its rival, a more able rm threatens to further increase the ex
post cost disparity, incentivising it to locate more centrally and push its rival
further from the market. In turn, this induces the more able rm to invest
more too. In contrast, the less able rms decisions are more reliant upon
the level of consumer heterogeneity. With more homogeneous consumers, the
weaker rm faces a greater threat of predatory behaviour so, to mitigate this,
it reduces its investment level to minimise spillovers and price competition.
However, when consumers are less "ckle", this threat is reduced and the rm
is willing to invest more.
It is this nal result that is most applicable to real world situations. When
a rm is better able to assimilate a rivals research, this gives it a competitive
advantage. As the e¤ective spillover rates di¤er, it is the more able rm
that gains more than its rival. Therefore, when a rm is in a better position
to "steal" a rivals economic knowledge, we would expect them to be more
aggressive and dominant. Consequently, despite the fact that agglomeration
never obtains, it is likely that agglomeration is less likely with asymmetric
rms as the rms incentives will di¤er and cannot be overcome by simply
increasing the spillover rate to both rms.
5. Conclusion 128
Finally, Chapter 4 examined how venture capital and ability helps shape
the landscape of the nal product market. To this end, we examined the
VC-to-success link from the rms perspectives, examining pre- and post-VC
funding decisions to determine whether VC-funding spurred innovation: i)
directly after being granted; ii) indirectly by incentivising rms to increase
initial research e¤orts to increase their chances of receiving VC funding (and
its associated benets); or iii) a combination of both.
The second stage results clearly demonstrated a direct link between venture
capital and innovation/success. The second stage results clearly demonstrated
a direct link between venture capital and innovation/success. First, it appears
that "success breeds success", in so far as a predictor of future innovation ap-
pears to be past innovative success. Second, and most important, the addition
of venture-backing to a rm tips the balance of competition in its favour. The
addition of funding enables rms to, in essence, "buy success", by spending
money on better equipment or materials. The addition of value-adding ser-
vices is equally important for two reasons: i) it directly increases the likelihood
of success by enabling an entrepreneur to focus on innovation; and ii) a ven-
ture capitalists expertise may indirectly benet a rm if it is able to direct
it along more fruitful research pathways. Yet, the addition of venture capital
only benets the rm that receives it and unambiguously reduces the likeli-
hood of innovation for all other rms. Therefore, the commonly held belief
that venture capital spurs innovation may only be a partial truth. Instead,
venture capital may, in general, spur innovation, but this is dependent on the
balance of these two, contradictory e¤ects. However, most pertinent to this
discussion is the identity of the most likely innovator. Simply, the extent to
which venture capital can determine which rm is the likely innovator depends
upon the level of heterogeneity: the more symmetric the rms, the more likely
that venture capital is an important factor in determining the composition of
the nal product market. Therefore, when the ability gap is large, the more
able rm will be the most likely innovator whether or not it has demonstrated
innovative potential initially.
We also nd evidence of indirect impacts on initial e¤ort levels, before VC
is o¤ered to rms. By altering future expected prots, VC indirectly impacts
upon the rms initial, pre-VC, e¤ort decisions. However, given the general
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specication of the model, it is not possible to determine whether the impact
of nance and value-adding services are positive or negative. In contrast, the
venture capitalists equity stake in the rm impacts on initial e¤orts in two
ways: i) it directly reduces initial e¤orts by reducing expected future prots;
and ii) it indirectly increases (decreases) e¤orts if the rms treat e¤orts as
strategic substitutes (complements). Nonetheless, this "ambiguity" should not
be misinterpreted as there being no indirect e¤ect. Rather, it is likely that VC
does, indeed, have an impact and this is left for future work.
To summarise our ndings, it is clear that the abilities of the rms plays
an important role in the strategic decision making process with regards to
innovation. However, regardless of the setting, the most likely innovator is,
in general, a more able rm. Indeed, the only scenarios in which a less able
rm may come out on top is if: i) they have an advantage in another respect
(perhaps timing); ii) the rms are relatively symmetric; and iii) they receive
some outside help (venture capital in this case). These results are intuitive and
have a number of real world applications and allow a better understanding of
why some rms are more innovative and the underlying mechanisms that allow
this to occur. Nonetheless, e¤orts in this eld should not rest on their laurels.
Much more can be done to understand the importance of relative abilities in
determining the composition of markets, especially given a move towards a
more innovation driven society.
Chapter 6
Appendix A: Proofs for Chapter
2
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The second order conditions are given by:
@2A
@I2A
=
216tm2A
(8m2B   27t)2
  1 < 0 (6.1)
@2B
@I2B
=
8m2B
27t
  1 < 0 (6.2)
From equation (6.1) it is possible to observe that the denominators of equa-
tions (2.4) and (2.5) are strictly negative. Given this, it is necessary that the
numerators of (2.4) and (2.5) must be non-positive for IA and IB  0 to hold.
Given that mA > mB > 0 and t > 0, this implies:
16m2B   27t  0
16m2A + 8m
2
B   27t  0
Rearranging these inequalities, noting mA > mB > 0 and t > 0, yields:
m2A 2 (m2B;
27
16
t  m
2
B
2
] (6.3)
m2B 2 [0;minfm2A;
27
8
t  2m2Ag) (6.4)
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The restrictions in (6.3) and (6.4) ensure that equilibrium investment is
non-negative, but it also necessary to check that they are compatible with the
second order conditions. This requires:
m2A <
(8m2B   27t)2
216t
(6.5)
m2B <
27
8
t (6.6)
Equations (6.5) and (6.6) o¤er the maximum ex ante cost reducing e¢ ciencies
for each rm that are consistent with the second order conditions. It is most
obvious that equation (6.6) is always met as it is fairly trivial to show, from
(6.4), and assuming mA = mB, that maxfm2Bg = 2724t < 278 t. Knowing that
m2B 2 [0; 2724t) makes it easier to demonstrate that equation (6.5) must always
hold too. Taking m2B 2 [0; 2724t) as given, it is possible to show
maxfm2Ag  
(8m2B   27t)2
216t
=   1
432
(8m2B   27t)(16m2B   27t)
t
which is strictly negative for allm2A andm
2
B pairs as dened by (6.3) and (6.4).
Therefore, the second conditions hold under these restrictions.
Finally, it is necessary to evaluate whether the restrictions in (2.6) and
(2.7) yield equilibrium investment levels consistent with subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for the entire model. For this to occur we require mAIA mBIB 2
( 9
4
t; 9
4
t). The ex post cost di¤erential is given by
mAIA  mBIB = 18t[27t(mB  mA)(mA +mB)  8m
4
B]
216tm2A   (8m2B   27t)2
which is strictly positive given the conditions in (6.3) and (6.4). Therefore, it
is necessary that mAIA  mBIB < 94t, or
 243
4
t2(16m2A + 8m
2
B   27t)
216tm2A   (8m2B   27t)2
< 0
Of course, this holds if and only if m2A <
27
16
t   m2B
2
. This implies that the
restrictions derived from the second order and non-negative investment con-
ditions are generally consistent with mAIA  mBIB 2 ( 94t; 94t). However, it
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is necessary to remove a single case from (6.3), where m2A =
27
16
t   m2B
2
, which
yields (2.6) whilst (2.7) remains identical to (6.4).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. (i) It is trivial to show that the equilibrium investment levels are
strictly positive as this follows directly from the proof of proposition 1.
(ii) Taking m2A and m
2
B dened as in (2.6) and (2.7):
@IA
@mA
=
 18t(16m2B   27t)(216tm2A + (8m2B   27t)2)
[216tm2A + (8m
2
B   27t)2]2
> 0
@IB
@mA
=
 288tmAmB(8m2B   27t)(16m2B   27t)
[216tm2A + (8m
2
B   27t)2]2
< 0
(iii) Recall rm Bs investment function given in equation (2.4) and assume
that the e¢ ciency gap is given by
 =
27
8
t  3
2
m2B
If this is the case then IB = 0. However, it is known that IB > 0 for all other
levels of the e¢ ciency gap (proposition 1) and that, for any m2B,
@IB
@mA
< 0.
Therefore, taking m2B as given, it must be that increasing the size of the
e¢ ciency gap reduces IB until it equals zero.
(iv) Where equations (2.6) and (2.7) hold:
IA   IB =  18t[(mA  mB)(16mAmB + 27t) + 8m
3
B]
216tm2A + (8m
2
B   27t)2
> 0
This is strictly positive for all relevant m2A and m
2
B pairs which implies that
IA > IB in all relevant cases.
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6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. (iii) Taking m2B 2 [0; 2724t) as given, we note that A   B = 0 if and
only if m2A = m
2
A or m
2
A where
m2A =
1
576
243t2(32m2B   81t) + 
t(8m2B   27t)
m2A =
1
576
243t2(32m2B   81t)  
t(8m2B   27t)
and
 =
q
 3t(16m2B   81t)(32m2B   81t)(16m2B   27t)3
It is obvious that the domains of both m2A and m
2
A are given by m
2
B 2 [0; 2716t]\
[81
32
t; 27
8
t) \ (27
8
t; 81
16
t]. However, from proposition 1 and corollary 2, it is know
that m2B 2 [0; 2724t), which is strictly contained in this domain, and so this does
not pose a problem.
As A   B = 0 only if m2A = m2A or m2A, it must be that A   B has a
constant for all m2A 2 (m2A;m2A) and so we examine if: (i) m2A < minfm2Ag;
and (ii) maxfm2Ag < m2A. Simply, that m2A 2 (m2A;m2A).
First, m2A = 0 if and only if m
2
B 2 f0; 8132tg and implies that m2A is continu-
ous, with the same sign, over m2B 2 [0; 2724t). Therefore, we can evaluate
minfm2Ag  m2A = m2B  m2A
for all m2B 2 [0; 2724t). Doing so yields
minfm2Ag  m2A =
1
576
288tm2B(16m
2
B   81t)2 + 19683t3   
t(8m2B   27t)
(6.7)
Equation (6.7) is zero if and only if m2B = 0;
189
64
t  27
64
t
p
17. Therefore, it is
quite trivial to check that this minfm2Ag  m2A for all m2B 2 [0; 2724t). Hence,
for all m2B dened as in equation (2.7), m
2
A is strictly larger than m
2
A.
Second, m2A = 0 if and only if m
2
B =
81
32
t. Again, this implies that m2A is
continuous over m2B 2 [0; 2724t). This only leaves us to evaluate
maxfm2Ag  m2A =
27
16
t  m
2
B
t
 m2A
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for all m2B 2 [0; 2724t). With some manipulation
maxfm2Ag  m2A =
1
576
 9t(16m2B   27t)2 + 
t(8m2B   27t)
(6.8)
Equation (6.8) is zero if and only if m2B =
27
16
t which lies outside the relevant
range of m2B. In this case, it is trivial to check that this is strictly negative.
Hence, for all m2B dened as in equation (2.7), m
2
A is strictly smaller than m
2
A.
The implication of equations (6.7) and (6.8) being positive and negative
respectively, for all relevant m2A and m
2
B pairs, is that m
2
A 2 (m2A;m2A). How-
ever, it is already known that between these critical values A B must have
a constant sign. Thus, taking m2A = t and m
2
B = 0 we obtain
A   B = 294
361
t > 0
Naturally, if A B is strictly positive for these values of m2A and m2B, it must
hold from the signs of equations (6.7) and (6.8) that this holds for all relevant
values of m2A and m
2
B. Thus, A   B > 0 holds for all m2A and m2B as dened
in equations (2.6) and (2.7).
6.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The second order conditions are given by:
@2A
@I2A
=
8m2A
27t
  1 < 0 (6.9)
@2B
@I2B
=
216tm2B
(8m2A   27t)2
  1 < 0 (6.10)
From equation (6.9) it is possible to observe that the denominators of equa-
tions (2.11) and (2.10) are strictly negative. Given this, it is necessary that
the numerators of (2.11) and (2.10) must be non-positive for IA and IB  0 to
hold. Given that mA > mB > 0 and t > 0, this implies:
16m2A   27t  0
8m2A + 16m
2
B   27t  0
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Rearranging these inequalities, noting mA > mB > 0 and t > 0, yields:
m2A 2 (m2B;minf
27
16
t;
27
8
t  2m2Bg] (6.11)
m2B 2 [0;minfm2A;
27
16
t m2Bg) (6.12)
The restrictions in (6.11) and (6.12) ensure that equilibrium investment is
non-negative, but it also necessary to check that they are compatible with the
second order conditions. This requires:
m2A <
27
8
t (6.13)
m2B <
(8m2A   27t)2
216t
= gmB (6.14)
Equations (6.13) and (6.14) o¤er the maximum ex ante cost reducing e¢ cien-
cies for each rm that are consistent with the second order conditions. It is
most obvious that equation (6.13) is always met as it is fairly trivial to show
maxfm2Ag = 2716t. It is then trivial to note that gmB is strictly positive and,
consequently, that gmB > minfm2Bg = 0: Thus, it is then a case of simply
ensuring that maxfm2Bg <gmB.
First, for m2A 2 (0; 2724t], maxfm2Bg = m2A. Thus
maxfm2Bg  gmB =   1216 64m4A   81t(8m2A   9t)t
This equals zero wherem2A =
81
16
t 27
16
t
p
5 both of which are strictly larger than
27
24
t = maxfm2Bg. Therefore, for all m2A 2 (0; 2724t] and over all m2B 2 (0; 2724t)
it must hold that maxfm2Bg  gmB has the same sign. It is then easy to show
maxfm2Bg  gmB < 0 for all m2A 2 (0; 2724t].
Second, where m2A 2 [2724t; 2716t], maxfm2Bg = 2716t 
m2A
2
. This implies
maxfm2Bg  gmB =   1432 (8m2A   27t)(16m2A   27t)t
This is negative for all m2A 2 (0; 2716t) and equal to zero if and only if m2A = 2716t.
However, all possible m2B are strictly less than maxfm2Bg , which doesnt cause
a problem. Therefore, this implies that the second order conditions are met
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for all m2A and m
2
B pairs.
Finally, it is necessary to check that 'A 'B = mAIA mBIB 2 ( 94t; 94t)
also holds, or that the ex post cost asymmetry allows for a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. This is true if and only if
mAIA  mBIB >  9
4
t (6.15)
mAIA  mBIB < 9
4
t (6.16)
From equation (6.15) we obtain
243
4
t2(8m2A + 16m
2
B   27t)
216tm2B   (8m2A   27t)2
> 0
which implies m2A + 2m
2
B <
27
8
t. Equation (6.16) on the other hand requires
9
4
t(8m2A   27t)(16m2A   27t)
216tm2B   (8m2A   27t)2
< 0
This equation implies that m2A <
27
16
t.
Combining this nal element with (6.11) and (6.12) the non-negative in-
vestment and second order conditions it is apparent that we must remove a
single case (where m2A =
27
16
t). Doing this obtains the restriction in equations
(2.12) and (2.13).
6.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. (i) It is trivial to demonstrate that IA and IB are strictly positive as
this follows directly from Proposition 5.
(ii) Taking m2A 2 (m2B; 2716t) as given and m2B dened as in (2.13):
@IA
@mB
=
 288tmAmB(8m2A   27t)(16m2A   27t)
[216tm2B + (8m
2
A   27t)2]2
< 0
@IB
@mB
=
 18t(16m2A   27t)(216tm2B + (8m2A   27t)2)
[216tm2B + (8m
2
A   27t)2]2
> 0
Consequently, it is easy to see that, taking m2A as given, an increase to m
2
B
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decreases (increases) the equilibrium investment levels of rm B (A).
(iii) Where equations (2.12) and (2.13) hold
IA   IB =  18t[(mB  mA)(16mAmB + 27t) + 8m
3
B]
216tm2B + (8m
2
A   27t)2
This function is equal to zero if and only if m2B = m
I
B where
mIB =
1
1024
[16m2A   27t
p

]2
m2A
and

 = 729t2 + 864tm2A   256m4A
Of course, for the function to be continuous we require thatm2A 6= 0 and 
  0.
The rst of these follows from Proposition 5, but 
  0 if and only if
m2A 2 [
27
16
t(1 
p
2);
27
16
t(1 +
p
2)]
This clearly contains all relevant m2A and so is not an issue.
Note that there are two critical values of m2B which we will denote as
mI+B =
1
1024
[16m2A   27t+
p

]2
m2A
mI B =
1
1024
[16m2A   27t 
p

]2
m2A
It is possible to observe that mI+B > 0. This is because m
I+
B = 0 could only
occur if m2A = 0 but, if this were the case, m
I+
B =
0
0
which is not dened.
Therefore, mI+B is continuous overm
2
A 2 (0; 2716t) and it is trivial to demonstrate
that it is always positive over this range. In contrast, mI B > 0 if jm2Aj = 278 t
and is, therefore, continuous over all m2A 2 (0; 2716t) also. However, it is possible
to demonstrate that mI B is always positive over this range.
Given that both mI+B and m
I 
B are strictly positive over the relevant range,
it is useful to observe
mI B  mI+B =  
1
256
(16m2A   27t)
p


m2A
> 0
6. Appendix A: Proofs for Chapter 2 138
It is also important to note that the second order conditions are violated
if1
m2B >
(8m2A   27t)2
216t
=  
Now
mI+B     =
1
13824
(16m2A   27t)( 16m2A(16m2A   81t)  729t2 + 27t
p

)
tm2A
which equals zero if and only if m2A =
27
16
t. Therefore, for m2A 2 (0; 2716t) the
equation has the same sign. In this case, it is trivial to show that it is always
negative. Likewise
mI B     =  
1
13824
(16m2A   27t)(16m2A(16m2A   81t) + 729t2 + 27t
p

)
tm2A
This function equals zero if and only if m2A =
27
16
t or 27
8
t which implies it has
the same sign for all m2A 2 (0; 2716t). In this case, it is trivial to check that it
must be positive.
Consequently, we can ignoremI B (as it would violate the SOCs) and simply
usemI+B = m
I
B. This implies that for allm
2
B 2 (mIB; ) it must hold that IA IB
has the same sign also. Therefore, we must examine
maxfm2Bg  mIB = m2A  mIB 8 m2A 2 (0;
27
24
t] (6.17)
maxfm2Bg  mIB =
27
16
t  m
2
A
2
 mIB 8 m2A 2 (
27
24
t;
27
16
t] (6.18)
From equation (6.17) we observe
m2A  mIB =  
1
512
(16m2A   27t)
p

 + 729t2   512m4A
m2A
which is never equal to zero. Thus, it is continuous over all m2A 2 (0; 2724t] and
1As this value of m2B is derived from the second order conditions, it must be that all
relevant m2B - contained in equation (13) - meet this criteria. Therefore
maxfm2Bg <  
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positive over this range. Similarly, from equation (6.18) we observe
27
16
t  m
2
A
2
 mIB =  
1
512
(16m2A   27t)(16m2A   27t+
p

)
m2A
which equals zero if m2A =
27
16
t. However, as this is not a potential value for
m2A it must be that it is continuous over all m
2
A 2 [2724t; 2716t) and it is trivial to
demonstrate that this, too, is positive.
Therefore, it must be that, for all m2A 2 (0; 2716t), mIB 2 (0;maxfm2Bg).
6.6 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. (i) The ex post cost di¤erential is given by
mAIA  mBIB = 18tmAmB(8m
4
A   27t(mA  mB)(mA +mB))
216tm2B + (8m
2
A   27t)2
Furthermore, this equation is equal to zero if and only if m2B = m
'
B where
m'B =  
1
27
m2A(8m
2
A   27t)
t
Naturally, this is strictly positive and implies that it must be larger than the
minimum potential value of m2B. Therefore, for m
2
A 2 (0; 2724t] we nd
maxfm2Bg  m'B = m2A  m'B =
8
27
m4A
t
> 0
which implies that maxfm2Bg > m'B for all m2A 2 (0; 2724t]. In addition, for all
m2A 2 [2724t; 2716t)
maxfm2Bg  m'B =
27
16
t  m
2
A
2
 m'B =
1
432
(8m2A   27t)(16m2A   27t)
t
> 0
which implies maxfm2Bg > m'B for all m2A 2 [2724t; 2716t).
Together, these imply thatmaxfm2Bg > m'B for allm2A 2 (0; 2716t]. Moreover,
as mAIA mBIB = 0 if and only if m2B = m'B, we can observe that the sign of
the equation is the constant on either side of m'B. Thus, it is trivial to check,
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for a given m2A, if m
2
B < m
'
B, mAIA mBIB > 0. Therefore, if m2B > m'B then
mAIA  mBIB < 0.
(ii) It is easy to check the relationship between m'B and m
I
B by observing
m'B  mIB =  
1
13824
(16m2A   27t)(16m2A(16m2A   27t)  729t2 + 27t
p

)
tm2A
This equation is zero if and only if m2A =
27
16
t. Therefore, over all m2A 2 (0; 2716t]
this must have the same sign. Therefore, it is trivial to then check, for any
m2A, that m
'
B > m
I
B.
6.7 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. (i) Taking m2A and m
2
B as dened in (2.12) and (2.13) is is trivial to
demonstrate that the prots for both rms are strictly positive.
(ii) The di¤erence in rm prots is given by
A   B =
6t
(
m2A(81t  32m2A)(8m2A   27t)2
+729t2m2B(32m
2
B   81t)  864m2Am2B(8m2B   27t)
)
[216tm2B   (8m2A   27t)2]2
Of course, it is not obvious whether this function is positive or negative. How-
ever, we can observe that A   B = 0 if and only if m2B = mB where
mB =
1
576
243t2(32m2A   81t)
p

t(8m2A   27t)
and where
 =  3t(16m2A   81t)(32m2A   81t)(16m2A   27t)3
Of course, we require that   0. This occurs for all m2A 2 [0; 2716t] \ [8132t; 8116t]
which is contained in the feasible set of m2A.
However, this does imply that there are two critical values for which A  
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B = 0 given by
m+B =
1
576
243t2(32m2A   81t) +
p

t(8m2A   27t)
m B =
1
576
243t2(32m2A   81t) 
p

t(8m2A   27t)
First, over the relevant range of m2A 2 (0; 2716t), m+B = 0 if and only if m2A = 0;
which is not contained in this set. Therefore, for all m2A 2 (0; 2716t], over which
the function is continuous, the sign will be the same. It is trivial, then, to
check that this is positive. Second, over the relevant range of m2A 2 (0; 2716t],
m B = 0 if and only if m
2
A = 0 also. Consequently, the sign on this is constant
for all m2A 2 (0; 2716t] and it is trivial to observe that this is positive.
Therefore, we know that both m+B and m
 
B are positive. However, it is
fairly simple to observe which is larger by checking
m+B  m B =
1
288
p

(8m2A   27t)
For all m2A as dened as in equation (2.12) it must be that this is negative, or
m+B < m
 
B .
However, we must also check that they meet the necessary SOCs. This
requires
m+B     =
1
1728
 (16m2A   27t)(256m4A   2160tm2A + 3645t2) + 3
p

t(8m2A   27t)
< 0
m B     =
1
1728
 (16m2A   27t)(256m4A   2160tm2A + 3645t2)  3
p

t(8m2A   27t)
< 0
Interestingly, both of these equations only equal zero where m2A =
27
16
t. Thus,
for all m2A 2 (0; 2716t) these equations have the same sign and it is not di¢ cult
to check that these must be negative. This means that both of these critical
values are below the upper bound set by the SOCs. Consequently, it is possible
to argue that for all m2B 2 (m+B ;m B ) the di¤erence in rm prots has the
same sign.
Therefore, it is only left to check that m+B orm
 
B are contained within the
feasible set of m2B. Obviously, as both of these are strictly positive, it must be
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that they are above the lower bound. However, we must check whether they
are under the upper bound. First, for all m2A 2 (0; 2724t] we can check
m+B  maxfm2Bg = m+B  m2A (6.19)
=
1
576
 288tm2A(16m2A   81t)  19683t3 +
p

t(8m2A   27t)
m+B  maxfm2Bg = m B  m2A (6.20)
=
1
576
 288tm2A(16m2A   81t)  19683t3  
p

t(8m2A   27t)
Equation (6.19) equals zero if and only if m2A = 0. Therefore, for all m
2
A 2
(0; 27
24
t] it must have the same sign (and is continuous). It is trivial then to show
that this is negative. Equation (6.20) is zero if and only ifm2A =
27
64
t(7p17) >
27
24
t. Therefore, this too has the same sign over the relevant range but, in this
instance, the sign is positive. Consequently, for all m2A 2 (0; 2724t] only m+B is
contained within the set of possible m2B.
Second, we must check, for m2A 2 [2724t; 2716t)
m+B  maxfm2Bg = m+B   (
27
16
t  m
2
A
2
) (6.21)
=
1
576
6561t3   7776t2m2A + 2304tm4A +
p

t(8m2A   27t)
m+B  maxfm2Bg = m B   (
27
16
t  m
2
A
2
) (6.22)
=
1
576
6561t3 + 7776t2m2A   2304tm4A  
p

t(8m2A   27t)
Equation (6.21) is equal to zero only where m2A =
27
16
t. Thus, for all m2A 2
[27
24
t; 27
16
t), this equation has the same sign and it is simply show that this
is negative. The second equation, (6.22), is zero if and only if m2A =
27
16
t.
Therefore, this too has the same sign over the relevant range. However, in this
case, the sign is positive. Consequently, for all m2A 2 [2724t; 2716t) only m+B is
contained within the set of possible m2B.
Therefore, given that the sign of A B is constant for allm2B 2 (m+B ;m B ),
m+B < maxfm2Bg and m B > maxfm2Bg it must be that for all m2B 2
(m+B ;maxfm2Bg) the sign of A B is constant. We shall rename m+B = mB
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as it is contained in the relevant set and it is then simple to demonstrate that,
for all m2A 2 (0; 2716t), if m2B > mB then A < B.
(iii) Finally
mB  m'B =
1
1728
(16m2A   27t)(246m4A   1296tm2A + 2187t2) + 3
p

t(8m2A   27t)
This equals zero if and only if m2A = 0 or
27
16
t and is continuous between. This
means that mB  m'B has the same sign for all m2A 2 (0; 2716t) and it is quite
easy to show that this is positive.
Thus, mB > m
'
B > m
I
B over the relevant range.
Chapter 7
Appendix B: Proofs of Chapter
3
7.1 Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. The distance between rm A across cases is given by
al   ag = 2
75
(1  )(1 + )"
t

8(1 + 2)(1 + 2)  32   27t
8(1 + 2)(2562 + 625)  12800   16785t
# (7.1)
where
 = 256(25  16)(25  16)(1  4 + 2 + 2 + 22)
+ 432t

25(1 + 2)(162   75) + 42(625  722)
+ 1658475t2
Given equation (7.1), it is trivial to observe that the sign of this equation
depends upon . The other terms are easy to sign, with both terms of the
denominator negative for 27
16
(1  16
25
)2 < t. Let 27
16
(1  16
25
)2 = t.
Examining , it is possible to observe that this function is minimised if
t^ =
8
61425
25(1 + 2)(162   75) + 4(625 + 722)

144
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and, with some manipulation, we can observe
t t^ = 8
1535625
163(35372 + 625) + 100(625  13842) + 625(107  752)

which is positive for all  2 (0; 1);  2 (0; ). Therefore,  is increasing in t
over the relevant range. Thus, at t = t^ we nd
 =
256
15625
 (25  16) (25 + 16) (25  16)
"
3125  2(625 + 20812)
+125(5  51)
#
which is positive. Thus, for all relevant t,  and . Therefore, it must be that
al > ag.
If this is true for rm A then, given the constant distance between the
rms, this must hold for B by symmetry.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 15
Proof. First, we observe
@al
@IA
  @ag
@IA
=
1
25

t
which is greater than zero for all  2 (0; ).
Second, with some manipulation one nds
@al
@IB
  @ag
@IB
=   1
25

which is less than zero for all  2 (0; ).
7.3 Proof of proposition 16 (generic spillovers)
Proof. We prove each of these in turn
1. It is simple to check that the investment levels are positive. Both the
numerator and denominator are decreasing in t. Therefore, it become
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trivial to check that where t = 16
27
(1   16
25
)2 both the numerator and
denominator are negative. More formally
16(  )2   27t = 16
625
"
25(1 +   )
 16
#"
16
 25(1   + )
#
16(1  )2   27t =  144
625
 (50  41)(
8(1 + )2(1 + )2
 32   27t
)
=
8
625
(113   900)  8(1 + 2 + 2)
all of which are strictly negative for  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; ).
The di¤erence between the investment levels are given by
IAg   IBg = 2
3
(1  )(1 + )[16(1  )(  )  27t]
8(1 + )2(1 + )2   32   27t
Given the above analysis, we can easily sign the denominator and so our
focus is simply on the sign of the numerator. Again, this is reducing in
t and, for t = 16
27
(1  16
25
)2 we observe
16(1 )( ) 27t = 512(25 8)+16 [(1  ) (  )  1] < 0
for all  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; ). Therefore, IAg   IBg > 0 or IAg > IBg.
2. In this case
'Ag   'Bg =  
18t(1  )(1 + )(1  )(1 + )
8(1 + )2(1 + )2   32   27t
Given our analysis in 1., it is trivial to observe that this must be positive
for all t > 16
27
(1  16
25
)2.
3. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the location stage if
'Ag   'Bg 2 ( 
9
4
t;
9
4
t)
For all t > 16
27
(1  16
25
)2 we know from 3. that 'A   'B > 0 and so we
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only require
'Ag   'Bg <
9
4
t
or,
 9
4
t [16(1  )2   27t]
8(1 + )2(1 + )2   32   27t < 0
which occurs if
t >
16
27
(1  )2
It is then simple to observe
16
27
(1  16
25
)2   16
27
(1  )2 = 16
1875
(50  41) > 0
This ensures that an equilibrium exists in all stages of the game.
4. The prot functions are given by
Ag =   1
36
(8(1  )2   27t)(16(  )2   27t)2
[8(1 + )2(1 + )2   32   27t]2 (7.2)
Bg =   1
36
(8(  )2   27t)(16(1  )2   27t)2
[8(1 + )2(1 + )2   32   27t]2 (7.3)
The key term in both equations is the rst term (in brackets) of the
numerator. From these we observe that when they are negative the two
prot functions are positive. This occurs if
t >
8
27
(1  )2
t >
8
27
(  )2
Given that
16
27
(1  16
25
)2 >
8
27
(1  )2 > 8
27
(  )2 > 0
the prots must always be positive.
The di¤erence between the rms prots is given by
Ag   Bg = 2
9
(1  )(1 + )(1  )(1 + ) 
[8(1 + )2(1 + )2   32   27t]2
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where
  = 256(1  )2(  )2 + 27t[128 + 81t  32(1 + 2)(1 + 2)]
It is intuitive that the sign on this latter equation determines the sign of
A  B. It is obvious that the rst term of   is positive and the second
term is increasing in t. Thus, where t = 16
27
(1  )2 we nd
  = 256(1  )(1 + )(1  )(1 + )(1  )2 > 0
As 16
27
(1  16
25
)2 > 16
27
(1 )2 it must be that A B > 0, or A > B.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 16 (location based
spillovers)
Proof. We prove each of these in turn.
1. Take any t > 16
27
(1  16
25
)2. If this is the case then it must be that the
denominators of both IAl and IBl are strictly positive. The denominator
is clearly decreasing in t and, even when t = 16
27
(1  16
25
)2, we observe"
8(2562 + 625)(1 + 2)
 12800   16875t
#
=  88(25 16)(25+16)(1 )(1+) < 0
Thus both IAl and IBl are strictly positive.
The di¤erence between the investment levels are given by
IAl   IBl = 2
75
(1  )(25 + 16)[16(16   25)(25  16)  16875t]
8(2562 + 625)(1 + 2)  12800   16875t
It turns out that the numerator is strictly negative and, consequently,
the sign on IAl  IBl is determined by the denominator. Given the above
analysis it must be that IAl   IBl > 0 or IAl > IBl.
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2. In this case
'Al   'Bl =
2
25
(1  )(1 + )
(
32(16   25)(25  16)
 1125t(125  322)
)
8(2562 + 625)(1 + 2)  12800   16875t
Again, the numerator must be negative given the nal term in square
brackets. Consequently, the sign on 'Al   'Bl is determined by the sign
on the denominator which, again, implies that for 'Al   'Bl > 0.
3. Unlike in the previous case, we do not end with a simple function that
is dependent upon the size of the cost di¤erential. Instead, we require
@2Al
@a2
) 1
1518750
0B@ 4IB(25  16) 4IA(25  16)
 225t
1CA
264 4IA(152   125)+4IB(125  152)
+3375t
375
t
< 0
@2Bl
@b2
) 1
1518750
0B@ 4IB(25  16) 4IA(25  16)
+225t
1CA
264 4IA(152   125)+4IB(125  152)
 3375t
375
t
< 0
Subbing in the equilibrium investment levels makes this even more un-
wieldy, with a functional form given by
@2A
@a2
) 1
2250
8>>>><>>>>:
"
1024(1  )(1 + )
(25  16)(25  16)
#
+234375t(81t  32  162)
 38400t(982 + 22   375)
9>>>>=>>>>;
 
16(25  16)2
 16875t
!
[8(2562 + 625)(1 + 2)  12800   16875t]2 < 0
@2B
@b2
) 1
2250
8>>>><>>>>:
"
 1024(1  )(1 + )
(25  16)(25  16)
#
+234375t(81t  322   16)
 38400t(98 + 222   375)
9>>>>=>>>>;
 
16(25  16)2
 16875t
!
[8(2562 + 625)(1 + 2)  12800   16875t]2 < 0
Taking the former of these two second order equations, we can see that
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the sign of this equation is dependent on
 =
8><>:
1024(1  )(1 + )(25  16)(25  16)
+234375t(81t  32  162)
 38400t(982 + 22   375)
9>=>; (7.4)
and
16(25  16)2   16875t (7.5)
where
@
@t
=
(
38400(375  22)  12002(31362 + 3125)
+37968750t  7500000
)
@2
@t2
= 37968750
Thus, the equation is minimised where
t = t^ =
8
81
(2 + 2) +
256
253125
(22 + 982   375)
and we can also note that
t^  8
27
(1  16
25
)2 =   8
253125
(3125  7042)(1 + )(1  ) < 0
This implies that 8
27
(1   16
25
)2 is strictly larger than t^ and that  is
increasing over the relevant range of t. Moreover, as 8
27
(1   16
25
)2 <
16
27
(1   16
25
)2 this is also true over our relevant range. Taking any t >
16
27
(1   16
25
)2, it is obvious that (7.5) is negative. Consequently, we
require that (7.4) is positive. Setting t = 16
27
(1  16
25
)2 we nd
 =
256
225
(25  16)(25 + 16)(1 )(1 +)(25  16)(125  44) > 0
and is increasing in t. Therefore, it must be that for all t > 16
27
(1  16
25
)2
we have @
2A
@a2
< 0 which ensures an equilibrium in the location stage.
The proof for @
2B
@b2
is remarkably similar and involves identical steps and
so is omitted here.
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4. The prot equations are given by
Al =
1
22500
(
(16875t  8(25  16))
[16(25  16)2   16875t]2
)
"
8(2562 + 625)(1 + 2)
 12800   16875t
#2 (7.6)
Bl =
1
22500
(
(16875t  8(25  16))
[16(25  16)2   16875t]2
)
"
8(2562 + 625)(1 + 2)
 12800   16875t
#2 (7.7)
The denominator is strictly positive and so the sign of both equations is
dependent on the numerator. It is trivial to show that A is positive if
t >
8
16875
(25  16)2
and B is positive if
t >
8
16875
(25  16)2
which holds for all t > 8
27
(1  16
25
)2. As 16
27
(1  16
25
)2 > 8
27
(1  16
25
)2,
it must be that both Al and Bl must be strictly positive for all relevant
values of ,  and t.
The prot di¤erential is given by
Al   Bl = 2
5625
(1  )(1 + )(25  16)(25 + 16)
[8(2562 + 625)(1 + 2)  12800   16875t]2
where
 =
"
256(25  16)2(25  16)2   540000t2(625 + 2562)
+34560000t(25  4) + 10546875t(81t  32)
#
Again, it is obvious that  determines the sign on this equation. In this
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case, we observe
@
@t
=
 
34560000(25  4)  5400002(625 + 2562)
+1708593750t  337500000
!
@2
@t2
= 1708593750
This indicates that  is minimised where
t = t =
16
81
(1 + 2) +
1024
50625
(42   25 + 4)
Now, it is possible to observe that
16
27
(1  16
25
)2   t = 16
81
(2  2) + 512
50625
(162   25  8)
which is strictly larger than zero for all  2 (0; 1) and  2 [0; ). There-
fore, for all t > 16
27
(1   16
25
)2 it must be that  is increasing and, at
16
27
(1  16
25
)2, we observe
 = 256(1  )(1 + )(25  16)(25 + 16)(25  16)2 > 0
Therefore, for all t > 16
27
(1  16
25
)2 it must be that A   B > 0.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 17 (generic spillovers)
Proof. First, the the impact of  on IAg is given by
@IAg
@
=  2
3
f(; ; t)
[8(1 + )2(1 + )2   32   27t]2
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where f(; ; t) is given by
f(; ; t) = 729t
2
+ 216t
 
2(1 + 32)
 3(3  2)  (1 + 52)
!
+128 (  )
8><>:
3(1 + )  22(7  2)
+(5 + 2)
+2(1  )(1 + )  2
9>=>;
Furthermore, we observe
ft = 216

2(1 + 32)  3(3  2)  (1 + 52)+ 1458t
ftt = 1458
Consequently, we can observe this f minimised where t = tf such that
tf =
4
27

2(1 + 32)  3(3  2)  (1 + 52)

It is then simple to check that 16
27
(1  16
25
)2 > tf . Therefore, this function is
everywhere increasing and, at t = 16
27
(1   16
25
)2 we nd f(; ; t) > 0 for all
 and . Therefore, this must be strictly negative.
Similarly, the the impact of  on IAg is given by
@IAg
@
=
2
3
g(; ; t)
[8(1 + )2(1 + )2   32   27t]2
where g(; ; t) is given by
g(; ; t) =  729t2 + 216t
 
(1 + 32) 
2(2   5)  2(1 + 32)
!
+128 (  )
8><>:
3(1 + 2) + 2(1  72)
+(5 + 2)
 4(1  )(1 + )  2
9>=>;
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where
gt = 216

(1 + 32)  2(2   5)  2(1 + 32)  1458t
gtt =  1458
Therefore, g(; ; t) is maximised where t = tg, where
tg =
4
27

(1 + 32)  2(2   5)  2(1 + 32)

Again, it is trivial to observe that 16
27
(1   16
25
)2 > tg. Thus, this function is
always decreasing and, at t = 16
27
(1  16
25
)2 we nd g(; ; t) < 0. Thus, this
must be negative for all relevant parameter values.
For equation the impact of  on IBg,we nd
@IBg
@
=
2
3
u(; ; t)
[8(1 + )2(1 + )2   32   27t]2
where u(; ; t) is given by
u(; ; t) = 729t2 + 216t
 
[2 + 6 + 22   3]
 2(1 + 52)
!
+128 (1  )
8><>:
1  3(1 + 2)
 2(1  72)  (1 + 52)
 2(1  22)
9>=>;
In this instance,
ut = 216
 
[2 + 6 + 22   3]  2(1 + 52)+ 1458t
utt = 1458
Thus, u(; ; t) is minimised where t = tu, where
tu =
4
27
 
[2 + 6 + 22   3]  2(1 + 52)
It is possible to observe that 16
27
(1   16
25
)2 > tu and so for all relevant t,
u(; ; t) is strictly increasing. Therefore, where t = 16
27
(1  16
25
)2 it is trivial
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to observe u(; ; t) > 0. Therefore, u(; ; t) is positive for all  2 (0; 1),
 2 (0; ) and t > 16
27
(1  16
25
)2.
Finally, the impact of  on IBg, given by
@IBg
@
=
2
3
v(; ; t)
[8(1 + )2(1 + )2   32   27t]2
which depends upon v(; ; t). Here, v(; ; t) is given by
v(; ; t) =  729t2 + 216t
"
(3 + 2)(1  2)
 2(1  52)
#
 128 (1  )
8><>:
1 + 24   3(5 + 2)
 2(1  72)  (1 + 2)
 2
9>=>;
In this instance
vt = 216

(3 + 2)(1  2)  2(1  52)  1458t
vtt =  1458
Obviously, this is maximised at t = tv, where
tv =
4
27

(3 + 2)(1  2)  2(1  52)
It is not di¢ cult to show that tv < 16
27
(1  16
25
)2 and so for all relevant value
of t - given  and  - this must be decreasing. Evaluating v(; ; t) at the
minimum value of t = 16
27
(1  16
25
)2 implies that the sign is dependent on the
size of both  and . More formally, we can derive a value of t, equal to tg,
such that for t < tg, this value will be positive. This is
t =
4
9
  4
27

2(2   52   1) + ( + 6)+ 4
27
p

where
 = (1 )(1+)
"
1 + 152   4(32 + 5) + 22(1  )(1 + )(22 + 1)
+43(53 + 3) + 4(1  172)
#
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However, it is not possible to derive a value of  or  for which this ensures
t > 16
27
(1  16
25
)2. Nonetheless, it is possible that this may occur for certain
parameter levels. For example,  = 0:9 and  = 0:1 imply
t = 0:68
16
27
(1  16
25
)2 = 0:53
7.6 Proof of Proposition 17 (location based
spillovers)
Proof. This proofs for equations @IAl
@
, @IAl
@
and @IBl
@
are logically similar to
those for @IAg
@
, @IAg
@
and @IBg
@
and so are omitted.1
The interesting case, as before, is the function
@IBl
@
=
32
75
h(; ; t)
8(2562 + 625)(1 + 2)  12800   16875t2
where h(; ; t) is given by
h(; ; t) =  284765625t2   16875t
264 500(3 + 
2)
 6400(3 + 2))
 20482(1  52)
375
 128(25  16)
8>>>><>>>>:
312504   163(2562 + 3125)
+252(17922   625)
 16(2562   625)
+25(25  16)(25 + 16)
9>>>>=>>>>;
Furthermore, we observe
ht = 8437500(3 + 
2)  108000000(3 + 2)  345600002(1  52)  569531250t
htt =  569531250
1Proofs for these are available upon request.
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Consequently, the function is maximised when t = th, where
th =
8437500(30 + 2)  108000000(3 + 2)  345600002(1  52)
569531250
It is possible to observe that th < 16
27
(1   16
25
)2 and so h(; ; t) is strictly
decreasing for all relevant t. However, as with the last case, we observe that the
sign on h(; ; t) is always strictly positive when t = 16
27
(1  16
25
)2, regardless
of the initial parameters  and . Moreover, there exists a value of t, noted
as tl 2 (16
27
(1  16
25
)2;1); such that @IBg
@
= 0. This is given by
tl =
4
27
(3 + 2)  128
16875
(25

3 + 2

+ 8

1  52) + 4
16875
p

where
 = (1  )(1 + )
264 390625(1 + 15
2)  1000000(32 + 5)
+3200002(1  )(1 + )(1 + 22)
+4096003(3 + 52) + 655364(1  172)
375
It then becomes simple to check that for all  and 
tl   16
27
(1  16
25
)2 > 0
7.7 Proof of Proposition 18
Proof. The di¤erence between the investment levels in the two cases are given
by
IAl   IAg =   6
25
x(  
8(1 + 2)(1 + 2)  32   27t
8(1 + 2)(2562 + 625)  12800   16785t
)
IBl   IBg =   6
25
y(  
8(1 + 2)(1 + 2)  32   27t
8(1 + 2)(2562 + 625)  12800   16785t
)
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where
x = 80000(2  2 + 4)  131200(1 + 2)2
+1282(2081 + 32812   4004)  81923(41  42   4)
+216t

(1025   625)(1 + 32) + 22(2002   1081)+ 455625t2
y = 131200(1 + 2)2 + 1282(400  32812   20814)
 80000(1  2 + 4) + 819223(41  42   4)
 216t (1025   625) (3 + a2) + 22(200  10812)  455625t2
In both of these cases the sign on the equations simply depend upon x and y.
Therefore it is su¢ cient to evaluate these functions.
First, x is clearly continuous for all t > 16
27
(1   16
25
)2, with a positive
denominator. Therefore, we must simply evaluate the sign to determine the
sign of x. In this instance we can observe
@x
@t
=  216 (1025   625)(1 + 32) + 22(2002   1081)+ 911250t
@2x
@t2
= 911250
Consequently, x is maximised where t = t, where
t =   4
16875

(1025   625)(1 + 32) + 22(2002   1081)

It is easy to check that
16
27
(1  16
25
)2   t > 0
for all  and  and so this function is decreasing. Thus, evaluating x at
t = 16
27
(1  16
25
)2 we obtain
x =  128
625
(25 16)(25+16)(1 )(1+) 1875  2(625  9122)  125(11 + 5)
which is strictly negative. Therefore, x must always be negative and IAl > IAg
for all relevant parameters.
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The case of y is slightly more complicated. It is possible to observe that
IBl = IBg if and only if t = ty where2
ty =   4
675
(123 + 413 + 16) +
4
16875
2(625 + 21622) +
4
16875
p
	
and
	 = 390625(1  )(1 + )(1 + 152)  1281250(1  )(1 + )(32 + 50)
+6252(800 + 10532   22384 + 16816) + 41003(600 + 1572   10814)
+44(35212   200)(2412   200)
With some manipulation it is possible to demonstrate
ty >
16
27
(1  16
25
)2
for all relevant  and . Consequently, given any  and  pair, we must simply
check whether y is positive or negative. Assuming t = 16
27
(1   16
25
) - which
is less than ty, we nd that it is strictly negative. Therefore, for all t < ty we
nd IBl < IBg with the reverse true for all t > ty.
2There are, in fact, two value for which this is true. However, this is the only value that
lies within the relevant range of t.
Chapter 8
Appendix C: Proofs of Chapter
4
8.1 Proof of Proposition 19
Proof. The slope of the reaction functions are given by
R
0
i =  
@2i
@e2i @e
2
j
@2i
@(e2i )
2
Consider case (i) -
 
qil ; q
j
l

rst. Then observe that
@2il;ljt=2NV C
@(e2i )
2
=
@2'2i
@(e2i )
2

(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)

< 0 (8.1)
@2il;ljt=2NV C
@e2i@e
2
j
=
@'2i
@e2i
@'2j
@e2j
[DL +DH  M ] < 0 (8.2)
by assumption A1 (concavity) and M > 2DH > 2DL.
As both probability functions, '2i (ai; e
2
i ) and 
2
i (ai; e
2
i ), possess similar
properties (by A1 and A3) it then follows immediately that that the other
cases yield the same result.
160
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8.2 Proof of Proposition 20
Proof. The proof holds for all cases (i) - (iv) given the assumptions in A1 -
A3. Consequently, we only prove this for the case (qil ; q
j
l ), but similar proofs
exist for all other cases. We solve this comparative static using Cramers rule
where
Ax = b24 @2il;ljt=2NVC@(e2i )2 @2il;ljt=2NVC@e2i @e2j
@2jl;ljt=2NVC
@e2i @e
2
j
@2jl;ljt=2NVC
@(e2j )
2
35" de2idx
de2j
dx
#
=
"
 @2Ei
@e2i @x
  @2Ej
@ej2@x
#
Using this, we can obtain dei2
dai
by substituting ai = x and using
de2i
dai
=
Ae2i ai
jAj
=

 @
2il;ljt=2NVC
@e2i @ai
@2il;ljt=2NVC
@e2i @e
2
j
 @
2il;ljt=2NVC
@ej2@ai
@2jl;ljt=2NVC
@(e2j )
2

@2il;ljt=2NVC
@(e2i )
2
@2il;ljt=2NVC
@e2i @e
2
j
@2jl;ljt=2NVC
@e2i @e
2
j
@2jl;ljt=2NVC
@(e2j )
2

which yields
jAj = @
2'2i
@(e2i )
2
@2'2j
@(e2j)
2
(
[(M  DL)  '2i (M  DL  DH)]
(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)
 )
 

@'2i
@e2i
2@'2j
@e2j
2
(M  DH  DL)2
Ae2i ai =   @2'2i@e2i@ai @
2'2j
@(e2j)
2
(
[(M  DL)  '2i (M  DL  DH)]
(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)
 )
+
@'2i
@e2i
@'2i
@ai

@'2j
@e2j
2
(M  DH  DL)2
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Signing these equations is quite simple. First,
Ae2i ai is strictly positive
given the assumptions A1 and A2. The sign of jAj is harder to interpret.
However, assuming uniqueness and stability holds, or
1
jR0ij
>
R0j (8.3)
we observe
@2'2i
@(e2i )
2
@2'2j
@(e2j)
2
 
[(M  DL)  '2i (M  DL  DH)]
[(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)]
!
>

@'2i
@e2i
2@'2j
@e2j
2
(M  DH  DL)2
Consequently, jAj > 0 and de2i
dai
> 0.
The case for
de2j
dai
is similar and we obtain
Ae2jai =   @2'2i@(e2i )2 @'
2
i
@ai
@'2j
@e2j
 
[(M  DL)  '2i (M  DL  DH)]
(DH +DL  M)
!
+
@2'2i
@e2i@ai
@'2i
@e2i
@'2j
@e2j
[(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)](DH +DL  M)
which is strictly negative. Consequently
de2j
dai
< 0
8.3 Proof of Proposition 21
Proof. The proof for proposition 21 is similar for both rms. Therefore, we
only present the proof for rm i.
First, comparing e2i jqih;qjl and e
2
i jqil ;qjl , and recalling i(ai; e
2
i ) = 'i(ai; e
2
i ),
we observe
@'2i
@e2i
jqih;qjl =
c
(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)
@'2i
@e2i
jqil ;qjl =
c
(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)
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Assuming across both cases rm i invests symmetrically, we observe
@'2i
@e2i
jqih;qjl <
@'2i
@e2i
jqil ;qjl
Given the assumptions made in A1 and A3, it must be that this implies that
rm i would like to: i) invest strictly more where it has developed a high
quality prototype; ii) invest strictly less where it has developed a low quality
prototype; or iii) some combination of i) and ii). Either way, when rm j has
developed a low quality prototype, rm i invests more when it has developed
a high quality prototype.
Second, comparing e2i jqih;qjh and e
2
i jqil ;qjh we observe
@'2i
@e2i
jqih;qjh =
2c
(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)
@'2i
@e2i
jqil ;qjh =
c
(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)
Again, a symmetric level of e¤ort cannot be observed. More formally, we nd
@'2i
@e2i
jqih;qjh <
@'2i
@e2i
jqil ;qjh
which implies e2i jqih;qjh > e
2
i jqil ;qjh .
Therefore, regardless of the prototype developed by rm j, rm i always
invests strictly more when it has developed a high quality prototype.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 23
Proof. The slope of rm is reaction function depends upon
@2ijt=1NV C
@(e2i )
2
=
@2'1i
@(e1i )
2
"
(1  '1j)(ih;ljt=2NV C   il;ljt=2NV C)
+'1j [
i
h;hjt=2NV C   il;hjt=2NV C ]
#
@2ijt=1NV C
@e1i@e
1
j
=
@'1i
@e1i
@'1j
@e1j
"  
ih;hjt=2NV C + il;ljt=2NV C

   ih;ljt=2NV C + il;hjt=2NV C
#
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Given assumptions A1, A3 and corollary 22 it must be that the former of
these equations is strictly negative. In contrast, corollary 22 is not su¢ cient
to determine the sign of the second order cross partial derivative. However,
we are able to determine that the second order cross partial derivative of rm
i is negative, and so e¤orts are treated as strategic substitutes, if and only if
ih;ljt=2NV C   il;ljt=2NV C > ih;hjt=2NV C   il;hjt=2NV C (8.4)
Given this, it is trivial to note that in the case of rm j e¤ort is treated as
strategic substitutes if and only if
jl;hjt=2NV C   jl;ljt=2NV C > jh;hjt=2NV C   jh;ljt=2NV C (8.5)
Where both of these equations are met both rms act as strategic substi-
tutes. If neither of these are met then both rms act as strategic complements.
Interestingly, it is possible that one treats e¤ort as a strategic substitute whilst
the other strategic complements.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 26
Proof. This proof is done for the case (qih; q
i
l) but holds for all other cases due
to assumptions A1, A3, A4 andM > 2DH > 2DL. Recall that this implies rm
i has received VC funding as the sole developer of a high quality prototype.
We solve the comparative statics using Cramers rule, or
Ax = b24 @2ih;ljt=2NVC@(e2i )2 @2ih;ljt=2NVC@e2i @e2j
@2jh;ljt=2NVC
@e2i @e
2
j
@2jh;ljt=2NVC
@(e2j )
2
35" de2idx
de2j
dx
#
=
"
 @2Ei
@e2i @x
  @2Ej
@ej2@x
#
where x could represent either venture capitalist e¤ort, E, or pecuniary fund-
ing, F .
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First, solving the comparative statics with respect to F , we nd
de2i
dF
=
Ae2iF 
jAj
=

 @
2ih;ljt=2V C
@e2i @F
@2ih;ljt=2V C
@e2i @e
2
j
 @
2ih;ljt=2V C
@ej2@F
@2jh;ljt=2V C
@(e2j )
2

@2ih;ljt=2V C
@(e2i )
2
@2ih;ljt=2V C
@e2i @e
2
j
@2jh;ljt=2V C
@e2i @e
2
j
@2jh;ljt=2V C
@(e2j )
2

where
jAj = @
2^2i
@ (e2i )
2
@2'2j
@
 
e2j
2 (1  ^2i )(M  DL) + ^2iDH (1  '2j)(M  DL) + '2jDH
 

@^2i
@e2i
2
@'2j
@e2j
2
[M  DL  DH ]2
and Ae2iF  = @^2i@e2i @^
2
i
@F

@'2j
@e2j
2
[M  DL  DH ]2
Given assumptions A1, A3, A4 and M > 2DH > 2DL, it is trivial thatAe2iF  > 0 but jAj is not so trivial to sign. However, it is possible to observe
that a unique and stable equilibrium exists if
1
jR0ij
>
R0j
holds. It turns out this this is the case if
@2^2i
@ (e2i )
2
@2'2j
@
 
e2j
2
( 
(1  ^2i )(M  DL) + ^2iDH

(1  '2j)(M  DL) + '2jDH
 )
>

@^2i
@e2i
2
@'2j
@e2j
2
[M  DL  DH ]2
Therefore, jAj is strictly positive too and therefore de2i
dF
> 0.
Similarly, the e¤ects of pecuniary funding on rm j can simply be derived
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fromAe2jF  =   @2^2i@ (e2i )2 @^
2
i
@F
@'2j
@e2j

(1  '2j)(M  DL) + '2jDH

[DH +DL  M ]
which is again strictly negative given assumptions A1, A3, A4 andM > 2DH >
2DL. Note that since the sign of jAj, positive, remains unchanged and so
de2j
dF
< 0.
Determining the impact of venture capitalist e¤ort is derived in a similar
way, with the sign on jAj still unchanged. For the sake of brevity, we simply
state
Ae2iE = @bi2@ei2 @bi2@E

@'j2
@ej2
2
[DH +DL  M ]2
  @
2bi2
@ei2@E
@2'j2
@e2j2
(
[(1  bi2)(M  DL) + bi2DH ]
(1  'j2)(M  DL) + 'j2DH
 ) > 0
Ae2jE =  @2bi2@e2i2 @bi2@E @'j2@ej2
(
[(1  'j2)(M  DL) + 'j2DH ]
[DH +DL  M ]
)
+
@2bi2
@ei2@E
@bi2
@ei2
@'j2
@ej2
( 
(1  'j2)(M  DL) + 'j2DH

[DH +DL  M ]
)
< 0
Again the signs of these equations are determined by assumptions A1, A3,
A4 and M > 2DH > 2DL. Given that
Ae2iE (Ae2jE) is strictly positive
(negative), it is easy to observe both de
2
i
dE
> 0 and
de2j
dE
< 0.
As it has already been noted, assumptions A1 - A4 cover all the possible
functional forms that may be present but assume that, whilst they are not
identical, they all act in a similar way. Consequently, the result of this case
extends to all other VC cases.
It is trivial to demonstrate that the equity stake, s, has no impact given
the rst order conditions are independent of s. Consequently, equity does not
impact upon the optimal investment decision and has no impact on either e2i
or e2j .
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8.6 Proof of Proposition 28
Proof. The proof of proposition 28 is complex simply because there are a
large number of cases to examine. However, given the almost identical nature
of the proofs, we only derive the result for the case in which s = h, or the rival
rm has developed a high quality prototype.
First, assume that rm j has developed a high quality prototype such that
the e¤ort ordering becomes
e2i jqih;qjhV Ci > e
2
i jqih;qjhjV Cj > e
2
i jqil ;qjh
Comparing e2i jqih;qjhV Ci to e
2
i jqih;qjhjV Cj we observe
@^2i
@e2i
jqih;qjh;V Ci =
c
(M  DL)  (1  2j)(M  DL  DH)
@2i
@e2i
jqih;qjh;V Cj =
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2j)(M  DL  DH)
When ai = aj and E = F = 0, it is obvious given assumptions A1 - A4
that the e¤ort levels are equal, e2i = e
2
j = e
. Furthermore, given the results
derived in remark 25 and proposition 26, it is known that should a rm receive
VC backing, any increases in venture capitalist e¤ort or funding will strictly
increase that rms investment levels and decrease that of its rival. Therefore,
starting from a purely symmetric case, ai = aj and E = F = 0, when rm i
receives venture capital, holding abilities constant, it must be that e2i > e
 >
e2j . Similarly, were rm j to receive funding, e
2
j > e
 > e2i . Therefore, it must
be that a rm invests more when it is VC-backed rather than its rival. The
addition of asymmetric abilities does nothing to alter this result.
Second, in the other relevant case, e2i jqih;qjhjV Cj > e
2
i jqil ;qjh , and after using
equation (4.3) we observe
@'2i
@e2i
jqih;qjh;V Cj =
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2j)(M  DL  DH)
@'2i
@e2i
jqil ;qjh =
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2j)(M  DL  DH)
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It is obvious that, for any given level of e¤ort by rm j, it must be that
@'2i
@e2i
jqih;qjh;V Cj <
@'2i
@e2i
jqil ;qjh
Therefore, it is the case in which rm i has developed a high quality prototype,
but not received VC funding, that yields a greater level of investment.
8.7 Proof of Proposition 30
Proof. The proof is determined by the relevant rst and second order equa-
tions, given by
@2ijt=1NV C
@(e2i )
2
=
@2'1i
@(e1i )
2

(1  '1j)

ih;ljt=2V C   il;ljt=2V C

+ '1j

1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

  il;hjt=2V C

@2ijt=1NV C
@e1i@e
1
j
=
@'1i
@e1i
@'1j
@e1j

1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

+ il;ljt=2V C

   ih;ljt=2V C + il;hjt=2V C
Given the prot ordering in corollary 29, it is obvious that the former of
these equations is negative. Consequently, the slope of the reaction function
is determined by the second order cross partial derivative. However, corollary
29 is not su¢ cient to determine the sign in this case. Given assumptions A1 -
A4, it is obvious that it is trivial to observe that the sign is determined by
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

+ il;ljt=2V C

   ih;ljt=2V C + il;hjt=2V C
which is negative, for both rms i and j, if and only if
ih;ljt=2V C >
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

+ il;ljt=2V C   il;hjt=2V C
jl;hjt=2V C >
1
2

jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj

+ jl;ljt=2V C   jh;ljt=2V C
Where both of these conditions are met, both rms treat e¤ort as strategic
substitutes.
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8.8 Proof of Remark 31
Proof. Solving these comparative statics by Cramers rule obtains
de1i
dx
=
Ae1i x
jAj
=

 @2ijt=1V C
@e2i @x
@2ijt=1V C
@e2i @e
2
j
 @2ijt=1V C
@ej2@x
@2j jt=1V C
@(e2j )
2

@2ijt=1V C
@(e2i )
2
@2ijt=1V C
@e2i @e
2
j
@2j jt=1V C
@e2i @e
2
j
@2j jt=1V C
@(e2j )
2

where x = E, F .
In both cases
jAj =

@2'1i
@(e1i )
2

@2'1j
@(e1j)
2

2666664
(
(1  '1j)

ih;ljt=2V C   il;ljt=2V C

+'1j
h
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

  il;hjt=2V C
i )
(
(1  '1i )

jl;hjt=2V C   jl;ljt=2V C

+'1i
h
1
2

jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj

  jh;ljt=2V C
i )
3777775
 

@'1i
@e1i
2@'1j
@e1j
2
2666664
( 
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

+ il;ljt=2V C

   ih;ljt=2V C + il;hjt=2V C
)
( 
1
2

jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj

+ jl;ljt=2V C

   jh;ljt=2V C + jl;hjt=2V C
)
3777775
Whilst this looks rather unpleasant and impossible to sign, the condition for
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uniqueness and stability,
R0i R0j < 1, yields

@2'1i
@(e1i )
2

@2'1j
@(e1j)
2

2666664
(
(1  '1j)

ih;ljt=2V C   il;ljt=2V C

+'1j
h
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

  il;hjt=2V C
i )
(
(1  '1i )

jl;hjt=2V C   jl;ljt=2V C

+'1i
h
1
2

jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj

  jh;ljt=2V C
i )
3777775
>

@'1i
@e1i
2@'1j
@e1j
2
2666664
( 
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

+ il;ljt=2V C

   ih;ljt=2V C + il;hjt=2V C
)
( 
1
2

jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj

+ jl;ljt=2V C

   jh;ljt=2V C + jl;hjt=2V C
)
3777775
Consequently, the sign on both comparative statics, E and F , depend on jAeiEj,AejE, jAeiF j , AejF .
For the sake of brevity, we simply o¤er the equations here:
jAeiEj =  

@jjt=1V C
@(e1j)
2
8><>:@'
1
i
@e1i
0B@ (1  '1j)@
i
h;ljt=2V C
@E
+'1j

1
2

@ih;hjt=2V Ci
@E
+
@ih;hjt=2V Cj
@E

  @
i
l;hjt=2V C
@E
 1CA
9>=>;
+
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@ijt=1V C
@e1i@e
1
j
8><>:@'
1
j
@e1j
0B@ (1  '1i )@
j
l;hjt=2V C
@E
+'1i

1
2

@jh;hjt=2V Ci
@E
+
@jh;hjt=2V Cj
@E

  @
j
h;ljt=2V C
@E
 1CA
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AejE =  @ijt=1V C@(e1i )2
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1
j
@e1j
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j
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@E
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j
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@E
 1CA
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@jjt=1V C
@e1j@e
1
i
8><>:@'
1
i
@e1i
0B@ (1  '1i )@
i
h;ljt=2V C
@E
+'1i

1
2

@ih;hjt=2V Ci
@E
+
@ih;hjt=2V Cj
@E

  @
i
l;hjt=2V C
@E
 1CA
9>=>;
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jAeiF j =  
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@F
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@F
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i
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Unfortunately, given that it is not possible to determine the magnitude of the
rst order conditions with respect to E or F , it is not possible to sign these
equations.
8.9 Proof of Proposition 32
Proof. Again, using Cramers rule we observe
de1i
ds
=
Ae1i s
jAj
=

 @2ijt=1V C
@e2i @s
@2ijt=1V C
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2
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where jAj is identical to that in remark 31. Thus, it is only the signs on
Ae1i s
and
Ae1js that are important. With come manipulation we obtain
jAeisj =  

@jjt=1V C
@(e1j)
2
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where
@ix;yjt=2V C
@s
< 0 8 x; y 2 fl; hg
Therefore, when rms treat e¤ort as strategic complements, or
@2ijt=1NV C
@(e2i )
2
< 0
@2ijt=1NV C
@e1i@e
1
j
> 0
we nd jAeisj and
Aejs are both strictly negative. Thus,
de1i
ds
< 0
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